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Thesis Abstract 
The safe extraction of shale gas resources has become a controversial issue in the energy sector 
and within energy law and policy circle.  These issues have transcended to other areas of the 
society such as the environment, public health, and geopolitics.  In fact, in environmental issue 
and regulation, it has become a norm in the minds of many that finding a model individual to 
do the right thing is a onerous task. One solution to this problem currently would be to realise 
the benefits energy resource extraction presents by devising the right regulatory strategies to 
improve the compliance level of those operating such risky activity to do the right thing. 
However, the strategic solutions to achieve the benefits are not that complex when compared 
with the strategic measures for achieving compliance to set regulatory standards for mitigating 
risks from energy extraction activity. This thesis argue for a complementary regulatory 
instrument mix (self-regulation and command & control regulatory strategies) to improve 
effective compliance for mitigating risks associated with energy extractive and consumption 
activities. 
One fundamental problem for this disparity is that the available regulatory strategies and 
approaches are fraught with diverse limitations that makes it unable to accommodate the 
dynamic of energy resource extraction. Also, industry and regulators of such activity’s 
dependence on regulatory approaches has been centred on command and control regulation 
that inhibits the incentive for the operator to go beyond the set standards. Hence, the urgency 
to devise an effective framework to balance costs that comes with the quest to relaise the 
benefits from resource extraction activities and the need for the preservation of the environment 
and health. Though achieving full compliance is far-fetched but optimal compliance is 
achievable within the context of collective participation amongst all industry players. 
One pragmatic means of achieving these conflicting interests within the global energy sector 
is through alternatives or a combination of regulatory instrument mixes (self-regulation and 
command and control regulation). This thesis intends that these alternatives should serve as 
complements to the command and control regulation and not to replace them. Such alternatives 
to regulation which this thesis argue and formulate that can help mitigate especially water 
contamination risk which has an increased frequency of occurrence is what it calls: ‘the 
risk/segment based strict liability rule.’ In addition, ‘self-regulation’ as a complement to 
command and control environmental regulation. While self-regulation helps to address the 
problem of information asymmetry that regulation grapple with, the risk based strict liability 
rule helps to address risks that have a highly probable or increased frequency level of 
occurrence. By risk based strict liability rule being proposed in this thesis, it means a risk from 
an activity can be subject to a strict liability cause of action without necessarily subjecting the 
entire activity to stricter environmental laws. This is based on the legal rationale that where 
particular risks’ has an increased frequency level of occurrence or the impacts could lead to 
transgenerational harm, it should be classified as abnormal. Therefore, should be subject to 
strict liability cause of action. Thus, the philosophy behind this thesis is to see how regulation 
can deal with particular risks under strict liability when they have an increased frequency to 
occur and not necessarily the entire activity. 
Thus, the significance of this thesis is that it resonates the ability of self-regulation and liability 
systems to direct the costs of the harms to those who create them. More so, these innovative 
policy options embedded in the properties of self-regulation and liability system will force 
operators to incur additional costs needed to forestall or control their actions that might result 
in externalities beyond the socially optimal level. Thus, environmental governance through 
self-regulatory and risk/segment liability rule systems as alternatives to command and control 
regulation will erode that complacency on the part of the creators of such possible negative 
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impacts to act sustainably. These alternatives to command and control regulation are cogent in 
mitigating risks associated with shale gas as an energy source on two grounds. 
Based on the above problems, this thesis shall examine the critical question of whether stricter 
environmental liability and regulatory approaches is required to achieve a sustainable shale gas 
extraction. Also, what other features should be included in these environmental protectionist 
tools to achieve effectiveness in managing water contamination and dispersed risks associated 
with fracking activity. This thesis, argue for a stricter liability and regulatory approach as a 
complement to the limitations of command and control regulation with some added features to 
address dispersed harms associated with energy extraction activity especially the risk of water 
contamination. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Understanding Shale Gas in Energy Law 
The energy industry has witnessed success in the exploration and development of 
unconventional resources as evidenced by shale gas boom.1 This, no doubt is a great way 
forward in the global energy sector in relation to the theoretical and technological innovation. 
Accordingly, the shale gas boom has to an extent broken the existing lower limit of 
conventional reservoir and the traditional idea of trap accumulation, and reinvested the 
geological theory of petroleum and gas with new connotations.2 This phenomenon has 
changed the dimension of exploration and development types and the amount of hydrocarbon 
resources. More so, it has overturned the postulations known as “peak oil” and “oil depletion”. 
Innovative application of massive technologies represented by multistage fracturing of 
horizontal wells has led to the advances in technology in the energy industry.3 Through these 
massive technologies that account for the shale gas revolution, America’s external 
dependence on oil and gas is said to be rapidly declining.4 The global energy structure is not 
left out in this significant alteration.  
Presently, shale gas exploitation in the United State (U.S) is rapidly expanding.5 A study by 
the U.S Energy Information Administration (EPA) which focused on the last decade of U.S 
shale gas production and made future projections,6 stated that during the period of 2014, 
production increased by eight hundred percent, of which shale gas accounted for ten percent 
of total U.S gas production, and over twenty percent of total remaining recoverable gas in the 
U.S will be discovered in shale basins.7 Thus, it will be difficult for any pundit to contest the 
economic benefits from the U.S experience.  
Likewise, countries within Europe, Asia and Africa. A typical example is Poland.  Previously, 
Poland was only seen as a large Coalbed Methane (CBM) producer.8 However, shale gas 
production since 2009 has received a lot more attention in Poland than their CBM resources.9 
According to documented estimates by an oil and gas group, Poland’s shale gas reserves could 
potentially be as high as forty-eight trillion cubic feet of natural gas.10 The estimated report 
coupled with other reports conducted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), corroborates 
the enormous undiscovered reserves that have attracted ExxonMobil, Lane Energy, Talisman, 
Chevron, and Aurelian Oil and Gas.11 Massive efforts towards exploration and production 
have already occurred even in the relatively short-time span between initial reports estimating 
                                                          
1Meng, Q. (2014). Modelling and prediction of natural gas fracking pad landscapes in the Marcellus Shale region, 
USA, Landscape Urban Planning. 121, pp.109-116. 
2Yongsheng, M, et al., (2018). China’s Shale Gas Exploration and Development: Understanding and Practice. 
Beijing: Geological Publishing House  Petroleum Exploration and Development, Volume 45, Issue 4 at p.589-603 
3Ibid. 
4See supra Meng, Q. (2014) footnote 1 p.116. 
5See supra Yongsheng, M, et al., (2018) footnote 2 at p.381. 
6U.S. Energy Information Administration, (2010). Annual Energy Outlook. [Online] 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdfl0383(2010).pdf. [Accessed On 23/06/2018] 
7Ibid at p.8. 
8See International Energy Agency [IEA]. (2010). Medium-Term Oil & Gas Markets, [Online] 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/mtogm2010.pdf [Hereinafter IEA] [Accessed 
04/05/2018]. 
9Ernest, W. (2011). Path to prosperity or ruin? Shale gas under scrutiny. PISM [hereinafter Polish Institute. of Int'l 
Affairs] p.18. 
10Ibid. 
11Susan, L. S. (2011). ‘The global shale gas initiative: Will the united states be the role model for the development 
of shale gas around the world? 33 Houston. Journal of. International Law. 369, 394. 
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the size of the reserves and the present day.12 The Polish government has granted over forty 
five exploration licenses for shale gas and is actively promoting drilling activities within its 
territory.13 
Whilst Poland within the European region is eager to explore and extract its shale resources, 
some countries like France have issued national moratoria toward the further exploration and 
production of shale gas.14 This is based on the environmental concerns stemming from 
groundwater contamination and landscape destruction. Finally, the EU has been less 
optimistic regarding shale gas development. Also, Bulgarian government released a 
memorandum on January 17, 2012 signalling its preparation for a “full ban on shale gas 
drilling against the backdrop of environmental concerns” too.15 The memorandum that was 
released by the Bulgarian government led to the cancellation of an exploratory permit given 
to Chevron for locating and preparing to drill shale gas in the North Eastern Bulgarian 
reservoir.16 Britain suspended deep-excavation practices near Blackpool as a result of an earth 
tremor measuring 2.3 on the Ritchers scale felt in the Lancashire seaside resort as well as an 
earth tremor measuring 1.5 scale in May, 2011.17  
Reasons such as environmental and health risks, economic prospects, basic infrastructure and 
market challenges are responsible for the setbacks in the development of shale gas in the 
context of energy law perspective in the EU and elsewhere. Among these reasons, 
environmental risks ranging from water contamination, earthquakes, air pollution, water use 
and community impacts have been a source of concern for the safe extraction of shale 
resources. Energy law in recent times have shifted from just addressing: how to generate 
electricity, mine coal, extract oil and gas, and distribute energy sources. Its focus has transcend 
to energy efficiency, demand side management, and the sustainable development of/use of 
energy.18 
Shale gas is an energy source and its risks and benefits must be regulated within the ambit of 
energy law and policy framework principles. This is crucial because energy law is the 
regulation of energy related rights and duties of various stakeholders over energy resources 
over the energy life-cycle.19 Nevertheless, for energy law to further develop, and to be 
effective, it must take into account the advances in society in terms of technology and the 
inevitability of risks emanating from such technological advancement. This twist is more 
evident in the energy industry as the energy law regulatory framework strategies have failed 
to address these growing level of risks emanating from technological advances in the shale 
gas extractive industry. 
                                                          
12See supra Meng, Q. (2014) footnote 1 at p.109. 
13Neil, B. (2012). Resources: Shale gas will have its day in Europe-but not just yet, Financial Times (8: 50 PM), 
[Online] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b56d8b2-1c42-11e2-a63b-00144feabdco.html#axzz2nnxvgwfw  (noting 
that while Poland proceeds with shale development, several countries have delayed or banned exploration). [Ac-
cessed on 20/05/2018]. 
14Ibid. 
15Marcin, S. (2011). ‘Resistance to Poland's shale gas exploration plans emerging’ Wall Street Journal. [Online] 
http:/www.iblogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2011/08/05/resistance-to-poland's-shale-gas-exploration-plans-
emerging [Accessed 02/04/2018]. 
16Tsvetelia, T. (2012). ‘Bulgaria Cancels Chevron Shale Gas Permit’ Reuters [Online] http://www.reuters.comlart 
cle/2012/01/17/us-bulgaria-shalegas-chevronidustre80g18j20120117. [Accessed on 18/05/2018] 
17Ibid. 
18Heffron, J. R. et al., (2018). A treatise for energy law, Journal of World Energy and Business, at p.39-46; AJ 
Bradbrook and RD Wahnschaft, The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development (CUP 2005). 
19Heffron, J. R & Talus, K. (2016). “The evolution of energy law and energy jurisprudence: Insights for energy 
analysts and researchers, Energy Research & Social Science 19, pp.1-10.  
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However, the geological and formation differences associated with shale plays across the 
world present different nature and degree of increased frequencies of risks. For example, in 
the US, there is said to be a concern over increased frequency of water contamination.20 In 
China, an increased frequency of earthquake risks has caused a clog in the wheel of 
development of shale gas resources.21 The United Kingdom (UK) share similar experience as 
well as the fact that most of its shale reserves are located just directly below water aquifers. 
Based on these increased frequency of risks and the transgenerational harm associated with 
the extraction of shale gas, this thesis argues that such increased frequency of risk associated 
with an activity provokes a need for stricter environmental liability and regulatory regime for 
the mitigation of risks. It is the argument of this thesis that where such increased frequency 
level of risk that leads to transgenerational harm is prevalent in an activity, it connotes a high 
probability of risk occurring which automatically makes that activity to be abnormally 
dangerous. Therefore, a strict environmental liability and regulatory regime will encourage 
operators of such activity to go beyond the C&C regulatory standards. This in turn, promotes 
the incentives for industry to self-regulate which acts as indirect regulation. 
To this end, this thesis formulates a new rule known as the ‘risk/segment based strict liability 
rule’ to mitigate increased frequency of risks associated with an activity on one hand. In 
addition, the thesis proposed a self-regulatory approach as a complement to command and 
control otherwise known as a prescriptive form of regulation. C&C creates a problem whereby 
perpetuators of harms might be shielded from liability on the basis that they have satisfied the 
set standards and requirements for carrying out such activity. This thesis postulates that using 
the ‘risk/segment based strict liability rule’ and the properties of ‘self-regulation’, activities 
that present highly probable risks, would be made liable even though they have complied with 
the set standards. 
This thesis provides support for a complementary approach for environmental regulation 
using the risk/segment based strict liability rule and self-regulation to improve the role of 
C&C regulatory approach in mitigating increased frequency of risk associated with an activity 
on the ground that--risk that have a high probability rate of occurring should be categorized 
as abnormal and subject to a stricter environmental liability cause of action.  
An identification of good principles will be explored to determine whether a given activity is 
best reserved to be controlled by liability or regulation. The very essence of this is to avoid 
wasting time on the already contentious debates about whether additional regulation is 
required, but rather will focus on useful discussions on how both systems can be made more 
resilient in reducing risks associated with energy extraction activities. While enough options 
in terms of policy initiatives exist for improving shale gas regulation, the options for 
improving liability systems has not been sufficiently examined. This, needs to be addressed 
considering the significant role liability play in ensuring and encouraging the exercise of care 
by operators and thus managing the risks involved. 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to clearly contribute to energy law and policy formulation by 
stating that in order to reduce the increased frequency levels of risks associated with water 
contamination in shale gas fracturing and other sources of energy extractive activity, it is 
                                                          
20Rozell, D. J & Reaven, S.J. (2012). Water pollution risk associated with natural gas extraction from the 
Marcellus shale, Risk Analysis, Volume 32, Issue 8 [Online] 
http://www.otsego2000.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/Water_Pollution_Risks_Associated_wtih_Marcellus_S
hale-3.pdf (Accessed on 23/02/2017). 
21China Youth Daily. (2013). China should approach shale with caution. Retrieved from Tencent News Editorial: 
http://view.news.qq.com/a/20130506/000048.htm (Accessed on 23/02/2018) 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
4
imperative that stricter environmental and liability approaches and the promotion of the tenets 
of self-regulation are included in the energy policy measures to mitigate risks that may arise 
as technologies advances in society. Thereby, upholding the energy law principle to protect 
the environment, human health and combatting climate change of which certain risks of shale 
gas extraction pose a threat as evidenced in water use and contamination and earth tremors 
and quakes in regions most likely to be prone to them. A typical example, is China where 
there are increased frequency level of earthquakes and in the UK where groundwater 
contamination and earth tremors concerns have raised agitations where test sites exists. 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to modern energy law in that it resonates the urgency for 
reviewing the present risk mitigating measures in the global energy sector that has been 
overturned by advances in technologies in the industry. New strategies that are self-sustaining 
are needed if energy law which is about regulation of the rights and duties of stakeholders 
and promotion of energy justice and prudent, rational and sustainable use of natural resources 
needs to be proactive in tackling the attendant issues highly probable risks. Thus, this thesis 
states that as long as human activity is concerned risk is inevitable and as such the strategies 
to mitigate these risks must be strengthened. Otherwise the seven principles of modern energy 
law which include the: the principle of natural resource sovereignty; the principle of access 
to modern energy services; the principle of energy justice, the principle of prudent, rational 
and sustainable use of natural resources; principle of the protection of the environment, 
human health and combatting climate change; the principle of energy security and reliability 
and the principle of resilience.22 These principles will be defeated in achieving its purpose in 
the energy law if the subject of risk mitigation is not strengthened further beyond the 
traditional C&C form of regulation and the implementation of stricter liability regimes. 
This is crucial in that at the core of energy law is the regulation of energy carriers and energy 
activities which pertain to rights and duties of various stakeholders over energy resources. 
This very foundation of energy law fits perfectly with the objective of this thesis which is to 
foster effective compliance with set regulatory and liability systems for the purposes of 
building up on some of the principles of energy law as discussed by Raphael J.Heffron and 
others in their article titled “A treatise for energy law”.23 Particularly, the principle of 
prudent, rational and sustainable development of natural resources and the protection of 
environment. Thus, by improving compliance through the deployment of self-regulatory and 
stricter liability measures in mitigating risks from energy activities, goes to further strengthen 
specifically the principles mentioned above through sound regulatory policy objectives. 
Thus, the use of stricter liability and self-regulatory approaches in mitigating risks from 
energy activities also has direct reference and relevance to the pursuit of the Millennium 
Development Goals from 200024 expanded by the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 201525 to cover among other issues energy and the 
use of natural resources directly. Sustainable use of natural resources and the environmental 
protection requires the integration of effective compliance policy framework, in particular, 
with a view to promoting risk mitigation. This in turn, contribute to the pursuit of preserving, 
protecting and improving among others the prudent and rational utilization of natural 
                                                          
22See supra Rozell, D.J & Reaven, S. J. (2012) footnote 20 at p.9. 
23Ibid. 
24UN Res A/55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted on 18 September 2000. 
25UN Res A/70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted on 21 
October 2015. 
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resources, and combatting climate which forms the basis for energy justice as a principle of 
energy law.  
1.2 Research Problem 
The occurrence of accidents with widespread consequences are inevitable even if there is the 
exercise of reasonable care for an industry that operates on such a large scale like fracking. 
The shale gas industry reflects a typical scenario where either the technology has developed 
fast beyond human capabilities in tackling associated risks or where C&C regulation have 
proved ineffective in improving compliance to set regulatory standards. 
Looking at the regulatory structure for most oil and gas extracting nations, it is evident that 
the available regulatory and liability regimes could not respond adequately in addressing the 
science-based concerns about energy development in the energy extractive industry.26 This 
alone is a great problem that needs attention if the development of shale gas is to be carried 
out in a more cost effective and environmentally efficient manner. 
In addition, the determination of the level of care required by the courts in the event of harm 
is still very difficult to achieve. This is borne out of the fact that shale gas development 
activity just like other sources of energy occurs underground, where only the operator has 
control over the equipment underground and understands better the complexities involved. 
Thus, to know what is going on underground solely depends on what the operator decides to 
reveal. Because of this, a pragmatic liability approach is required to augment the 
shortcomings in C&C regulation whereby operator may be shielded from liability where they 
have complied with set standards. However, liability system has its own weaknesses in 
managing risks associated with energy source development, for example, many operators are 
small independents whose financial assets may be inadequate to cover all damage awards.  
As a result, both regulatory regimes as well as the liability system’s applicability in the shale 
gas development industry needs to be improved upon by addressing some of these weak 
elements so that each system can play a symbiotic role in addressing recurring risks involved 
in the extraction of energy resources. Especially, regarding the aspects that has to do with the 
level of compliance regulated entities should show toward risk mitigation in the energy 
industry. Compliance with regulatory set standards has become key debate in the energy 
sector especially as technology is advancing rapidly and the existing regulatory or liability 
apparatus is not adaptive to the tide of change occurring in the sector. More pathetic is the 
fact that in instances where full compliance with regulatory requirements is achieved, the 
policy outcomes is not achieved. These two elements (compliance and policy outcome 
objective) in regulatory design are what forms the bedrock of an effective regulation. For a 
better illustration of this, see section 4.5.3 in Chapter IV between the case of Amocco 
Yorktown plant and the U.S EPA where regulation requires that certain technology is to be 
installed in the smokestack of the plant to reduce benzene emissions level. It was discovered 
through a later study by an independent party that the smokestack was not where the largest 
quantity of benzene were being emitted. That Amocco would not have spent the amount of 
money they used in installing the technology just to comply with such prescriptive traditional 
regulation. This kind of situation is what necessitates a complementary regulatory instrument 
mix to ensure full compliance with environmental liability and regulatory standards. 
                                                          
26Benjamin, J. R & Stephen, W. (2006). Environmental Law for Sustainability: A Reader. Hart Publishing, 
Portland, p.361. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
The exploration and exploitation of Unconventional Oil and Gas (UOG) in shale formations 
through the process of hydraulic fracking technology has raised series of issues ranging from 
legal, economic, socioeconomic, and environmental to geopolitical within the global energy 
sector. More so, the entire industry fabric is plagued with contentious dissenting opinions as 
to whether the process of shale gas development should commence and why it should not. 
Either way, the commencement or discontinuance of the activity in regions yet to tap into this 
resource is dependent primarily on building effective strategies for improving the extant 
regulations on shale gas extraction. 
One basic strategy to this end is to formulate a joint system rather than a one-size-fits all 
strategy. However, to achieve this goal, the following key research question and sub-research 
questions are crucial to finding a likely route to the sustainable development of shale gas. 
The main research question is as follow: 
 Whether shale gas extraction activity should be subject to a strict environmental 
liability and regulatory regime to achieve a sustainable shale gas development? 
This research will also answer the following two sub-research questions: 
1. When should liability be appropriate and adequate, and when is regulation required in 
mitigating shale gas risks vice versa? 
2. What other features should be included in the systems to ensure effectiveness and 
efficiency in managing shale gas risks? 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
High Volume Hydraulic Fracking (HVHF) is just like any other oil and gas extractive 
technique in that it presents a number of negative health and environmental impacts. 
However, there are some impacts that fracking presents that seem to be quite peculiar to the 
industry alone. A closer look at the varying opinions regarding these impacts, it suffice to say 
that hydraulic fracking ought to be properly regulated in terms of the nature of liability of the 
operator to ensure safe resource development.  
In view of this, this thesis aims to discuss on how best to improve the concept of legal liability 
and regulation as tools for improving environmental requirement compliance. More so, the 
work is aimed at proposing a ‘risk/segment based strict liability rule’ to enforce a systematic 
behavioural pattern amongst shale gas operators. Contrary to the position of many who have 
been following the evolving intrigues that has characterised the debate, this work is novel in 
the sense that it will take further step in distilling the ingredients that illustrate fracking 
technique as an activity which should warrant a stricter regulatory and liability response in 
mitigating risks within the context of energy law and policy perspective.  
The argument that shale gas should not be subject to a stricter liability regime, shall be 
weighed against the factors which were promulgated in the various Restatement Acts27 and 
compare them with the operation of shale gas fracking activity. A different definition of what 
an abnormally dangerous activity is from the perspective of the author shall be attempted 
relying on the concept of what the author terms ‘transgenerational harm’ and the frequency 
of risks occurring theory. The focus of this thesis is to develop framework policies to further 
improve compliance through liability and complementary regulatory systems to promote an 
                                                          
27See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for physical & emotional harm (2010); Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Apportionment of Liability. (2000); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products. Liability. (1998). 
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effective and efficient means of mitigating shale gas extracting risks associated with slick-
water hydraulic fracking technology. 
In sum, the objective is to steer regulated entities in the energy industry towards public policy 
objective in mitigating risks resulting from extractive activities in the most effective and 
efficient way that compliance and policy outcomes is achieved, without necessarily distorting 
greatly with corporate autonomy and profit. Once this kind of regulatory framework is 
promoted, the syndrome of fruitless expenditure of government and business resources on 
traditional C&C styles of regulation that ignore the effects of self-regulatory orderings is 
addressed. The success of self-regulatory and strict liability systems as environmental 
regulatory and liability tools is strongest in environmental, occupational health and safety 
and financial services regulation.28  
1.5 Hypotheses 
Both liability and regulatory systems have been designed as environmental and health 
protective tools in industrial societies. However, these systems have witnessed divergent 
interpretation and application. As such, this thesis shall consider two thoughts that explore in 
detail the various arguments as to their appropriateness to address environmental and health 
risks in certain situations. This will be done in-order to develop the ideal hypotheses for the 
reader to follow the entire structure and objective of this thesis. The key question of whether 
fracking is an abnormally dangerous activity for the purposes of warranting a critical 
appraisal of both liability systems appears to be based on certain legal policy requirements. 
This big question turns on a smaller one: whether accidents in fracking are avoidable or 
unavoidable. These hypotheses shall be based on two thoughts:  
The Rationale for Stricter Liability and Regulatory Application:  
Indeed, different thoughts exist regarding the application of stricter liability and regulatory 
policy analysis by the courts. A judge postulates that the essence of strict liability is to 
compensate the plaintiff in situations where negligence cannot address the claim in that 
‘causation’ as a legal prerequisite is difficult to prove.29 Other scholars have argued for a 
more liberal use of stricter liability regimes. In fact, one commentator vehemently suggested 
that the high transaction costs in incidents characterised by low losses and the interactive 
situation should form the only two reasons for rejecting a more inclusive liability 
application.30 The issue of a more guaranteed accountability for accidents has formed part of 
the reasoning why some advocate for a stricter liability regime widely in contrast to 
strengthening the existing regulatory institutions for the task of managing environmental and 
health risks accordingly.31 
Moreover, the concept of a liability system, boxes “rational actors” who will bear the cost of 
harms that they cause into taking all cost effective precautionary measures that are within 
their reach to economise on liability.32 Thus, a party who is held strictly liable for harm caused 
by his or her actions is then forced to make efficient and dynamic market decisions so as to 
                                                          
28Aalders, M & Wilthgaten, T. (1997). “Moving beyond command and control: Reflexivity in the regulation of 
occupation health and safety and the environment” Law & Policy Volume 19. pp. 415-443. 
29William, L. P. (1953). The Principle of Ryland V. Fletcher. In: selected topics on the law of torts 135, 147 (Judge 
Posner made the comment also made the statement). 
30William K J. (1992). ‘Strict Liability for Hydraulic Hazardous Enterprise’, 92 Colum. l.Rev. 1705, 1709; Ryland 
V. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (Detailing how Ryland established the strict liability doctrine) at p.1754. 
31Ibid at p.1753. 
32Alan, O. S. (2007). ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor’, 74 u. Chi. l. Rev. 1911, 1918 at p.19. 
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internalise the cost of the damage incurred by its risky activity.33 Several scholars believe 
that, unlike regulation, holding operators in shale gas extraction strictly liable for water 
contamination is more effective in deterring socially harmful conduct. Hence, the concept of 
strict liability should be invoked and applied mostly during water contamination accidental 
injury.34  
The allocation of risk principle35 is another rationale for the liberal application of a more 
inclusive liability system under these hypotheses. The risk principle is based on fairness in 
that if the party thinks that it is appropriate to create an abnormal or undue risk of harm to 
members of particular community, it is also appropriate that that party is strictly made 
responsible for any harm caused.36 More importantly, stringent liability regime creates room 
for the actor to avoid accidents by foreclosing any opportunity for defence an actor may hide 
behind.37 This foreclosure, forces the actor to experiment with methods aimed at preventing 
accidents prior to the commencement of the activity. Such experimental methods could 
include relocating from earlier intended sites, changing, or reducing the activity causing the 
accident.38  
Given these rationales for the proposition of pragmatic policy options for developing a 
liability and regulatory systems to reduce the occurrence of harms from HVHF technology, 
two key hypotheses are made: 
 That achieving the required state of change (successful transformation from 
frequently occurring risks in energy extraction to an acceptable level) that the present 
industry requires, will continue to be far-fetched if attempts at managing these 
challenges remain focused on the bane of improving weak regulatory institutions and 
the incorporation of Best Available Techniques (BATs) to resource extraction among 
others, to the exclusion of the problem of applying a more holistic approach including 
stricter liability, regulatory measures and policy interventions as an undoubtedly 
strong governance structure for risk mitigating mechanisms so that industry can 
regulate themselves to an extent. 
 That the challenges of the HVHF technique can only be addressed if strong liability 
regimes are established to govern the operations of actors in the industry to the point 
that: (1) the choice of ensuring safety is in-built into the system such that it is the 
actors themselves that decide particular locations that are fit for fracking activities 
instead of relying on BATs which may not be ideal for particular activity. This is 
because they were formulated from activities which do not bear direct relationship to 
fracking sometimes; and (2) actors of such abnormally dangerous activities are not 
incentivised to pay for the cost of damage but are forced to adopt effective measures 
to forestall such risks from occurring regularly or completely avoid them. 
                                                          
33Nathan, R. H. (2010). ‘The feasibility of applying strict liability principle to carbon capture and storage’, 49 
Washburn L.J. 527, 537-38 at p.539. 
34U.S. Department of Energy., (2004). ‘Hydraulic Fracturing White Paper A’ -1[hereinafter doe white paper 
2004], at p. 1709. [Online] 
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_append_a_doe_whitepaper.Pdf. (Accessed 02/2/ 
2017). 
35Norman, J. H. (2001). Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production (2nd Ed) 
423–24 at p.538. 
36Ibid at pp.538-9. 
37See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. V. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990). 
38Ibid. 
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Accordingly, the first hypothesis creates a point of departure that guarantees a self-regulatory 
mechanism into the industry that ensures that industry actors themselves are responsible for 
making the right decisions to ensure the avoidance of risk of harm that characterise such 
economic activities like shale gas fracking in the energy industry. The actors do the 
investigations prior to the commencement of the activity instead of relying on external 
regulatory institutions who may not adequately understand the complexities involved in 
handling the technical safety of the operations in Unconventional Oil and Gas Extraction 
(UOGE) through hydraulic fracking technique. The second hypothesis authenticates the push 
for a stringent liability regime (strict) on one hand. On the other hand, it eradicates the 
rationale put forward by opponents of the principle that one may not know the complexities 
involved in a new technology like fracking since it has not been given an opportunity to 
operate before campaigning for a complete ban of the activity. The industry is relatively as 
old as the present wave of industrialisation in the world at large. It would be misleading to 
assume that the impacts of shale gas extraction cannot be categorised as abnormally 
dangerous when it is weighed against other negative risks that emanate from other extractive 
techniques. This leads to the conclusion that building a very robust liability and regulatory 
system transforms the complexities involved in new technologies that threatens the health 
and environmental needs of any resource rich nation. 
1.6 Significance and Contributions of the Study 
One important issue facing modern societies is how to avoid severe, presumably cataclysmic, 
harm to the natural environment. The reasons behind such harm are not only complex but 
controversial, and they arise from a wide spectrum of economic and social pressures. The 
results are evidenced in the apparent pollution, land degradation, deforestation, ozone 
depletion, climate change, and the loss of biological diversity which creates severe and, in 
some cases, transgenerational impacts to the planet that is required to sustain us. 
Consequently, it has been argued that the window of opportunity to avert these ecological 
disasters is rapidly closing in, and that in some cases, it may already be too late to prevent 
ongoing health implications and environmental degradation.39  
One solution to manage these severe risks associated with resource extraction from energy 
law and policy perspective is to strengthen regulatory strategies that ensures a higher level of 
compliance to regulation and promote the ideal for operators to internalize the cost through 
a stricter and robust liability regime.40 However, in today’s world, all indices point to the fact 
that recent technological advancements have presented a situation where direct regulation 
can no longer adapt to the changing dynamic of technology in several fields of discipline. 
One area where this miscarriage is so evident is in the extractive industry. Regulation is said 
to have been operating from a distance rather than taking the centre stage in mitigating the 
attendant risks. More pathetic is the fact that companies, and not regulators, decide on the 
details on safety governance, production technology, and quality of product.  
The issue of information asymmetry has been the fundamental reason behind this twist in the 
governance of safety and quality of production technology in the shale gas extractive 
industry. This invariably leads to the ineffectiveness seen presently in today’s regulatory 
environment surrounding energy extractive activities. Given the room to re-regulate, how can 
we attempt to further strengthen the effectiveness of regulation without forfeiting the benefits 
                                                          
39Selcuk, B & Ikbal, S. (2016). ‘New horizon in energy’: Shale gas. Journal of Natural Gas Science & Engineering 
Volume 35, Part A. 
40Aven, T & Ylonen, M. (2014). ‘Safety regulations: Implications of the new risk perspectives.  Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, Volume 149, pp.164-171. 
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resource extraction activity offers? Put another way, how can we re-regulate to balance the 
conflicting needs between what is beneficial to society and what is beyond the socially 
optimal level of harm to the same society? These underscores the significance of this 
research.  
To deal with these questions, it is the assumption of this thesis that regulation can be more 
effective and improved upon if it does not neglect the strategic regulatory approaches which 
will force the industry to self-regulate. This is important because indirect control otherwise 
known as self-regulation is compatible with controlling dispersed harms associated with 
highly risky outcomes that characterize energy extractive activities. It is also ideal in that it 
reduces the uncertainty in immature technologies as well as addressing the asymmetric 
information syndrome prevalent in resources extractive technologies. These problems 
provoke a strong incentive for regulatory subversion or capture by the operator.41 Thus, one 
way to achieve an indirect control through regulation is to impose stricter environmental 
liability measure using the ‘risk based strict liability rule’ formulated in this thesis. 
Particularly, this will help in mitigating the increased frequency of risks identified in shale 
gas extractive activity. 
Given these advantages, how can environmental regulation overcome the shortcomings 
inherent in indirect or self-regulatory approach in mitigating risks associated with resource 
extractive technique like fracking? Unlike other scholars42 that have proposed or argued 
vaguely that regulators could better manage the risks to water contamination from fracking 
activities by strengthening regulatory safeguards, incentivising research, clarifying tort 
responsibility and using insurance mandates to ensure compensation and remediation.43 This 
thesis proposes indirect regulation or self-regulatory approaches through specific strategies 
to overcome the shortcomings of direct regulatory approaches suggested to mitigate the risks 
of dispersed harms.  
Again, considering the widespread ban on fracking technology within States in the U.S44 and 
within the EU due to its environmental impacts, this thesis aims to develop a framework that 
will strengthen the entire gamut of energy law and policy in regulating risks to a socially 
optimal level. Also, it precludes the operator of a dangerous activity to be shielded from 
liability simply because he has adhered to the prescribed best practices or regulatory 
requirements. On the reverse side, operators of shale gas activity will be given the social 
license to operate as members of the public are quite confident that justice would be done if 
harm occurs by eroding the difficulty in proving the liability of the operator. 
Prior efforts to mitigate certain risks associated with extractive activities through regulation 
and liability fell short in capturing the effectiveness required for achieving a socially optimal 
level of harm. For example, Shavell Steven in his work 45 clearly outlined the issues that 
confronted the tasks of mitigating risks. Such issues include: information asymmetry; 
inability of a judgment debtor to pay; the cost involved in suing an alleged defaulter; and 
threat to suit. He vehemently argued that the issues of energy and environment are 
fundamentally entrenched in an indissoluble nexus with multiple dimensions that, in turn, 
                                                          
41Ibid at p.279. 
42Cecot C. (2016). ‘Fractured Systems: A Multiple Policy Proposal for Promoting Safe Shale Gas Delivery in the 
United State’ In: Raphael J. Heffron & Gavin F.M. Little (2016). Delivering Energy Law and Policy in the EU 
and US: A Reader (ed), Edinburgh University Press, United Kingdom at p.334. 
43Ibid. 
44Loftis, R. (2013). Dallas Oks gas drilling rules that are among the nation’s tightest’ Dallas News. [Online] 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2013/12/11/dallas-oks-gas [Accessed 08/08/2017]. 
45See supra Nathan R. H. (2010) footnote 33. 
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exert asymmetric influence over divergent stakeholders and settings and occur at different 
spectrums and physical scales. Having done that, Shavell did not take a definite stance on the 
issue of the best tool between liability and regulation in mitigating risks associated with 
resource extraction. 
Rather he proposed a combination of both by highlighting the merits and demerits in both 
tools. Also, Caroline Cecot in her article ‘Fractured Systems: Multi Policy Proposal for 
Promoting Safe Shale Gas Delivery in the United State’46 clearly toed the line of argument 
by proposing multi policy strategies. The work identified the use of liability, regulation and 
financial liability schemes such as the establishment of “Superfunds”, which obligates 
operators to contribute to the fund. In her recommendations, she suggests that operators with 
the greatest default should be made to contribute more. However, their work did not contain 
specific strategic policy options that might address the issues of dispersed harms that are 
associated with shale gas fracking just like every other energy extractive activity. Further, 
they47 did not clearly recommend a system that would strengthen the effectiveness of 
regulation by ensuring compliance without the regulatory institution closely monitoring the 
operators of such risky activity. It is based on these overarching premises that this thesis 
builds upon, to provide specific policy options that might help to address the asymmetric 
influence over diverse stakeholders as prevalent in the industry. Furthermore, this thesis seeks 
to add to the collection of solutions Shavell proposed for each of the problems that confronts 
regulation and liability systems. Thus, the thesis contribution to the available literature 
regarding safe shale gas extraction has the following ramifications discussed below. 
This research argues for a combination of policy proposals for strengthening the existing 
regulatory system. Specifically, the work proposed and agreed with some of the suggestions 
of scholars that for there to be a reduced level of risks, regulators need to clarify tort 
responsibility. This is true because stricter measures of liability forces the operator to devise 
internal management arrangements to reduce risks that are highly probable to occur. It makes 
them go beyond the regulatory set standards and best practices that are applicable in the 
energy industry. However, this thesis seems to be quite bold in arguing for a strict liability to 
be applied to fracking risks where water contamination claims is involved by adducing 
evidence that suggest that this is the most prominent risk. The legal rationale for this is 
anchored on the argument that water contamination risks have an increased frequency level 
of occurrence. Also, on the premise that water is a special commodity which ought to be 
protected in line with the objective of the United Nation (UN) Millennium Development 
Goals.48 
More so, energy development is the most rapid growing consumer of water in the US.49 And 
any attempt to prioritise gas as an energy source over water means that the very essence of 
living would disintegrate as the status of water and energy are distinct and contribute 
immensely to the aspects of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, if 
strict liability is applied to water contamination claims, it would make operators to be more 
certain before introducing technologies which have great and transgenerational negative 
impacts to society. 
                                                          
46See supra Loftis, R. (2013) footnote 44. 
47See Aven, T; & Ylonen, M. (2014) foot note 40; Caroline Cecot (2016) foot note 42. 
48Dorling, D. (2013). Population 10 Billion: The coming demographic crisis and how to survive it. United 
Kingdom, Constable and Robinson Ltd Press. 
49United Nations (2014) ‘Water and Energy’. The United Nations World Water Development Report Volume 1, 
[Online] http://www.unesdoc.org/images/0022/002257/2254741e.pdf (Available 20/07/,2018) 
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Furthermore, this thesis makes a novel contribution on how to solve the issue of liability 
claims when it comes to dispersed harms from oil and gas extractive activities like shale gas. 
Dispersed harms from extractive activities presents a situation where potential plaintiff(s) are 
unable to sue a defendant-operator(s) as they often find it difficult in identifying the actual 
defendant that caused their injury. This indirectly gives the operator the incentive to continue 
the polluting act. Some of such dispersed risks could be air and groundwater contamination. 
This thesis contributes by specifically identifying the independent segregated licensing 
scheme to address this difficulty faced by potential plaintiffs. By this, this thesis sets out that 
when issuing licenses for exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons, the relevant licensing 
authority should designate a large area to an individual licensee where by other license 
holders can trace their rights to the original license holder. So, in the event of a dispersed air 
or groundwater contamination where the source is unknown, it affords the plaintiff to sue for 
liability claims connecting that harm to the original license holder. This resonates the joint 
and several liability rule under tort law and thus clearing any ambiguity surrounding the 
perpetuator of the alleged harm and addressing the ‘threat to suit’ problem inherent in direct 
forms of regulation. 
This thesis made another contribution in addressing the information asymmetry syndrome 
and the inability to pay/judgment proof defendant problem which accounts for the regulatory 
subversion or capture and the shortcoming of liability systems in mitigating risks by 
suggesting self-regulatory policy interventions. To address the information asymmetry, each 
well should have an ‘independent well assessor’ whose responsibility is to report directly to 
the regulatory institution. Whereas, a model known as the ‘Polluter Does Not Pay’ is 
proposed to tackle the inability to pay/judgement proof defendant. How this works is that the 
plaintiff who is unable to recover in damages against the defendant because the defendant’s 
available assets cannot cover the judgement sum, the plaintiff can recover same from the 
government who in the first place gave the judgement debtor the license to engage in the 
activity that caused the said harm. This model will only work for most legal systems where 
the ownership of mineral rights resides with the government. The government in turn may 
recover same from the mother-company or benefit from the insurance or bonding cover in 
place. For detailed discussion, see Chapter V under sub section 5.3. 
1.7 Methodology  
A comparative study on shale gas extraction activity’s and its associated risks is adopted in 
this research. The focus of this research is to promote the effectiveness of environmental 
regulation and liability in mitigating such risks. This thesis complements the existing 
initiatives and strategies to enhance synergies and encourages coordination in the 
implementation of regulatory requirements; and reinforces the connectivity struck between 
regulation and liability systems.  
1.7.1 The Single Case Study Approach 
Researchers often run into the risk of contradiction whilst embarking on case study research. 
This can be further exacerbated by the varying legal, economic, cultural and socio-economic 
variables existing in each selected case study. In other words, what might apply for A to 
achieve success can be remarkably different for B. Therefore, scholars end up making 
assumptions instead of arriving at a definite solution to address a particular existing problem.  
Conversely, in a single case study methodology in research, that particular country example 
is explored and examined. All the factors that accounts for either the success or failure of that 
system in that single jurisdiction is peculiar to that region alone. Thus, it makes it easier for 
countries to study that country in question by looking for similarities and differences where 
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necessary. Once, these similarities are found it would be either easier to replicate the same 
level of success or avoid the errors committed by the other country.  
Also, single case study research methodology provides the opportunity for change in the 
positive direction by the other party who intends to adopt or reject the lessons drawn from the 
case study before it goes beyond the capabilities of the country seeking to apply the outcomes 
from the sister country. These makes single case study approach in research methodology 
important especially in the energy resource extraction industry that is more susceptible to 
frequent changes. However, single case study research forecloses the opportunity for a 
different analysis to be explored that have similar intervening indices. This is crucial because 
the opportunity for changing the course of event is totally jeopardized as multi case study 
approach might expose new adaptive ways of resolving issue(s) which single case study 
approach would not have revealed in the first place. This is a fundamental weakness of a 
single case study research methodology. 
Having said that, it is important to quickly give a brief overview of the U.S context in terms 
of energy related matters and why this thesis chose to focus more on U.S regarding the 
discussions on shale gas extraction risks. The reason is quite simple. The U.S is the first 
country that took the bold step in introducing the technology used for extracting these 
unconventional oil and gas resources. Also, the literatures reveals that indeed success have 
been recorded as well as failures. In addition, the U.S mineral rights is such that attributes 
autonomy to individual states to regulate the activities of oil and gas extraction within their 
territory with the exception of federal lands. Thus, there seem to be wide spectrum of 
complexities because of the nature of legal regime that regulate energy resource extraction for 
which shale gas plays a part. Each state have different regulatory approach that govern them. 
This in itself, makes it quite interesting in choosing the U.S and its states as a case study in 
this thesis. 
More importantly the U.S is being used as a case study because of the autonomy each states 
has in making their own environmental regulations and environmental protection programmes 
applicable to the oil and gas sector. The unique phenomenon about the laws in each states’ 
environmental programmes are often influenced by several factors ranging from the economic 
positions of individuals and the educational standing as well as the financial capability of the 
citizens. These factors account for either the severity or otherwise of the nature and type of 
environmental protectionist measures adopted by the regulatory bodies. However, the EPA 
play a major supervisory role regarding these diverging environmental programmes to create 
some level of harmonization of legal laws operating in the U.S or within lands jointly 
controlled by state and federal government.50  
Also, the U.S is used in this study as a case study because evidence shows that it is an 
influentially inclusive centre for the proliferation of effective regulatory compliance 
programmes for risk mitigation within the energy and larger corporate outfits.51 A survey of 
Canadian companies revealed that companies operating in Canada with a U.S parent company 
were much more likely to have a larger number of elements of an effective regulatory 
compliance programme instituted such that U.S owned companies averaged 6.6 out of 9 
                                                          
50Cook, F. J. (2014). Who’s regulating who? Analysing fracking policy in Colorado, Wyoming, and Louisiana. 
Environ. Pract. Volume. 16, p.64-67. 
51Schwartz, M. (1998). “Compliance and business ethics are coming of age I Canada” Ethikos & Corporate 
Conduct Quarterly, Volume 12(1) pp.7-9, 12. 
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elements of the regulatory compliance programme while Canadian owned enterprises 
averaged only 3.5 out of 9.52 
1.7.2 Comparative Legal Analysis 
Prior to this time, comparative legal research was viewed by some as mainly as an instrument 
for improving domestic law and legal doctrines, as a way to renovating the old approach of 
the still dominating Exegetic School to the Civil Code and its interpretation.53  Comparative 
legal analysis became fashionable in that it became the necessary instrument for a desirable 
harmonization of law around Europe and beyond by the end of the twentieth century. 
Hence, according to the circumstance, comparative legal analysis as a method in research 
evolved with different aims and divergent reasons for comparing legal systems. Thus, 
comparing legal systems was not only the area that forms the basis for embarking on legal 
analysis. Scholars now saw the need to incorporate other areas such as the comparison of the 
economic factors; government policies on aspects of governance and regulation and the 
behavioural aspects of firms operating within one country to another on how they influence 
the overall decision reached on an identified problem.  
Having said that, it is pertinent to note the key aspects for comparative legal analysis. 
Comparative legal research analysis is seen as an instrument of learning and knowledge 
(information on the law elsewhere and a better understanding thereof). Comparative legal 
analysis as an instrument of evolutionary and taxonomic science. Comparative legal research 
contributes to one’s own legal system (understanding it better, including the resistance of its 
traditions, improving it, and using it as a means for interpreting the constitution). Comparative 
legal analysis as an instrument of harmonization of laws and regulations.54 
To this end, this thesis seek to compare the state policies and laws designed to mitigate 
prospective environmental impacts associated with U.S oil and gas drilling fracking 
operations. Particularly, to embark on a comparative legal analysis of the characteristics of oil 
and gas producing states that have enacted policies designed to mitigate prospective 
environmental impacts associated with fracking operations. Secondly, to examine the 
applicable environmental liability and regulatory regime designed in various oil and gas 
producing states to mitigate environmental issues relating to gas fracking. Charles Davis in 
his 2016 article titled “Fracking and environmental protection: An analysis of the U.S. 
State”55 shares similarity in terms of the object for a comparative legal analysis. After briefly 
comparing the regulatory context of fracking regulations and legal environmental liability 
regimes in some states in the U.S, this thesis argued using the factors as stated in the 
Restatement (Second) Torts as a basis in arriving at the conclusion as to why a stricter liability 
rule should be applied to water contamination claims as well as formulated strategic legal 
policy options that would foster self-regulation for achieving some form of rational behaviour 
amongst operators in the energy industry.  
 
                                                          
52Ward, A. (1997). “Compliance Surveys: Compliance say better safe than sorry” Corporate Legal Times, Volume 
62(7), pp.1-3. 
53Sacco, R. (1991).’Legal formants a dynamic approach to comparative law’ American Journal of Comparative 
Law p.1-34 (part I) and pp.343-401 (part II). 
54In the Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Glenn 2006). Compare the purposes of comparative law 
research’ as listed by Esin Orucu (2007, p.53-56). 
55Davis, C. (2016). Fracking and Environmental Protection: An analysis of the U.S. State, The Extractive 
Industries and Society, [Online] www.elservier.com/locate/exis (Accessed on 21/11/2018). 
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1.7.3 Stages of Research 
The expectation of this thesis is to extend the deterrence effect of environmental regulation 
and liability systems to a point where industry will self-regulate. The method of research 
engaged in this thesis is tiered; and systematically developed through a case study and 
interpretation of established legal principles and rules. The stages of the methodology 
developed include: 
Examination of what HVHF is about and its associated impacts as well as the various forms 
of fluid based fracking techniques.  
A descriptive approach will be undertaken to highlight how fracking operates and the 
components of the associated risks as it relates to environment and health. The issue of water 
contamination among others is identified as a unique risk because of its highly probable level 
of occurrence. This discussion gives credence to the argument as to why strict liability should 
be applicable to water contamination cause of action. The relevant forms of fluid based 
hydraulic fracking technique will be identified and elaborated. The issue of ‘cost 
effectiveness’ factor will be advanced as an argument that compelled industry to choose the 
applicable slick-water hydraulic fracking technique amidst better options. 
Definition of principles and identification of legal principles and the interaction between 
regulation and liability systems.  
The definition of certain applicable legal principles as they relate to risk mitigation will be 
studied. The need for regulating shale gas extraction, alternatives to regulation and the 
relationship between the core ingredients of liability and regulation will be studied. This stage 
also determines the normative alternative to regulation and the benefits and criticisms of 
liability regimes whilst contrasting that with the limits of safety regulation in the field of risk 
mitigation mechanisms. This stage is equally crucial in illustrating that shale gas fracking 
activity and its associated risks reflects an abnormally dangerous phenomenon based on the 
Restatement (Second) of Tort. 
Justification for implementation of policy options for mitigating shale gas extractive risks. 
This stage is important in illustrating the policy, social and regulatory concerns for allowing 
shale gas extraction. The inherent difficulties in some theories of law determining where 
defendant’s liability lie to give justification for a strict liability as well as the relevant policy 
options will be discussed in this stage. This stage will make a strong argument in favour of 
the viability for strict liability to govern fracking claims. This will be upon the conclusion that 
fracking is an abnormally dangerous activity having compared the requirements of 
Restatement (Second) of Tort. 
           Identification of the environmental regulatory and liability problems. 
This stage highlights the problems embedded in regulation and liability systems that make 
them ineffective in managing the attendant risks from fracking. It sets the foundation for the 
policy options that will be put forward in this research.  This thesis will comparatively begin 
by examining the similarities and differences in the technique used for extracting oil and gas 
from conventional and unconventional well. In addition, this thesis will analyse the impacts 
it poses to the environment, identifying water contamination as one unique risk different from 
conventional gas extraction.  
The USA oil and gas laws applicable to shale gas extraction will be compared with other 
countries currently nursing the idea to extract their shale gas deposits. The similarities in terms 
of weakness and strength will be explored. Particularly, the EU shale gas legal framework and 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
16
some member states within the EU will also be examined. More so, the factors that are 
responsible for the success of shale gas development from the U.S will be comparatively 
weighed against the dynamics within the EU.  
Consequently, a critical comparison will be conducted into the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of both 
regulation and liability. The Restatement (Second) of Tort criteria for determining what an 
abnormally dangerous activity is. This will be weighed against the risks of shale gas 
extraction. This thesis will then compare some common law principles to show the difficulties 
in proving defendant’s liability against present fracking risks. This exposition is meant to 
provide justification for a strict liability system for water contamination claims.  
Since the entire work is about devising a framework for environmental regulation and liability 
to strengthen the principles of energy law and policy, this thesis will embark on a systemic 
comparison of both strategies for risks mitigation, namely how each problem affect regulation 
and liability. This thesis will suggest concrete policy directions to address these problems for 
the required effectiveness. The methodology developed informs the justification for a 
complementary approach through policy measure to achieve effectiveness for risk mitigation 
that provides the structure in which the research questions in this thesis will be explored and 
answered.   
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
Shale gas controversies are focused particularly around the U.S experiences where several 
factors such as: the nature of mineral right and geographical locations of these resources has 
contributed to the huge successful exploitation. Thus, this research takes a cue from the cases 
surrounding shale gas development in the U.S and that of the European region where countries 
like France and Bulgaria (at the time of writing this thesis) issued moratorium regarding the 
possible exploitation of shale gas.  
Therefore, because the case study of shale gas is concentrated around one country with regard 
to what is ongoing, that is, the U.S, it resonates one of  the major limitations of case study 
research as posited by Robert Yin in his book titled Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods.56 He said: “a single case study research presents the absence of systematic 
procedures due to a relative absence of methodological guidelines”.57 Thus, the reader will 
only have examples of such regions where the development of shale gas operations has been 
explored or is currently undergoing production.  
Second, the fact that shale gas development operations through the introduction of novel 
aspects of HVHF technique is quite new, for example, the slick water technique. Hence, the 
issues are new and controversial within the energy resource industry. And because of the 
conflicting interests involved, there is no clear-cut position regarding any issue amongst 
opponents and proponents of fracking techniques in general. Therefore, this study is limited 
in the sense that what might be correct might change tomorrow based on future findings which 
might be scientifically proven. Due to this, the reader is advised to have a very open mind set 
while approaching all works relating to shale gas development through hydraulic fracking as 
they may be subject to very rapid changes. 
More so, this article might well be limited in that it assumes that the ability of operators in 
risky activities to act rationally may be triggered by deploying the utilities of self-regulatory 
strategies. Although, studies on human behaviours have shown clearly that apart from the fact 
                                                          
56Yin, R. K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. (5th edition) SAGE Publications Ltd: London, 
p.14-15. 
57Ibid at p.14-15. 
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that humans have the ability to influence their own well-being, they do not have that same 
cognitive ability to influence the direction of their actions and decision all the time.58 Certain 
factors are also responsible in playing a role in either making an individual act rationally or 
irrationally in complying to set standards meant to regulate his behaviour in the long run.  
From a policy and regulatory stand point, this thesis assumes that improving a rational 
behaviour with the energy industry in terms of achieving full compliance through effective 
regulation, human participants should be allowed to take part in regulatory decisions. This is 
important because no matter the best regulatory structure in place, humans will forever be 
bent on improving their condition in an agentic way.59 This inherent state of mind of the 
individual is what makes them self-regulators. Therefore, this is the very basis for the root 
meaning of “rationality.”  In fact, this thesis concludes by assuming that when we speak of 
rationality we should actually refer to self-regulatory process. Hence, it is the position of this 
thesis that if self-regulatory strategies and internal management standards in conjunction with 
traditional C&C regulation are deployed in regulation, actors within the energy industry will 
be rational in complying with the set regulatory requirements in mitigating risks from resource 
extraction. 
Thus, in environmental issues, we need to understand that we cannot convert human beings 
into model people to do the right thing. However, policy makers can leverage on the power 
of regulation and strategies to make right decisions which are self-sustaining and has the 
ability to create incentives for people to be rational. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that the researcher might end up presenting a subjective 
argument based on logic and reasoning60 on the issues to be addressed in order not to take 
side with either the proponents of fracking or opponents. There are no contradictory process 
tracing results.61 Also, the researcher rests its arguments on certain assumptions that can raise 
deeper and potentially irreconcilable issues.62 
Furthermore, there is the issue of external validity or generalisability. This qualifies as one of 
the major criticisms of a single case study research. This is an unavoidable valid criticism 
because it may be that theories which passes a single crucial case study test, for example, a 
rare antecedent, have little explanatory range.63 Case studies provide a means to investigate 
complex situations with multiple variables under analysis. Case studies are particularly ap-
pealing for advancing a field's knowledge base. They are very popular in the fields of applied 
sciences in the areas of social sciences, education and health.64 Case studies offer a good op-
portunity for innovation and challenge current theoretical assumptions. They can also be a 
good alternative or complement to the focus group method. However, it can be difficult to 
                                                          
58Bechara, A & Damasio, A.R. (2005). “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A Neural Theory of Economic Decision 
Making.” Games and Economic Behaviour 52, no. 2: 336–72. 
59Baumeister, R. F. & Kathleen D. V. (2007). “Self-regulation, Ego Depletion, and Motivation.” Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass 1, no. 1: 115–28. 
60Verschuren, P. J. M. (2003). ‘Case study research strategy: Some ambiguities and         
Opportunities’, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6, 2, 121-139. 
61Owen, J. M. (1994). ‘How liberalism produces democratic peace’, International Security, 19, 2, 87-125; Layne, 
C. (1994). ‘Kant or Cant: the myth of the democratic peace’, International Security, 19, 2, 5-49. 
62Bennett, A & Elman, C. (2007). ‘Case study methods in the international relations subfield’, Comparative 
Political Studies, 40, 2, 170-195. 
63Van, E. S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. 
64Atieno, O. (2009). An analysis of the strengths and limitation of qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. 
Problems of Education in the 21st Century, Volume 13, pp.13- 18. 
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establish a cause-effect connection to reach conclusions and it can be hard to generalize, par-
ticularly when a small number or case studies are considered. 
 
Field research allows researchers to have a depth perception about people and processes. The 
collection of data is done on the field and it can occur over an extended period of time. As 
stated by Blackstone (2012)65 social facts may not appear and be revealed to a researcher in a 
first moment, but they can be discovered over time during the course of a field research pro-
ject. Field research is an excellent method for understanding the behaviour of people and their 
experiences. However, it is not easy to generalize this approach to a very large number of 
people or groups, and documenting observations may become a challenging process. This 
research did not carry out frequent field trips to shale gas sites as these sites require a lot of 
permits. As a result, the research had to rely solely on research narrative from library and 
online sources to make certain inferences in the thesis and the conclusions on certain issues 
raised. 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
As this work is about analysing and devising an environmental regulation and liability 
framework for mitigating risks in the ambit of energy law and policy. However, it important 
the reader has an overview of each Chapter. Thus, Chapter II provides an in-depth literature 
review on the various contributions made by scholars regarding regulatory reform for an 
effective risk governance and mitigation strategy. It divided these contributions into three 
broad segments for easy understanding: by institutions; academics; and shale gas specific 
regulatory reforms. Chapter III generally describes what hydraulic fracking is by examining 
the various stages from drilling to actual production and further explores the health and 
environmental impacts associated with fracking ranging from water quality and 
contamination to impacts on people, communities and climate change. However, in the same 
Chapter III, it argue that water contamination is a unique risk to fracking since the frequency 
with which they occur is quite different from conventional natural gas activities. 
Under water contamination risks, this Chapter broadly categorised these water risks into four 
namely the drilling and fracturing fluid as the first risk. Such fracturing fluid risks could arise 
from migration of fracturing fluids caused by subsurface cracks or surface spills or flow back 
as a fracturing fluid risk. It could be as a result of cracked well casing or blowouts. The second 
category of risks relating to water contamination can arise from contamination of groundwater 
well Aquifers with methane contents. Sludge and other residue disturbances in wells due to 
fracking could be the catalyst for this water related risk. 
Fourth, the injection of fracking fluid waste and produced water into injection wells and 
sewage facilities could be the result of risk relating to water contamination. Chapter III 
concludes by identifying other forms of fluid based hydraulic fracking techniques by 
exploring the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
Chapter IV commences with a broad background definition to two key concepts and 
principles: The concept of regulation and the principle of liability is defined. This Chapter 
examines some principles of regulatory design. Carefully identifies factors that necessitates 
the need to regulate shale gas extraction activity. The limits to safety regulation is also 
analysed, along with identifying the issues of technological innovation leading to outdated 
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regulation, regulator’s lack of information on risks, regulator’s lack of information on costs 
and benefits and regulatory capture or subversion to mention a few as factors limiting 
regulatory efficiency. Similarly, the thesis explores certain alternatives to regulation in sub 
section 4.3.2. These alternatives range from market-based regulation to self-regulation. 
Liability as a system for environmental protection in conjunction with innovative policy 
options is analysed as a complement not as a substitute for regulation. Further, this Chapter 
reviewed both regulation and liability systems by identifying certain indices that account for 
their ineffectiveness, the benefits and negative criticisms of each of them. The Chapter rounds 
off by analysing the six factors contained in Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Tort 
Act66 to buttress the argument why shale gas should be classified as abnormally dangerous 
activity based on the increased frequency and transgenerational theory to subject fracking 
stricter liability regime and the strategic policy options recommended by the work to improve 
the effectiveness of both environmental regulation and liability.  
In line with factors (a) & (b) which talks about great harm and high degree of risk. The work 
took note of the number of accidents that had taken place since the commencement of shale 
gas within US. It was revealed from the available statistics that from 2009 to 2012, over 30 
cases were filed in court regarding shale gas claims. The Court within the U.S reported over 
1000 issues of contamination alone.67 The thesis also examined water as a special commodity 
to mankind and if contaminated may not be redeemed even with the most sophisticated 
technology. This work stressed the issue of water contamination as the most devastating and 
frequent risks associated with fracking. A quick analysis of how shale gas water 
contamination risks could be frequent is needed here. 
For example, to identify potential scenarios of concern regarding human health risks sur-
rounding the natural gas drilling industry a survey of industry workers and regulators was 
developed and implemented to quantify the frequency of failure incidents and near-miss ac-
cidents at the wellhead site. The goal of the survey is to better understand scenarios of concern 
for human health risks as a result of operational failure incidents and regulatory violations 
during natural gas drilling in the Marcellus shale region in the state of Pennsylvania.  Thus, 
an elicitation of health perceptions regarding unconventional shale gas development in the 
Marcellus region found that 22% of the 72 respondents perceived unconventional drilling as 
a health concern, while 42% attributed health symptoms to environmental factors, the most 
frequently selected of which was unconventional drilling activities.68 
Also, to further illustrate to the reader the frequency level of shale gas incidents to justify for 
a strict liability regime, a study conducted by Vengosh et al., in 201469 regarding contamina-
tion risks to water sources.  The study identified four scenarios where these risks can occur 
from shale gas extraction: stray gas leaking into shallow aquifers, surface water contamination 
from spills and leaks, soil and river sediment contamination from wastewater, and the overuse 
of freshwater for hydraulic fracturing.70 These four scenarios is only related to water contam-
ination risk. This accordingly, resonates a high frequency level of risk resulting in water con-
tamination issues. This is why this thesis proposed for a ‘risk/segment based strict liability 
                                                          
66Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520. 
67Barclay R. N. (2014).  Report on the Statistical Review of Frack Accidents in the U.S.A [Online] 
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68Saberi, P. et al., (2014). Field survey of health perception and complaints of Pennsylvania residents in the Mar-
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rule.’ By this, the thesis means that where particular risks relating to an activity is frequent in 
their occurrence, those risk should be subject to a strict liability claim under the segmented 
strict liability rule. 
However, factor (c) talks about a consideration of the inappropriateness of the activity to its 
location. The thesis in this sub section illustrated to the reader that the word inappropriate 
cannot be confined to whether the activity was carried on in a proper location. Rather it argued 
that an activity could become inappropriate by reason of the choice of technique. This 
argument was based on the simple reason that the slick water hydraulic fracking was chosen 
amid other alternatives which were far more environmentally friendly due to its cost 
effectiveness. 
Factor (d) bother on question of whether the risk from shale gas can be eliminated by 
reasonable care. The thesis stated that reasonable care cannot eliminate risks associated with 
shale gas extraction. Being that the magnitude and the frequency level is beyond the social 
optimal. Then the thesis looked at factor (e) which is the extent to which the activity is not a 
matter of common usage. It made a simple argument that shale gas extraction as it were 
presently is only being used in the U.S and no active extraction is on-going in other countries. 
That based on this, it cannot be said that the technique of gas extraction passes the common 
usage test based on the intent of the Restatement (Second) of Tort. The last factor-extent to 
which the activity’s value to the community outweighs its dangerous attributes. The thesis 
illustrated to the reader that the job opportunities which shale gas extraction activities presents 
is always short lived and is usually tied to the life span of producing reservoirs. Second, the 
so-called jobs are based on your field of study or your choice to work in the industry. Whereas, 
the negative impacts of fracking affect every person within shale sites. (For detail discussion, 
see section 5.8). 
To justify a strict liability system for mitigating water contamination risks associated with 
shale gas development, Chapter V critically explores various statutory, regulatory and the 
social policy concerns for allowing HVHF. This Chapter also explores inherent difficulties in 
some theories of law designed to determine defendant’s liability regarding shale gas fracking 
risks, for example, ‘Nuisance’ and the complexities involved in proofing intent in relation to 
fracking cases, and the principle of ‘Negligence’ were explored for the reason being that 
defining due care and determining whether exercising such care will prevent harm, makes it 
problematic for a plaintiff in shale claims. This will provide the reader with a broader 
understanding as to why a strict liability system alongside regulation would achieve the 
incentive for operators of such a dangerous activity to observe the utmost standard of care.  
The thesis examined these principles and the difficulties involved so that it can justify the 
bases for introducing strict liability for water contamination claims that completely discards 
the requirements in nuisance, trespass or negligence. The viability of strict liability to fracking 
claims was discussed as well by making four key assertions based on the factors stated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Tort Act.71 That water contamination harm attributable to HVHF is 
significant both in magnitude and in likelihood. That the exercise of reasonable care cannot 
eliminate HVHF water contamination risk. That the slick water fracking technique fails the 
common usage test and probably be inappropriate to the location where it is carried on. That 
it is false that fracking benefits outweighs the environmental and public health risks. 
Having laid the foundation in Chapter IV and discussed other key arguments and 
contributions in Chapter V. Accordingly, Chapter VI will analyse each of the problems 
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identified in sub section 5.6 that affects the effectiveness of regulation and liability systems 
against shale gas risks. Such issues include information asymmetry, inability to pay/judgment 
proof defendant, threat to suit and the cost implications. While information asymmetry is to 
traditional regulation, inability to pay and threat to suit is to liability system. Cost affects 
traditional regulation as well as liability. Chapter VII attempts to go further in systemically 
suggesting key effective strategies from a policy and energy law perspective to address each 
of the issues identified above. For instance, compulsory disclosure requirements, shifting the 
burden of proof policy option and the appointment of an independent well assessor were 
certain solution identified to address the information asymmetry. Strategies such as insurance 
and bonding were some financial options deployed to address the inability to pay problem. 
The Polluter Does Not Pay Model adopted in the Indian legal jurisprudence was introduced 
in addition to the financial requirement solution. This Chapter highlights the novel 
contributions that this thesis seeks to achieve in the field of mitigating risks associated with 
most human resource extraction activity that presents a highly probable level of harm 
occurring. Accordingly, Chapter VIII concludes the arguments and the findings of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
2. A Literature Review of the Contributions on Regulatory Reforms for Risk Mitigation 
Before the thesis attempts to examine the negative environmental and health impacts of 
fracking, it is important to do a review of the various literatures regarding energy extraction 
activities and the proposals made for their safe extraction by scholars in the field. This is 
important to strengthen the justification for the thesis. Also, to give the reader an insight on 
key area for further research. However, a brief discussion and definition of what risk is will 
be important prior to the detailed discussion on the literatures on the contributions on 
regulatory quality reform in the energy law context. It is better to note upfront a fundamental 
misconception on the definition of risk. The first myth on the concept of risk is that “risk” 
must have a single, well defined meaning.72  
What then is risk?  
Given the lack of consensus on the definition of risk. The earliest discussion on risk centred 
on the distinction between risk that should be quantified objectively and subjective risk.73 
Frank Knight the famous scholar who has been quoted regarding the definition of risk 
summarized the difference between risk and uncertainty thus: 
“Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, 
from which it has never been properly separated…The essential fact is that “risk means in 
some cases a quantified susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something 
distinctly not of character and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the 
bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two is really present and 
operating…It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or “risk” proper, as we shall use 
the term, is so far different from an un-measurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty 
at all.”74 
Arguably, Knight defined only quantifiable uncertainty to be risk and provided the example 
of two individuals drawing from an urn and red and black balls; the first individual is ignorant 
of the number of each colour whereas the second individual is aware that there are three red 
balls for each black ball. The second individual estimates (correctly) the probability of 
drawing a red ball to be 75% but the first operates under the misperception that there is a 50% 
chance of drawing a red ball. Knight’s argument is that the second individual is exposed to 
risk but the first suffers from ignorance. Thus, the emphasis on whether uncertainty is 
subjective seems to us misplaced. The controversy currently is whether uncertainty is 
measurable or not even when it is true that risk that is measurable is easier to insure. 
Holton in his paper on Defining Risk (2004) argues vehemently that there are two ingredients 
that are needed for risk to exist.75 The first is uncertainty about the possible outcomes from 
an experiment and the other is that the outcomes have to matter in terms of providing utility. 
He posits that for example, that an individual jumping out of an airplane without a parachute 
faces no risk since he is certain, that to die (no uncertainty) and that drawing balls out of an 
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urn does not expose one to risk since one’s well-being or wealth is unaffected by whether a 
red or black ball is drawn. However, he argues that the drawing of a red or black ball out of 
an urn will become a risk where different monetary values is attached to red or black balls. 
From the above, it is expedient to now give a working, though flawed definition of what risk 
is. First, risk can be defined as an unwanted event which may or may not occur. Second, risk 
is the cause of an unwanted event which may or may not occur. Third, risk is the probability 
of an unwanted event which may or may not occur. Fourth, risk is the statistical expectation 
values of unwanted event which may or may not occur.76 Having given a general description 
of what risk is, it is important to now discuss the various literatures that centres on the 
regulatory quality improvements within the energy industry. 
2.1 Introduction 
One thing is clear, when activities that are socially beneficial has the perceived potential of 
creating harm, the fastest growing and oldest tools for government to mitigate these risks, 
include: regulations; tort liability standards; and market based instruments. Thus, these three 
tools deployed by government to tackle these externalities is not an end in themselves, 
considering the pace of technological advancement. More so, as some scholars have noted, 
there is, overall, a dearth of data in environmental regulation, and this makes the regulatory 
task both more difficult and necessary.77 However, the available literatures vary in terms of 
the proposal for the approaches most suitable in mitigating shale gas extraction risks.  
The need to evolve environmental regulation beyond the normal direct C&C regulatory 
strategies is increasingly becoming important. To this end, many institutions and researchers 
have suggested changes and alternatives to the prescriptive form of regulation. Although it is 
outside the scope of this present research to carry out a broad review of all these initiatives, it 
is the objective of this thesis to distil and build on the common proposals from the most 
relevant suggestions specifically on regulatory reforms. 
Gouldson, et al.,78 carried out an interesting screening of some initiatives which centred on 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), EU and UK 
programmes on environmental regulatory reforms. This research was actualised and 
complemented by some previous literature from the 1990s which played a chief role in 
promoting the adoption of economic instruments. In addition, other proposals were made by 
other researches. This thesis shall identify each of these initiatives into three broad segments 
(institutional, academic and shale gas specific based regulatory reforms) to facilitate a better 
understanding of the evolving environmental regulatory reforms. These initiatives were 
targeted toward evolving environmental regulation beyond C&C strategies.  
The basis that informed the choice of these three literature sets is that they all support the idea 
of a complementary regulatory strategy for improving compliance through the deployment of 
combination of regulatory instruments mixes or regulatory pluralism. Equally these literatures 
examined in this thesis posits that for regulation to be effective, regulators should leverage on 
the good will of regulated enterprises first by persuading them to comply with the standards 
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for safety in resource extraction in the energy industry, that when such fails, regulators should 
progress up the pyramid of regulatory strategies by using their most drastic regulatory strategy 
to achieve compliance and policy outcomes.  
One of the major contributions to the understanding on how pluralistic or instrument mixes 
regulatory strategies can be most efficient in achieving compliance is that these literatures as 
well as this thesis agrees that the pyramid of regulatory strategies should not be exclusive of 
government regulation, but that the pyramid should utilize both second parties (i.e regulated 
enterprises themselves) and third parties (commercial and non-commercial including civil 
society) regulations. Regulatory strategies from these collection of sources can together 
constitute a pyramid of escalating regulatory strategies and sanctions without government 
hijacking the role of regulatory formulation completely. 
Accordingly, these sets of literature’s contributions to the understanding on how regulatory 
strategies can be most effective at accomplishing compliance in risk mitigation in the energy 
law and policy making is that they set out the principles for how diverse regulatory policy 
instruments can most effectively be used together to support each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses, and avoid conflicts. These literatures proposed the following combination of 
regulatory instrument mixes:  
Inherently complementary combinations comprising of: 
o Information and all other instruments 
o Voluntarism and C&C regulation 
o C&C regulation and broad-based economic incentives 
o Liability rules and C&C. 
o Broad-based economic instruments and compulsory reporting and monitoring 
provisions. 
Inherently counter-productive combinations: 
o C&C regulation and broad-based economic instruments (which target the same 
aspects of a common problem). 
o Self-regulation and broad-based economic incentives. 
o Technology and performance based standards. 
o Incentive based instruments and liability rules. 
Instrument combinations that should chronologically follow one another: 
o Self-regulation and sequential C&C. 
o Self-regulation and sequential broad-based economic incentives. 
From the above combination of regulatory instruments, it is clear that a central theme that 
much of the current research on regulatory effectiveness is that, to understand and improve 
compliance levels within energy law and policy in relation to risk mitigation, it expedient that 
academics and scholars in the field, must understand how government regulation interacts 
with other forms “regulation” such as self-regulation, internal corporate management and with 
the actions of other parties such as civil groups, professional bodies and commercial financial 
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institutions. In particular, this thesis will build on the notion and concepts of “regulatory 
pluralism” as espoused in the three sets of literatures examined here to demonstrate a shift 
from the norm where the state is seen as the only source of regulation.  
To this end, this thesis’s contribution to the understanding on how mixes of regulatory 
strategies can be most effective at accomplishing compliance is in suggesting that the pyramid 
should consist of strategies that will segment particular frequently recurring risks and classify 
them as abnormal due to their probability level of occurence. Also, such highly probable risks 
from an activity should be subject to a strict liability claim. By so doing, it is the argument of 
this thesis that the industry will be forced to self-regulate by being innovative in finding 
solutions to the recurring risks instead of relying on prescriptive regulations that has failed to 
solve the recurrence of such highly probable risks (water contamination and earthquakes 
disturbances from shale gas fracking).  
2.2 Institutional Based Regulatory Reforms 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) was one of the first, and 
perhaps the most cited documents establishing environmental principles.79 This document, 
written in 1992 but updated in 2009, evaluated key areas of a compliance-based programme 
designed to primarily focus on enforcement. This could serve as a starting point for inspiration 
for general environmental regulatory measures.  
Without prejudice to other suggestions made by the USEPA, it fundamentally recommended 
that all environmental regulatory programme should: ensure enforceable requirements; make 
clear distinction as to who is liable to requirements and to set programme priorities; make 
compliance (and monitoring) as the focus for regulation; evaluate the success of the initiative; 
and ensure that programme personnel are to be held accountable for its success or failure.80 
2.2.1 Economic Instruments to Complement Direct Regulation 
The effectiveness of environmental regulation was conducted by some institutions 
immediately when the first generation of environmental regulation appeared to be successful. 
The 1990s is the time period where most references to this discussion emanated, signalling 
the emergence of a strong stance on alternative economic instruments such as taxes, emission 
markets and others. A vital reference to these alternative economic instruments which has 
been frequently quoted is a study conducted by the US Congress in 1995.81 The study sought 
to subsidise the adoption of alternative policy instruments and assessed how various tools 
could be harnessed collectively in environmental regulatory strategies to achieve better 
outcomes. Though the study focused on command and control type of regulation, asserting 
that coercive enforcement is the fundamental source of achieving compliance from operators 
of dangerous activities, it developed seven useful parameters to compare instruments 
regulatory quality, comprised of: assurance in meeting goals; preventing pollution; 
environmental equity and justice; cost-effectiveness and fairness; demands on governments; 
adaptability; and technology innovation and diffusion. Subsequently, two other aspects as part 
of the compliance-based programme were mentioned: extend use of the market to regulate; 
and improve information collection and disclosure. Command and control form of regulation 
is otherwise known as (direct form of regulation) where the regulatory body gives the 
                                                          
79United States Environmental Protection Agency, (1992). Principles of Environmental Enforcement. 
80Ibid at p.21. 
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regulated certain requirements and obligations to be fulfilled prior to the commencement and 
during the pendency of the activity. Failure to adhere, could lead to warning with an option 
of fine or suspension. Where the violation is grave like flagrant abuse of regulatory procedure 
or gross negligent, criminal prosecution and conviction.82 
As a result, the adoption of market-based instruments to complement traditional regulation 
became a subject to be investigated. Diverse grades of success were recorded as countries, 
agencies and research dedicated huge effort in experimenting and evaluating the options from 
taxes to emission markets as illustrated by UNEP.83 Thus, according to authors like Baumol 
and Oates84 who believed the general hypothesis that environmental problems emanated from 
market failures, solving them required giving markets the right signals through the 
establishment of economic rewards associated to environmental policy objectives which 
would impact the behaviour of firms.85  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also gave voice for the adoption of these economic 
instruments and criticised traditional regulation. It argued that traditional regulations are: 
economically inefficient; full of administrative burdens; barriers to innovation; and create the 
possibility for regulatory capture. 86 The authors of this IMF document concluded that no one 
model was enough to solve every challenge, proposing that market solutions are always ideal, 
and suggesting that practicability, efficiency, equity, ecological incidence, information 
requirements and availability, transition problems and administrative costs should be the 
considerations of a new environmental regulation.87 Further, the IMF suggested that finding 
a way to determine the acceptable limits of risks by society in standards, as well as ensure the 
capacity to monitor and inspect compliance, should be the priority of regulatory reform. 
According to the IMF, this would reinforce the need for government’s commitment, 
represented by the establishment of strong environmental agencies, supported by the required 
resources. 
The idea of using a market-based approach as an alternative to regulation as part of a 
regulatory reform agenda received recommendation too from the Economic Commission for 
Latin American and Caribbean (CEPAL). However, Bettts88 proposed an increased use in the 
preventive approach: search for cost effectiveness through economic instrument adoption; and 
the use of revenues from environmental taxes to finance environmental agencies once it is 
evident that financial limitations has hindered success as an approach to new environmental 
regulation. 
The World Bank (WB) recommended the use of the market based approach as a new 
environmental regulatory reform for developing countries.89 The conclusion of the WB was 
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that a new regulatory logic is required, mainly due to the recognition that regulated efforts in 
improving performance and taking profit from economic rationale through market-based 
instruments. It proposed a reform approach that welcome new approaches, including: taxes 
and information requirements; creates participation; information intensive processes; and 
transparency. In short, this was an approach that ensured that the environmental institutions 
work more as mediators and less as dictators of rules, arriving at strategic decision on a cost-
benefit analysis of regulatory actions and rules and making use of informal regulation, as 
information-based instruments, and technical assistance.90 
Whereas some researchers argued that the expectation on economic instruments should be 
treated with care, mainly in developing countries,91 the Inter-American Development Bank 
(BID) argued in their publication92 that the hypotheses for the economic rational could not be 
verified in real situations as anticipated. Thus, proposing a much more cautious understanding 
of environmental regulatory dynamics, they stated that the issues of high transaction costs of 
economic instruments, the inadequacy of economic instruments and the limited institutional 
architecture in developing countries are the most relevant problems that can affect the use of 
economic instruments in a new environmental regulatory reform. This publication suggested 
that the analyses should transcend economic aspects and evaluate the following: aspects of 
stakeholder institutional capabilities; level of governmental commitment; data availability on 
pollution sources and environmental quality; legal and administrative contexts for 
environmental regulation; and resource availability within environmental agencies.93  
2.2.2 Regulatory Quality Efforts of the OECD 
At the end of the 1990s, the OECD tried to review regulatory quality, which primarily meant 
achieving a reduction in bureaucratic and administrative costs and burdens involved in 
enforcing legal compliance.94 As part of the Organization’s first attempt to review regulatory 
quality, it highlighted eight principles which it argued should form the establishment of a good 
regulation. It recommended that regulation should clearly: identify policy goals, and be 
effective in achieving same; have a legal and empirical basis; have the ability to reflect 
benefits that justify costs; reduce costs and market distortions, encourage innovations through 
market incentives and goal-based approaches; be clear, simple, and practical; avoid 
inconsistency with other regulations and policies; and should not be incompatible as far as 
possible with competition, trade and investment facilitating principles.95 
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These principles were substituted by the guiding principles for regulatory quality and 
performance96 which provided guidelines such as: the need to conduct regulatory reform at a 
broad political level; establish clear objectives and frameworks; assess impacts and review 
regulations systematically; ensure non-discriminatory issues and transparency; review and 
strengthen scope, efficacy and enforcement of competition policy; economic regulations that 
should encourage competition and efficiency; remove unnecessary regulatory restrictions; and 
highlight vital linkages with other policy goals. 
Subsequent to the above guidelines, three surveys were conducted to evaluate the quality of 
regulatory systems in OECD countries in 1998, 2000 and 2005, respectively. The results of 
these surveys made a set of recommendations which proposed that regulations should be: 
proportionate to the identified problem and goals, with a minimal burden for compliance; 
prompt in addressing identified problems; effective in achieving objectives with minimum 
cost; avoid inconsistency with other existing regulations; flexible and not too prescriptive; be 
open to improvement by continuous update; be accommodating and an effective means of 
communication with stakeholders; be open and able to be held accountable; reflect respect for 
legal and constitutional requirements; and be enforceable.97 
2.2.3 Better Regulation 
The EC carried out a review on regulatory quality similar to the OECD studies on governance 
reforms known as ‘better regulation’.98 An aspect of the EC study focused on the 
establishment of five principles for good governance: openness; participation; accountability; 
effectiveness; and coherence.99 Consequently, these criteria have been evaluated and applied 
to over 400 policy initiatives.100 The 6th Community Environmental Programme was then 
established following the rapid traction that ‘better regulation’ had within environmental 
regulation, providing guidelines for thematic strategies for 2002-2012.101 For the thematic 
strategies to assume the status of those better regulation efforts, it must be predicated on 
impact assessments with particular reference to stakeholder consultation, simplification and 
cross-cutting issues and linkages.102 The Reporting on Environmental Measures (REM) 
project suggested a methodology to report and evaluate impacts of regulation on the local 
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environment.103 Further, the European Agency reported104 on some specific policies, whilst 
some studies carried out by member states such as the UK task force provided some parallel 
initiatives that were conducted in addition to the ‘better regulation’ initiative.105 
The final report of the 6th European Action Programme (EAP) listed many positive outcomes 
from the initiatives. Nevertheless, it listed and recognised that expected regulatory reform 
goals had not fully become a reality because of planning and implementation burdens. Thus, 
the EAP made recommendations for new future objectives whereby member states should 
focus on pollution prevention and resource efficiency, integration of environment into 
business models and other policies, ensure a robust base of indicators to inspect and evaluate 
impacts of policies, carry out better evaluation of regulatory action to see if it has the ability 
to change consumers behaviour, and incorporate environmental policy planning with 
financing schemes among other initiatives.106 
2.2.4 Other Institutional Proposals for Regulatory Reforms 
The UK Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) report was among those huge efforts 
that contributed towards principle setting for regulatory reforms.107 A governmental 
independent body, the SDC determined five principles of good regulation: being 
proportionate; accountable; consistent; and transparent and target oriented. It made 
recommendations for the elimination of obsolete and inefficient regulation, the establishment 
of guidelines to facilitate compliance, the need to identify and address inconsistencies and 
reduce bureaucracy and compliance costs. 
To this end, the UN and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), a Canadian 
Institution jointly compiled a study regarding the relationship between market, regulation, 
commerce and innovation.108 Acknowledging the huge potential for good regulation to 
influence and improve competitiveness and environmental protection, the document favoured 
a regulatory reform based on reflexive learning, pushing enterprises to understand the benefits 
embedded in securing the social license to operate. Proposals within the documents 
encouraged: a push for the environmental agenda to be included in economic policies; adopt 
a collaborative relationship with enterprises; equip regulators with the requisite training and 
resources; a deliberate focus on prevention as a priority; foster innovation and encourage 
technical assistance in problem solving and the expansion of enforcement particularly in 
developing countries;109 promote research and development and share new solutions among 
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member states; incentivise the voluntary efforts of companies; refrain from using regulation 
as a barrier to trade; create a conducive environment for civil society groups to participate in 
decision making process; create avenues to facilitate access to the development of new 
technologies through the grant and loan facilities;110 extend where necessary the use of self-
regulation; expand the use of non-traditional strategies for protection (shaming, and informal 
sanctions, etc.); deploy the use of economic constraints in which firms operate.111 
The civil society groups were not left out in the major contributions. The Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI) proposed that a reform anchored on ‘progressive governance’ principles, 
comprised of: making environmental objectives as a priority;112 setting realistic goals; 
focusing on environmental outcomes instead of technologies; periodic review laws and 
procedures; decentralised decisions;113 increased regulatory flexibility, going beyond 
prescriptive safety guidelines; rewarding companies for their performance; involving actors 
including communities; creating a consistent approach to sectors and regions; restructuring 
regulatory assignments; making funds available to agencies; concentrating on more 
environmentally friendly production; rendering technical assistance where necessary; and the 
disclosure of information for better regulatory efficiency.114 
2.3 Academic Contributions of Regulatory Reform Improvements 
In addition to institutional studies dedicated to regulatory reform, some academic researchers 
have also contributed by proposing innovative ways to regulate. In this light, some 
contributions are briefly discussed, but the aim is to illustrate a number of relevant 
contributions to environmental regulatory quality principles consolidation. 
2.3.1 Regulation, Self-Regulation and Risk 
Regulation entails the formulation of diverse set of rules through legal instruments by which 
governmet set requirements on enterprises and citizens.115 These sets of requirements are not 
limited to laws and formal orders, but transcends to administrative instruments used to pursue 
policy objectives and goals. Also, one analyst has written: 
Regulation refers to sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over 
activities that are socially valued. The reference to sustained and focused control by an 
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agency suggests that regulation is not achieved simply by passing a law, but requires 
detailed knowledge of, and initimate involvement with, the regulated activity.116 
The inevitability of risks from human activities that present negative effects on certain aspects 
of the environment such as air, soil, water and ecosystems calls for the need for regulatory 
reforms. To this end, environmental protection requirements have garnered huge attention 
among the agenda in modern governance issues in countries across the world. Thus, making 
countries to develop strategies, legislation and administrative orders, and establish designated 
institutions to prevent, reduce, control or remediate the negative impacts of human interaction 
on the environment and human health generally recognised as “environmental regulation”117 
To reform regulation means to improve the efficiency, flexibility, simplicity, and 
effectiveness of individual regulations and non-regulatory instruments. 
However, these environmental regulation generally known as the C&C form of regulation is 
fashioned based on normative prescriptions for environmental requirements exemplified 
through emission standards contained in licenses issued by environmental agencies. These 
licenses set specific standard requirement based on legal determinations. C&C regulation 
expects that licensed activities must comply with those requirements by reducing risks to the 
regulatory standards or threshold.118 Interestingly, C&C still forms a core strategy for the 
majority of environmental agencies worldwide in addressing risks from human activities. 
However, a recent review of the strategies of the prescriptive regulatory approach has begun 
to show its limitations in dealing with contemporary environmental complex challenges. Such 
contemporary environmental problems range from diffuse and persistent kinds of 
contamination or pollution risks to dispersed risks of harm associated with human extractive 
activities. This immediately resonates new policy concerns of the economic efficiency of 
regulation.119 
Despite the central importance of C&C strategies of environmental regulation, both regulators 
and regulated entities recognize that these prescriptive strategies are not enough to deal with 
present environmental challenges. As a complement to the traditional approaches, it is 
imperative the tenets of self-regulation as an alternative form of regulation should be explored 
and strict environmental liability tools should be incorporated to address the limits on 
regulatory economic efficiency which the traditional C&C exemplifies.  
Therefore, this thesis argue that the major debate surrounding regulation and self-regulation 
is the inability of C&C regulation to address more diffuse and persistent forms of risks 
associated with human activity. Self-regulation on the other hand does not dwell on risk 
abatement, it goes further to risk prevention because the regulated entities assume a rational 
behaviour when they see that they are given some level of discretion to mitigate risks from 
their activity rather than adhering to standards set by the regulatory agencies. 
In view of this paradigm, this work relied on literatures that promote a strict environmental 
and pluralistic environmental regulatory improvement strategies. The pluralistic regulatory 
reform improvements proposed in the literatures is adopted in this thesis because these 
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strategies in order to achieve effectiveness of regulation, does not limit itself to attaining the 
legal standards of C&C. Rather is pushes operators to prevent risks and not treat the harm that 
may occur from accidents. Thus, regulations is not seen as an end-of-pipe solution but a means 
to enforce rational behaviour. 
Of greater importance is that the pluralistic regulatory quality reform for improving 
effectiveness and efficiency of any form of regulation is centred on achieving compliance and 
achieving policy goals as well. Though compliance is not always possible because legitimate 
enterprise are always careful in following all set rules so they go out of business simply 
because they strived toward full compliance of regulatory rules. Whereas, other literatures 
who propose for example corporate social responsibility or risks governance as a means of 
improving regulation in mitigating risks, depend solely on compliance to the set standards but 
is less concerned on achieving the policy objective. Regulated enterprise’s compliance to 
regulatory rules is dependent on certain conditions.  
The first condition is that the target group has to be aware of the rule and understand it. This 
is true because lack of clarity in a rule may result in unintentional non-compliance. Second, 
there must be willingness on the part of the regulated enterprise or industry to comply to set 
rules. Economic incentives have proven to foster a willingness to comply. In some cases a 
severe enforcement programme is also most likely able to discourage a non-compliant 
behaviour. The third condition has to do with the ability of the target group to comply. For 
certain regulatory rules and policy to be implemented, it requires the provision of necessary 
information and other technical support. Non-compliance becomes almost impossible if any 
of these conditions is not met. Thus, policymaker’s should direct their quality control 
activities not only to the drafting and publishing of a rule, but must ensure that the three 
conditions are met to ensure regulatory compliance.120 These conditions underscores the very 
need for a pluralistic/multi-dimensional approach of regulatory quality reform within energy 
law. 
2.3.2 Ecological and Environmental Economics 
The subject of economic factors regarding the environmental protection debate is not a new 
issue. Different aspects of economics has been analysed within regulatory architecture since 
the early days of environmental rules and legislation.121 Two clear movements can be 
examined critically. 
‘Environmental economics’ is the first approach which adopted the internalisation of 
externalities, understanding pollution as the “consequence of an absence of prices for certain 
scarce environmental resources”.122 The way to address these externalities, they argued, on 
the one hand, lies in specifying a price and then conducting cost-benefit analysis. Other 
academic contributors to the debate, on the other hand, proposed a reduction in the transaction 
cost involved in policy implementation, an issue not new to regulatory design.123 This paper 
stated that the main features for environmental regulation listed by environmental economics 
academics are: the deployment of economic instruments as a first preference; accepting 
uncertainty as inevitable in decision making; seeking marginal and transaction abatement cost 
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reduction; a consideration of existing alternatives including technology and institutional, to 
mitigate costs; investing in information campaigns; and evaluating the pros and cons.   
Recently, a new generation of economists complemented the environmental economy debate 
to include sustainability as part of the issues to be considered, mainly on the premise that 
environmental goods and services are scarce and fraught with capacity constraint.124 These 
scarcity and capacity problems created the ecological aspect of the equation in regulatory 
reform improvement.125 This recent research brought about a focus on the relationship 
between ecosystems and economic systems, giving high preference to ecological valuation 
methodologies because all indices show that current regulatory systems have not attached 
sufficient importance in the management of environmental resources for sustainability.126 
In common, all these authors have recognised this gap and proposed regulatory reform aspects 
that can be summarised as follows: a focus on sustainability as a goal; the adoption of a 
preventive approach; ensuring that ecosystem resilience is maintained, as well as the natural 
stock; improved instruments for flexibility and efficiency; and the need to adhere to scientific 
based processes and ensure institutional improvement.127  
2.3.3 Ecological Modernisation 
The 1980s led to the emergence of the ecological modernization theory from a small select 
group of European researchers. It generally evaluated the interaction of stakeholders during 
the regulatory process at different scales and made recommendations for improvements from 
concepts such as ‘reflexive modernisation’128 and risk society.129 This theory criticises 
alarmist perspectives toward environmental crises issues. However, the theory sought to strike 
harmony between ecological rationales for economic growth with environmental 
preservation.130 Recognizing that many problems presented some form of opportunity for 
reform, this suggested the need for environmental criteria and instruments, and that 
requirements should be adjusted to suit market conditions.131 
In this regard, the theory formulated five pillars aimed to promote dialogue and negotiations. 
They include: recognising the potential of science and innovation to proffer solutions; 
increasing the potential for market dynamics in the requirement of definitions; reviewing 
regulations to be more flexible, adaptive, decentralised and participatory; modifying the role 
and position of social movements in decision making; and making environmental and 
economic needs to be mutually inclusive.132 In summary, the ecological modernisation 
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concept called for a pragmatic regulatory reform where negotiations are decentralised, the use 
of market instruments is expanded, awareness of the recognition of government’s inability to 
tackle all problems alone. Further, it called for the adoption of a more participatory style of 
decision making, the creation of long term achievable goals for environmental agencies, the 
substitution of governance for government, a focus on prevention and the aim for self-
regulation and voluntary agreements.133 
2.3.4 The Strict Environmental Regulatory Reforms 
First popularised by Porter and Van der Linde,134 reflective contributions espouse the 
relationship between environmental regulation and competitiveness. Also, that a well-
designed environmental standard can push for innovation that may partially or more than fully 
eliminate the costs of complying with them. As a result, a lot of research have confirmed this 
hypothesis reasserting that Porter’s hypothesis does not require further complementary 
strategies.135 The focal idea behind their contribution otherwise known as the Porter 
Hypothesis is that strict environmental regulation has the potential of enhancing 
competitiveness.136 
A discussion of the Porter Hypothesis is outside the purview of this thesis. Nevertheless, the 
suggestions made for regulatory reform are quite useful. The most relevant include: focusing 
on result, not on technology; maintaining restrictive regulation; regulation should extend even 
to the end user, and encourage the search for solutions from previous stages of production and 
consumption chains; encourage the use of market incentives; harmonise legislation; ensure 
there is consistency with other countries legislations or slightly below theirs; maintain a 
certain level of regulatory process stability and predictability; engage regulated communities 
in the design process from the beginning; minimise the time and resources consumed in the 
regulatory process.137  
2.3.5 Performance Based Regulatory Reforms 
Amidst the debate of new regulatory reform improvements, requests arose from industry 
participants championing the drive in sustainability efforts for new regulatory style. This 
group requests that their environmental performance efforts should be taken into account 
whilst setting environmental standards. Hence, the strategy called ‘performance based 
regulation’.138 This genre of regulation is based on the assumption that ‘one-size-fit-all’ 
regulatory approaches are not fair or effective, and that government does have the absolute 
prerogative to determine the better solutions to all problems. In this regard, they have 
supported the stance that better performers should be allowed to contribute toward 
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improvements. This performance based regulatory reform is mainly focused on information 
disclosure, the establishment of indicators and performance evaluation methods.139 
Despite this regulatory architecture being focused on performance and flexibility, other 
relevant aspects suggested are: the use of information and technical assistance as instruments; 
creating more flexible licenses based on performance standards; encourage the use of funds 
collected as fines to fund improvements in companies; adopt self-regulation tools; ensure 
continuous improvements; create administrative benefits for those who uphold the highest 
form of environmental performance improvements; maintain consistent rigorous standards; 
assist small and medium enterprises technically and financially; set achievable targets within 
a long term period; use regulation to engender innovation; and mobilise resources for 
monitoring.140 
2.3.6 The Pluralistic Regulatory Approach 
Other vital contribution regarding the reform for improving regulation as frequently referred 
to by researchers is known as ‘smart regulation’ which Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
elaborated on in their work.141 Their main article admitted the insufficiency of command and 
control regulatory strategy, suggesting a more effective, efficient, equitable and politically 
acceptable approach. Gunningham and Sinclair argued that achieving a better regulatory 
design involves a more imaginative, flexible and pluralistic approach in conjunction with 
those suggestions described above by Gunningham Neil. Therefore, the article proposes five 
‘regulatory design principles’ to serve as guidelines and a roadmap for policy makers which 
include: incorporating instrument and institutional combinations; the preference of less 
interventionist measures; the escalation up regulatory measures to the extent necessary to 
achieve policy objectives; give room for participants who are in the best position to act as 
surrogate regulators; and maximise opportunities for win-win outcomes.142 
2.3.7 The ‘New Environmental Regulatory’ Approach 
Daniel Fiorino, former director of USEPA, proposed a regulatory reform to directly discuss 
how environmental regulation can be harnessed to expand its influence on the behaviour of 
firms and thus obtain more ambitious environmental outcomes.143 According to Fiorino, in 
his defence of regulatory reform, he stated that regulation is more of a learning process issue 
than a political struggle. The following guideline proposals were formulated by Fiorino: 
making regulation more comprehensive; preventing regulatory capture by firms or 
environmental groups; channelling the degree of regulatory pressure in relation to 
environmental performance; and developing learning from environmental experiences and 
outcomes. 
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2.4 Shale Gas Specific Regulatory Reforms 
Other research has served to provide a review of the economic and environmental implications 
of shale gas development around the world.144 Furthermore, the present research provided a 
comprehensive review of the challenges and implications regarding sustainability and 
economic aspects associated with the development of shale gas as an energy source at the 
global, regional, and local scale. Water contamination and use have been the common 
recurring theme from the reviewed studies in terms of shale gas extraction risks.145 They all 
identified a need for sustainable shale gas fracking. 
Similarly, another study146 using Pennsylvania state regulation, proposed ten key principles 
to reduce the risks and to increase the net rewards of UOGE. These ten principles as suggested 
by the study would be in addition to existing regulations and include: undertaking greater 
levels of pre-production measurement and monitoring, especially of ground water levels and 
quality, so as to establish a clear baseline for subsequent assessment; improve transparency 
by operators throughout the production process, particularly when fracturing operations are 
conducted, so that the public can have confidence in the operations and also compliance with 
regulations; heighten scrutiny on well integrity, so as to give the greatest possible assurance 
that no cross contamination of water resources will occur over the entire lifetime of the well, 
including when production ceases and wells are capped; treat or adequately dispose of both 
formation water and fracturing fluids for shale gas; minimise air emissions, especially of 
methane, from flaring or worse, venting; employ regional approaches to measure cumulative 
impacts, given the large numbers of wells drilled; lower operating risks (for example, less 
toxic fracturing chemicals, greater recycling of produced water) through rigorous and 
adequately resourced compliance work, funded by industry, and which includes the 
monitoring of fracturing operations; either establish purpose-built regulatory agencies in 
jurisdictions where this is appropriate or support better coordination across relevant agencies 
to respond to the complex issues spanning the range of government responsibilities; mandate 
on-going reviews of regulatory adequacy and cost/complexity, bolstered by experience and 
insights from global experience; and provide provision of adequate funding from the industry 
itself, for monitoring, assessment and compliance across the production process.147  
As part of the regulatory response required to tackle risks associated with shale gas extraction, 
some studies148 have also suggested the establishment of “Superfunds” and the signing up to 
an insurance scheme as part of the requirements for the grant of permit to explore for and 
extract shale gas resources. Superfunds are meant to address pollutions, which might be 
urgently required to tackle pollution from oil and gas accidents. Whereas the insurance 
schemes operate as a check between the financial institution who in this circumstance is a 
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quasi-regulator of the oil and gas companies. This seems helpful because companies have the 
greatest inkling and incentive to adhere to the prescribed best practices for fear of being 
declined when applying for financial loans or standing the chance of receiving an increased 
premium claim made against the operator.149 
A paper150 carried out a comparative analysis of the two environmental law principles that 
should guide the regulation of shale gas extraction in EU. According to the work, the two 
principles are the main tools of European law, which aim to strike a balance between enabling 
and prohibiting the development of an emerging energy technology like shale gas extraction. 
Nevertheless, all these proposed guidelines for environmental regulatory reform admit the 
fact that regulation is the key strategy that can guide the extraction of shale gas from any 
region.  
Notwithstanding the similarity in these articles in that they are all targeted towards promoting 
regulatory effectiveness in mitigating risks associated with shale gas extraction, they have 
also made a common recommendation for more inclusive research to be conducted into the 
existing regulatory approaches with divergence. As a result, this thesis observed that all 
regulatory responses have not been able to adequately argue how liability systems can be 
included into regulation in mitigating shale gas risks. Particularly, the issue of operators being 
shielded from liability having complied with all available regulatory guideline and standards 
in ensuring environmental and health protection. 
This and other issues that will be identified during this research in detail underscores the 
fundamental problem of why regulations and liability systems might remain ineffective. 
Whilst most studies and scholars have measured the effectiveness of regulation based on the 
compliance level to all available safeguard standards, this thesis begs to deviate from such 
narrow representation and, in doing so, argues that effectiveness of regulation and liability 
systems should transcend to the realm where operators will still be liable even though they 
have complied with the prescriptive safeguard standards for mitigating risks during their 
operations.  
The issue of regulatory capture either by oil and gas companies or environment groups is 
another reason why even a well-crafted regulatory framework might lose its potency. This 
capture may arise because companies or environmental groups may contribute to the 
formulation of some safety regulatory responses either through financial support or creating 
the enabling infrastructure. As a result, the likelihood that regulations will be crafted in such 
a complacent manner that favours the vested special interests of the companies or 
environmental groups who sponsored the regulatory institution. The economic and legal 
hurdles involved in developing regulations is another reason why direct environmental 
regulation might become unnecessary in the mitigation of risks associated with any activity 
such as shale gas extraction through HVHF. 
The cost involvement from the investigatory stages of certain issues that need to be addressed 
through policy intervention is huge. This might create a situation whereby regulatory 
institutions will be tempted to source external funding from firms and private institutions. 
Where this is the case, regulatory institutions then often fall prey to the whims and caprices 
of these firms. This investigatory requirement is crucial because, without this, the policy 
                                                          
149Iringe-Koko, N. (2014). Balancing commercial interests with environmental and socio-economic 
responsibilities in the Nigerian oil and Gas Industry, Grosvenor House Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom p.83. 
150Ruven, C. F & Leonie, R. (2016). Shale gas extraction, Precaution and prevention: A conversation on regulatory 
responses.” Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 20 pp.131-141. 
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intervention might be challenged and reversed as having no legal justification.151 In the long 
run such costs incurred are borne by the final consumer in terms of pricing regulation. Direct 
regulation also has the tendency to limit new participant’s entering into the market. When 
regulation becomes too robust and demanding, new entrants are limited in that they do not 
have a level playing field with their old counterparts to compete. It therefore negates the very 
essence of a competitive liberalised market. 
As this thesis is about law and policy with a view to developing a framework for 
environmental regulation and liability in mitigating shale gas risks, this thesis specifically 
argues for an indirect or self-regulatory system to deal with the existing problems of direct 
regulation as mentioned earlier. It will bring out possible incentives of self-regulation in 
addressing where liability should lie in circumstances where operators have observed the 
prescribed regulatory guidelines. The identification of environmental liabilities as a 
complement to environmental regulation in mitigating shale gas risks allocates a moral 
responsibility; the responsibility is required for effective reparation, and the economic 
valuation provides arguments to claim compensation, seek remediation in all the ramifications 
of resource extraction. This is because there has been no extensive study conducted regarding 
the complementary role of environmental liability to regulation.  
Moreover, within the extractive industry, technological advances are projected to increase. 
This increase in technologies is said to be sparked off by the increase in world population and 
the need to satisfy world energy needs.152 Without a well-defined environmental liability 
system that can foreclose the current dash for immature technologies which a direct form of 
regulatory response might not be able to address holistically, this thesis lays the foundational 
argument for an indirect or self-regulatory approach through the strengthening of liability 
systems in making regulation effective in risk mitigation. 
Regulation or regulatory responses could be adversely affected and become futile where 
creators of harms know that they could escape liability due to certain existing legal exceptions 
and uncertainties inherent in some legal frameworks. However, an indirect or self-regulatory 
approach can foreclose the possibility for operators of such risk promoting activities to escape 
liability. Thus, uncertainties surrounding where the residual liability should lie is defined. 
How this should work in principle is simple. The role of making safety guideline requirements 
towards avoiding the occurrence of harms should be left with the industry even though the 
regulatory agency drafted this rules and guidelines in principle. Industry players determine 
whether to go beyond the level of cement required for the well casing and the periodic baseline 
water testing before, during and after drilling operations, should be the legal duty of the 
operator in principle, even though in practical terms the regulatory institution makes the rules 
for governing their operations.  
Why this legal shift is required is that if there is a negligence claim against such an operator, 
the operator cannot shield themselves from liability on grounds that they have adhered to the 
standards laid down by the regulatory body. Therefore, the indirect or self-regulatory style of 
regulation re-enforces a strong liability system based on the precautionary principle153 and 
forces the operator to anticipate risks and proffer solutions ahead. 
                                                          
151Ibid. 
152See supra Andres J. C. et al., (2018) foot note 144 at p.78. 
153See supra Benjamin, J. R; & Stephen, W. (2006) footnote 26 (Discusses the aim of the precautionary Principle. 
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By strengthening the liability system through self-regulation such that the residual liability 
remains with the operator even where safety guidelines have been followed, it arguably erodes 
the present idea whereby the measurement for effectiveness of regulation must continue to 
depend on the degree of compliance level of those regulated. Rather, what self-regulation will 
do is to change the status-quo whereby the measurement of regulatory and liability system 
effectiveness would transcend to the ability of an operator to improvise or bear additional cost 
voluntarily in devising safety guidelines for mitigating risks the operator understands more 
than the regulator 
Thus, in a growing world like ours where technology is developing more rapidly than the 
available safety measures, it is imperative to devise other forms of strategies whereby liability 
would also remain with the operator of risky activities. To this end, it is the argument of this 
thesis that if the prescriptive safety guidelines are compiled by the industry, the issue of 
operators being shielded from liability where they have complied with the prescribed rules 
they made is no longer an issue.154 This thesis argues that industry players who invent 
technologies often perceive that they will be shielded from liability if they observe all 
available safety guidelines that govern resource extraction activities as prescribed by direct 
regulation. As a result, there is the dash to introduce technologies that are not environmentally 
friendly among better alternatives.  
The presence of information asymmetry makes direct regulation significantly susceptible to 
the prevailing uncertainties and complexities as mentioned above already. These complexities 
and uncertainties make even the most sophisticated regulation lacking. The issue of regulatory 
capture or subversion would also be compensated by self-regulation especially for issues 
relating to safety standards. Essentially, whether a tool, or a combination of tools, is ideal 
depends on the nature of risk that the regulatory agency seeks to mitigate. To this end, policy 
makers could adopt the properties of self-regulation alongside direct regulation and liability 
standards to ensure that all nature of harms to environment and health is reduced. When 
deployed effectively, it fosters responsible shale gas development, transfers the costs 
implication involved in making regulation to the party best able to bear them. Further, it 
ensures optimal activity levels and promotes a guaranteed level of risk-taking for 
comprehensive environmental preservation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
154McDuffie v. Watkins Glen International Incorporation 833. F, Supp. 197, (W.D.N.Y., September 3, 1993); See 
also, Johnson v. Smith, 2006 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 2618 at 37-38 (City Ct, of New York (Jefferson County) September 
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Chapter 3 
 
3. The Activity of Shale Gas Development, Its Environmental and Health Impacts 
In issues of liability and regulation in whatever form it may be enforced for the damage caused 
to the environment and health of human, a special place is occupied by the remedies available 
for shale gas accidents as it stands in today’s energy extractive industry. This regulatory 
regime that is being argued for by many, including this thesis, for the governance of the 
operations and establishment of liability for extractive activity’s damage began from a dual 
perspective.  
First, perspectives range from the reduction of energy sources that characterise some regions 
of the world, the shale gas boom represents a definite solution and perspective.155 Second, we 
must not neglect the serious risks in the long term to which both humans and the environment 
will be confronted with while harnessing these shale resources through hydraulic fracking 
technique. 
Such risks are linked to the possibility of contamination and added stress to the existing water 
scarcity that confronts the world today or the dispersed nature of risks that results in air 
pollution to personnel and those living around shale gas sites. Thus, it is the assertion of this 
thesis that the exploration and extraction of shale gas should be strictly regulated. 
Furthermore, it should be strictly monitored to forestall accidents whose effects would leave 
a transgenerational impact.  
Despite all the safety measures which industry claim would guarantee a safe delivery of shale 
gas exploitation, there are still increased frequency level of risks in terms of water 
contamination. Therefore, it appears there is a need to question the liability and regulatory 
systems applicable for shale gas extractive activity. Having said that, it is imperative the 
reader understands the technical aspects of fracking and the associated potential as well as the 
highly probable risks. As such, this Chapter illustrates both the technical aspects of hydraulic 
fracking and its impacts on environment and health. 
On one hand, these technical aspects of fracking are only examined in brief since this is not a 
vital ingredient of this thesis. On the other hand, this Chapter has carefully identified the 
various negative environmental, health and social aspects that fracking operation presents. 
This thesis in its discussion often drew a comparison between these negative impacts with 
conventional natural gas extraction. It corroborates the positions of other literatures that have 
asserted that these impacts are not in any way different from what happens in the context of 
conventional natural gas extraction. However, the present work share the assertion of other 
articles that water contamination seems to be a unique risk to fracking. This position is not 
because the magnitude is different from the conventional water contamination issues. Rather 
this work relied on a frequency level of occurrence and the fact that water contamination could 
result from so many sources and reasons during drilling. This work provides a statistical 
representation of various water contamination incidents in the U.S alone since the inception 
of fracking as well as identifying four diverse ways whereby water contamination could occur 
from fracking which will be examined later in this section. From this, it appears that the 
‘predominance’ with which water can be contaminated in unconventional oil and gas 
                                                          
155Tiemann, M & Vann, A. (2013). Hydraulic fracturing and safe drinking water Act issues In: Ferguson, S & 
Gilbert, M.T. Hydraulic fracturing and shale gas production: Issues, proposals and recommendations Energy 
Science, Engineering and Technology, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporation, New York, p.29-30. 
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extraction through the technique of fracking is more frequent when compared with 
conventional gas extractive technique. 
Thus, on the strength of these factors and the evidence, the present research categorised the 
issue of water contamination associated with fracking as a unique risk. Lastly, this Chapter 
will carry out a comparative analysis of the alternative forms of fluid based hydraulic 
fracturing by identifying the advantages and disadvantages of each. Based on this analysis, 
the work drew an inference as to why the water-based hydraulic fracking was chosen amongst 
the alternatives which appears to be better and less environmentally exerting.  
3.1 Introduction 
The high permeability that characterise conventional mineral formations contribute to the 
formation’s ability to retain abundant deposits of natural gas unlike shale that have low 
permeability. Hydraulic fracturing is therefore an engineering treatment performed to low 
permeable formations/reservoirs to strengthen communication underground within the gas 
reserves and enhance productivity. The ability to produce natural gas from shale deposits 
requires several steps in addition to hydraulic fracturing. These steps among others include 
road and well pad construction, drilling, well completion, production, abandonment and 
reclamation. These steps are characterised by potential environmental effects. 
For those living near hydraulic fractured wells, there exist documented negative impacts. A 
systematic review reveal that 84% of public health studies gives an indication that there are 
public health hazards, elevated risks, or adverse health outcomes.156 Similarly, 69% of studies 
conducted on water quality contained findings that suggests potential, positive association, or 
actual incidence of water contamination.157 Further, 87% of air quality studies reveal findings 
that suggests elevated air pollutant emissions and/or atmospheric concentrations.158 As the 
negative impacts of fracking have become something that is accepted by opponents and 
proponents as existing and clear, scholars have begun to seek the importance of devising 
effective regulations, policy interventions and a robust liability system to achieve the 
sustainable development of the oil and gas sector. Thus, policy makers and all stakeholders 
need to take account of the regulatory and complementary dimension, liability would have to 
regulation when making decisions159 regarding the mitigation of fracking risks and impacts 
that will be discussed further in this Chapter. 
On the reverse side, fracking’s public policy benefits are obvious. First, increasing industry 
use of hydraulic fracking provides diversity to the sources of domestic energy that has made 
countries like the U.S non-reliant upon imported oil from politically unstable countries.160 
Second, abundant natural gas from shale as a cleaner burning fossil fuel supports the argument 
that any country who shifts from coal to natural gas will have a quicker decline in Greenhouse 
Gas (GHG) emissions as a result of cleaner burning fossils in the generation of electricity 
                                                          
156Hays, J & De Melo-Martin, I. (2014). Ethical concerns surrounding unconventional oil and gas development 
and vulnerable populations. Rev Environ Health, 29, pp.275 [Online] www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-
s2.0 84915775768&origin=inward&txGid=e8bc5ae37dcebf6a22d31ee6ebc42d47 (Accessed 12/07/2018) 
157Evensen, D. (2016). Ethics and “fracking”: a review of (the limited) moral though on shale gas development, 
WIREs Water, 3. 
158Neville, K.J. et al., (2017). Debating unconventional energy: social political, and economic implications. 
Annual Review Environmental Resources, 42 pp. 241-266. 
159Evensen, D. (2015). Policy decisions on shale gas development (“fracking”): The insufficiency of science and 
necessity of moral thought. Environ Val, 24 pp.511-534. 
160Global Insight HIS. (2009). Measuring the economic and energy impacts of proposals to regulate hydraulic 
fracturing.  Report Prepared for the American Petroleum Institute. 
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power.161 Third, shale gas operations could result in economic development positives like the 
creation of infrastructure, well-paying jobs, revenues and taxes for affected local 
governments.162 Having said this, it is important to take a quick cursory look at what hydraulic 
fracking is and the associated impacts. 
Fracking as it is fondly called by industry participants means the merging of cutting edge 
technologies which include: advanced high pressure, high volume hydraulic fracturing, and 
often horizontal drilling, and it has been used worldwide.163 Fracking techniques entail the 
injection of a mixture of water, sand and synthetic chemicals into a borehole under high 
pressure to create fractures around the surrounding rock layers. The purpose is to produce 
channels for oil and natural gas to migrate freely. The sand, as part of the mixture that is left 
behind, keeps the fractures open.164 Boreholes are drilled comprising of well heads above-
ground tubes, valves that are attached to underground well, tanks and other equipment. This 
is done on the well pad. 
Multiple wells can be drilled on one pad covering typically an area equivalent to about three 
hectares.165 The well casing is inserted inside the borehole which serves as a seal for 
surrounding rock and the groundwater contained therein.166 Fracking as a technique for 
extracting oil and gas resources is not new in general. However, the technique has only been 
used to extract oil and natural gas from conventional wells until recently that is, in those 
surrounding naturally porous rocks like sandstone, where fluids find it easy to flow, and 
fracking is used to stimulate recovery in situations when extraction becomes a challenge. 
The extraction of unconventional oil and gas (i.e. trapped in tight low permeable rocks such 
as shale) through fracking techniques has only taken place on a large scale within the last 
decade in the US. While the chemical characteristics of shale gas are no different from those 
of natural gas extracted in other natural formations, the processes involved in its production 
is very distinct. Contrary to the requirement of a vertical drilling technique used for 
conventional wells, fracking in shale requires horizontal drilling which is more complicated. 
Huge numbers of wells are drilled as the gas cannot migrate far distances to the source for 
extraction. As a result, millions of gallons of water mixed with synthetic chemicals are used 
to aid these gases to migrate to the wellhead. 
3.2 Shale Gas Extraction Process Stages 
Broadly there two major stages involved in the extraction of natural gas from both 
conventional and nonconventional reserves, namely: well pad construction and well 
completion. Of note, the nomenclature may differ. Whilst unconventional gas fracking will 
call the first stage well pad construction, conventional extraction may call it well construction. 
They are as follows: 
 
                                                          
161Engelder, T. (2011). Natural gas: should fracking stop? Nature, 477, pp.271-275. 
162Sovacool, B. K. (2014). Cornucopia or curse? Reviewing the costs and benefits of shale gas hydraulic fracking 
(fracking). Renewable Sustainable Energy Reve. 37, pp. 249-264. 
163Meng, Q et al., (2016). ‘Fracking’ Handbook of climate change mitigation and adaptation, pp.1-14 
164The Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, (2012). Shale Gas Extraction in the UK: A Review 
of Hydraulic Fracturing. [Online] http://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/shale-gas-extraction/report/ [Accessed 
December 5, 2016]. 
165Ibid. 
166Broderick, J. A et al., (2011). ‘Shale Gas: An updated assessment of environmental and climate change 
impacts’. A report by the Tyndall Centre.   
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3.2.1 Well Pad Construction 
A prepared area on the surface is required for the horizontal wells being used for extracting 
gas and oil from shale formations. That area is known as a well pad. It serves as a stable base 
for the accommodation of a drilling rig, water-storage tanks, retention ponds, loading areas 
for water trucks, associated piping, and pumping and control trucks.167 Once the well 
construction is completed, the pad serves as a location for establishing the wellhead and other 
equipment used for production. Well pad size is dependent on the depth of the well as well as 
the number of wells to be drilled on site. Ordinarily, four to six wells or more can be drilled 
on an individual well pad with a footprint of around 260ha per unit.168 
3.2.2 Well Completion 
Well completion involves several steps necessary to assemble the downhole casing, tubulars, 
and equipment to effectively exploit oil and gas from a well once it is drilled. It also involves 
the processes of creating perforations in the production casing as well hydraulic fracturing of 
the formations. Consequently, the following sections illustrate the different processes of 
drilling a well and its completion. 
3.3 The Various Processes of Unconventional Oil and Gas Extraction 
3.3.1 Drilling 
Most shale resources are situated at depths of one thousand eight hundred metres or more 
below ground level and can be relatively thin.169 For example, the Marcellus Shale formation 
is between fifteen and sixty metres thick, depending on the location.170 Hence, to ensure 
efficient extraction of gas from such a thin layer of rock requires the use of the horizontal 
drilling technique through the shale as shown in figure 1 (below). This is achieved by drilling 
vertically downward first until the drill bit reaches a distance of around two hundred and 
seventy five metre from the shale formation.171 
At this stage, directional drilling is introduced to create a gradual ninety degrees curve for the 
wellbore and the drilled hole that is bounded by the rock face to become horizontal as it 
reaches optimal depth within the shale. Then the shale formation is drilled horizontally for 
one and a half thousand, metres or more for the wellbore to follow the formation.172 From a 
single pad, multiple horizontal wells that can access different parts of shale formations can be 
drilled thereby reducing the footprint of operations and enabling a large area of shale to be 
exploited from a single pad. 
 
 
                                                          
167Corrie, W. C et al., (2012). Introduction: The technology and policy of hydraulic and potential environmental 
impacts of shale gas development, Environmental Practice, 14, p. 250. www.doi; 10 1017/s1466046612000415. 
168Ground Water Protection Council and All Consulting. (2009). Modern shale gas development in the United 
States: A Primer. US Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory, Washington, DC, 116 pp. 
[Online] Available http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-
gas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf [Accessed December 12, 2016). 
169Qiang, W et al., (2014). Natural gas from shale formation-The evolution, evidences and challenges of shale gas 
revolution in United States, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews Volume 30 pp.4 
170Ibid 
171See supra Gray, W.B & Shimshack, P. (2011) footnote 118. 
172Thomas, M et al., (2018). Shale gas production costs: Historical developments and Outlook. The Extractive 
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Figure 1. Typical configuration for a horizontally drilled, hydraulic fractured shale gas well. 
 
Source Reference: Shale Gas Fracking-the facts and figures. The Guardian; (2012); What is 
Hydraulic Fracking? Propublica, 2012 [Online] https://ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-
S1364032113006059-gr2.jpg  (Accessed 21st June 2018). 
3.3.2 Casing Installation and Perforation 
Once drilling is done satisfactorily, the installation of steel casings at the wellbore to prevent 
the migration of contaminants to the freshwater aquifers is required. Although, drilling can be 
stopped in the event of potential contamination during the process to allow the installation of 
steel casing piping at the wellbore, when the wellbore reaches depths below the deepest 
freshwater aquifer, casing is installed to avoid the water from being polluted because of the 
drilling process. At the centre of the casing, cement is pumped down and forced up the annulus 
between the casing and the borehole.  
Several layers of protection through freshwater zones are provided as one or more 
intermediate strings of casing may be installed in these deep wells at some point. Production 
casing is run through the entire length of the borehole and is cemented in place from the end 
of the horizontal borehole to at least a point exceeding the curve where the well is vertical. 
This process is done after the well has reached its full horizontal length to prevent leakage of 
natural gas from the well to the rock demarcating the formation from the surface, and to 
prevent migration of natural gas to the surface through the annulus.  
Perforation of the section of the well through the shale formation is carried out with the aid 
of a perforating gun that detonates explosive charges, producing small holes in the well casing, 
which extend a short distance into the surrounding shale formation. This is carried out to 
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ensure the easy pumping of hydraulic fracturing fluids into the shale and the subsequent flow 
of salt water out of the shale into the well, along with natural gas and oil.173 
3.3.3 Hydraulic Fracturing 
Whilst little gas will flow freely into the well after perforation, fracture networks must be 
created in the shale to enhance the steady flow of natural gas. These fracture networks are 
created through hydraulic fracturing. Typically, in this process 8,700-20,820 m3 (2.3-5.5 
million gallons) of fluid composed of 98%-99.5% water and proppant (normally sand) are 
pumped at high pressure through the perforations.174 The fracking fluid may contain 0.2%-
2.0% volume of a mixture of chemicals that enhances the fluid properties.175 These chemicals 
play different functions:  there are acids that are used to ‘clean’ the perforations for efficient 
natural gas flow; biocides used for preventing the growth of organisms which clog the shale 
fractures; corrosion and scale inhibitors meant for protecting the integrity of the well; gels or 
gums that boost viscosity to the fluid and suspend the proppant; and friction reducers that 
improve the flow of fluid to the transmission of pressure from the pumps at the surface to the 
bottom of the wellbore and on to the deepest parts of the induced fractures.176 
Usually vertical fractures are created due to hydraulic fracturing that take place in the shale. 
These fractures extend away from the perforated horizontal wellbore connecting pores and 
existing fractures in the shale creating a pathway for fluids to flow. The proppants which are 
pumped into the wellbore under high pressure keep the fracture opened once the pressure is 
reduced and fluid flows back out of the well.  
Individual wells must go through hydraulic fracking in multiple stages, starting from the 
farthest end of the wellbore, to increase productivity of each well. Accordingly, once all 
hydraulic fracking is completed, plugs which were used to isolate each fracking stage are 
removed. 
After the post-fracture exercise, fluids (commonly known as flow back water) flow to the top 
of the well and immediately the surface valves of the well are opened. Aside from the 
proprietary blend of chemicals present in the hydraulic fracking fluid, it may also contain 
other constituents naturally present in the reservoir, including: Naturally Occurring 
Radioactive Materials (NORMS). The composition of the chemicals of the flow back water 
depend on the formation and the time after well completion. The initial flow back water looks 
like the fracturing fluid but later the combination of the flow back water looks more closely 
like the existing organic compounds found naturally in the formation. 
In certain instances, the fluid that flows out to the surface can be used again in subsequent 
fracking operations. However, this is dependent on the flow back water quality and the 
economics of management alternatives. If the flow back water is not used again for subsequent 
                                                          
173Cooper, J et al., (2018). ‘Social Sustainability Assessment of Shale Gas in the UK’ Sustainable Production & 
Consumption, Volume 14, pp.1-20. 
174Szolucha, A. (2018). Anticipating Fracking: Shale gas developments and the politics of time in Lancanshire, 
UK. The Extractive Industries & Society, Volume 5, Issue 3 pp.348-355. 
175Ibid. 
176Fernando, C. A et al., (2018). Sustainability lessons from shale development in the United States for Mexico & 
other emerging unconventional oil and gas developers. Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, Volume 82, 
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fracking operations, it is managed through disposal either into underground injection tanks or 
treated to a certain safe level for disposal into the domestic watercourse.177 
3.3.4 Actual Production Process 
At this juncture, recovered gases from the well during production are sent to small diameter 
gathering pipes that connect to larger ones that collect gas from a network of production wells. 
Also, oil and brines are recovered in large tanks on site and trucked off the site. The production 
lifetime of an average shale well is not fully determined because large-scale shale gas and oil 
production only started relatively recently. However, it is generally accepted that compared 
to conventional reservoir rock formations, unconventional shale gas wells experience more 
rapid declining production rates.178 
As a result of this uncertainty, once the initial production phase has lapsed and it is necessary 
to increase productivity, the shale gas well may be recompleted (i.e. cleaned and hydraulic 
fracking will take place) either multiple times or as occasion demands to improve 
productivity.179 In the event that the well no longer produces at an economic rate, the wellbore 
is filled with cement to avoid leakage of reservoir fluid into shallow formations or to the 
surface after the wellhead is eventually removed. Reclamation of the surface is carried out 
and the site is returned to the land surface rights owner. Having reviewed the processes 
involved in the exploration and exploitation of natural gas from unconventional reserves, it is 
pertinent to identify some of the novel impacts this technique presents. 
3.4 An Overview of the Environmental Impacts Associated with Shale Gas Development 
Natural gas from shale is one of a number of types of unconventional fossil fuel. Coal Bed 
Methane (CBM) and methane from Underground Coal Gasification (UCG) are the other types 
of unconventional fossil fuels. The extraction process of CBM resembles the one which is 
used for extracting shale gas, and often involves fracking,180 whereas UCG entails the igniting 
of unmined coal seams in-situ to gasify the coal.181 In as much as the techniques have 
commonality in the issues they present, each is distinct in terms of impacts, and this section 
concentrates specifically on shale gas.  
The environmental, health and social impacts of fracking are among the main concerns 
surrounding the technology. This section will examine the most important local 
environmental impacts, such as water contamination and earthquake risks. Further, this 
section will also consider the current evidence as it affects public health and wellbeing. It 
suffices to note too that the environmental impacts linked to shale gas and oil development 
occur at both the immediate local and national levels. These may include impacts to water 
quality and availability, local air quality, seismic events, climate change and the local 
community. 
                                                          
177Veil, J. A & Clark, C. E. (2011). Produced water volume estimates and management practices. SPE Production 
& Operations 26~3:234–239. 
178Mason, J. (2011). Well production profiles for the Fayetteville shale gas play. Oil & Gas Journal. 
179Zendehboudi, S & Bahadori, A. (2017). Chapter Five: Shale Gas Processing, Shale Oil & Gas Handbook, 
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3.4.1 Water Quality Impacts 
The fact that drilling a well using fracking involves the injection of water and chemicals at 
high pressure into the ground to open rock for the release of natural gas, accounts for series 
of challenges for protecting water resources. Thus, much of the oppositions surrounding shale 
gas extraction centres on water related issues.182 
The issue of methane and fluids from hydraulic fracking operations causes concerns over 
potential drinking water contamination and adverse effects on its quality. The probable 
pathways for such drinking water contamination emanates from improper disposal, 
underground leakages from wellbore to groundwater aquifers or leakages of hydraulic 
fracking fluids to surface water bodies caused by accidents. It has also been argued that the 
possibility for fluids to flow from another pathway aside from the existing wellbore within 
the shale play through thousands of feet of overlaying rock into the drinking-water aquifer.183 
Nevertheless, shallow shale formations may be vulnerable to this direct connection, as it has 
been suggested by the groundwater investigation carried out in Pavillion, Wyoming in 2011, 
where as little as 128 m separated gas deposits from drinking water reservoirs.184 
Contamination may also occur in deep formations due to defects in the wellbore. These 
defects may happen while installing the well if the cement in the annulus is not of sufficient 
quality, or methane can migrate from the shale reservoir up the outside of the wellbore to 
shallow aquifers where it could dissolve and find its way into the drinking water. When depths 
are shallow, casing defects could provide another pathway where contamination may occur, 
giving room for gas to flow through the wellbore to the aquifer. One of the largest documented 
instances of contamination occurred in Bradford County, Pennsylvania, after a well had been 
drilled but prior to any fracking; this was caused by faulty well construction.185 
According to some commentators, in addition to faulty well constructions, wells that are not 
cased or abandoned may result in the migration of methane.186 Among various sources of 
contamination, intentional dumping or accidental spilling of flow back water into adjacent 
water reservoirs is the most easily preventable cause. The overflow that occurs in retention 
ponds during heavy downpours can also cause accidental spillage. 
Flow back water contains pollutants such as NORMs, from mineral formations as well as the 
chemical additives contained in the hydraulic fracking fluid. Their significant concentrations 
may pose serious health concerns. At the commencement of shale gas developmental 
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to shale aquifers in Pennsylvania, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109, pp. 11961-11966 
183Toothill, A. (2013). Fracking in the UK: The storm gathering over our countryside, Amazon.co.uk, Great 
Britain. In: Ferguson, S & Gilbert, M.T. Hydraulic fracturing and shale gas production: Issues, proposals and 
recommendations Energy Science, Engineering and Technology, Nova Science Publishers Incorporation, New 
York, p.29-30. 
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operations in the U.S, there were no federal drinking water standard limits for methane. It is 
however a hazard in water in that at significant concentrations it can volatilise and collect in 
houses and possibly result in suffocation or cause fire explosions. It is worth noting however 
that in shallow formations and freshwater aquifers, methane may naturally occur. Thus, 
methane migration might not only be a product of defective wells or a defect connected to the 
shale reservoirs whilst hydraulically fracking the well. 
 3.4.2 Water Availability and Consumption Impacts 
In as much as hydraulic fracking involves a multi stage process with water being used in most 
of these stages, the bulk of the water is ultimately consumed during the drilling and 
completion phases. Large volumes of water, between 8,000-20,000 m3 (an equivalent of 2.3-
5.5 million gallons), are needed to frack each well.187 Additional water, from 700 to 1,200 m3 
(190,000-310,000 gallons), is used for drilling and cementing works during the construction 
of a shale well pad.188 
A well that has a production life span of 30 years and, during this period, the well is 
hydraulically fractured say three times, the construction and production of shale gas would 
require 27,000-64,000 m3 equivalent to 7,000, 000 to 17 000, 000 gallons of water per well.189 
However, the number of times a shale formation might be re-fractured to extend the economic 
life of that shale well is not known because of the limited production history of most shale 
plays. Once the gas is produced, it is sent for processing before use by the final consumer. 
During each of these phases, water is consumed with the most significant non-production 
consumption possibly happening during the end use.  
The quantity of water required in hydraulic fracturing process depends on the nature of shale 
gas and the fracturing operations, such as the depth and length of the well, the design of the 
fracturing job and the properties of the fracturing fluid. Natural gas combustion can be done 
directly without additional water being consumed. Where the end use of the gas is a vehicle 
tank, it is most likely to be compressed via an electric compressor. Such electricity 
compression involves at least 0.6-0.8 litres of water consumption which makes the total 
consumption vehicle life cycle 1.0-2.3 litre per.190 In fact, the water vapour created during the 
end use combustion process does not automatically make the resource useful until it has gone 
through the hydrological cycle.191 Figure 2 (below) graphically illustrates the water lifecycle 
in hydraulic fracturing. 
 
 
                                                          
187Clark, C. E et al., (2011). Life-Cycle Analysis of Shale Gas and Natural Gas. ANL/ESD/11-11. Argonne 
National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, p. 38 (2011). [Online] Available http://www.transportation. 
anl.gov/pdfs/ee/813.pdf ~ [Accessed 10/12/2016]. 
188The Coal Authority Website, “The Coal Authority (Undated) Underground Coal Gasification In The UK” 
[Online] Available http://coal.decc.gov.uk/en/coal/cms/publications/mining/gasification/gasification.asp 
(Illustrating in detail the extraction process of ucg as type of unconventional fossil fuel) [Accessed June 20, 2016] 
189Satterfield J. et al., (2008). Managing water resources challenges in select natural gas shale plays. GWPC 
Annual Forum. Oklahoma; US Environmental Protection Agency, 2(011). Plan to study the potential impacts of 
hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources Washington DC. 
190King, C. W & Webber, M. E. (2008). Water Intensity of Transportation. Environmental Science & Technology 
42~21! 7866–7872. 
191Wu, M. M et al., (2011). ‘Consumptive water use in the production of ethanol and petroleum gasoline’ Update 
ANL/ESD/09-1. Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, Pp. 100. [Online] Available 
http://www.greet.es.anl.gov/publication-consumptive_water ~, [Accessed 02/12/2016]. 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
49
Figure 2. The water lifecycle of hydraulic fracturing. 
 
Source Ref: EPA Plan to study the potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water 
resources, U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, (2011) [Online] 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032113006059#bib275 (accessed on 
July 13, 2018). 
Nevertheless, water that might potentially be used for shale gas wells may be derived from 
groundwater aquifers, surface water reservoirs (lakes, rivers, ponds), municipal supplies, 
reused waste water from industry or water treatment plants and recycled water from earlier 
fracturing operations. The point to note here is that such withdrawals will result in reduced 
stream flows or the depletion of groundwater aquifers. The impacts on water vary significantly 
depending on the location of withdrawals and their seasonal timing. This often accounts for 
the difference between high impact and no impacts on other users. An evaluation of the impact 
of such water withdrawals on local communities and the local environment both in the short 
and long term is the most reasonable approach to assessing water usage not only for shale gas 
development but other users. A key distinction regarding this water use is whether it is 
sustainable.  
All these issues must be considered when determining water availability and the consumption 
of water associated with shale gas developmental operations. However, the proponents of 
shale gas have claimed that a well will normally return 5%-20% of the original volume of 
fluid to the surface within the first 10 days as flow back after fracking.  
Subsequently, an additional volume of water as flow back, equivalent from 10% to almost 
30% of the total injected volume, will return as produced water over the life of the well.192 
According to these claims, one further proof of the insignificant impact shale gas development 
has on water consumption, is the fact that operators reuse 95% of the flow back.193  
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Hence, the ability to reuse water is highly dependent upon the quality and quantity of the 
water as well as the availability and affordability of water management options. In addition, 
the fact that flow back water is not able to be reused and thus are disposed of in Class II 
injection wells or used as dust suppressant is an added impact on the water consumption issue 
associated with HVHF operations that has an indirect effect on other freshwater users. In sum, 
water consumption for hydraulic fracking will grow with the increasing number of wells and 
shale gas production across any country where shale gas will be developed.194 
3.4.3 Local Air Quality 
Air pollution is another impact associated with concentrated shale gas development. Shale gas 
extraction operations produce GHGs in addition to fugitive natural gas emissions, volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) as well as hazardous air pollutants such as benzene. Drilling, 
hydraulic fracking and compression equipment, typically powered by large internal 
combustion engines, also results in significant emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides.195 
The emission inventories of several states reveal that shale gas operations may worsen the 
levels of ozone and hazardous air pollutants found in the immediate areas of shale gas 
development. For example, the 2008 Colorado emission inventory showed huge emissions 
from anthropogenic sources accounting for 48% of VOCs, 18% of nitrogen oxides, and 15% 
of benzene.196 These contributions notwithstanding, their actual impact is uncertain, since air 
quality within a development area depends on local conditions; hence, more comprehensive 
modelling and analysis is needed to fully appreciate these impacts. For example, an increased 
level of benzene emissions has been found near production sites.197 However, their 
concentrations have been below health-based screening levels.198 
Nevertheless, the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) generally 
reached a consensus agreement that natural gas emits about half as much as carbon as coal 
when used in efficient power plants.199 This consensus is also corroborated by the official 
reports of carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion such as the IEA,200 EIA,201 and the 
U.S EPA.202 These reports resonates the effect of carbon footprint (life cycle GHG 
emissions)203 on climate change that arise from shale gas extraction.204 
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3.4.4 Induced Seismic Event Impact 
It has been asserted that over 95% of injected water for hydraulic fracking, flows to the surface 
as flow back water which either can be reused for subsequent fracking or disposed in class II 
injection disposal wells.205 Keeping in mind that these reuse option depends on the quality 
and quantity of the water, where the flow back water cannot be reused for industrial activity, 
it is sent for disposal at a Class II injection well. The challenge is that in areas where shale 
gas development takes place, there is often insufficient Class II disposal well facilities for 
such water wastes to be accommodated.    
This increased disposal of hydraulic fracking fluid into Class II injection wells may be the 
cause of induced seismic events in such areas, contrary to the claims of the proponents of the 
technique that a properly located well will not cause earthquakes.206 They assert that a series 
of factors must trigger seismic events at a disposal site, that earthquakes are a result of faults 
that exist nearby and must be in a near-failure state of stress, that the injection well must have 
a path of communication to the fault and that the fluid flow rate in the well must be at a 
sufficient quantity and pressure long enough to cause failure along the fault or system of 
faults. 
Looking at the factors mentioned above, it suffice to say that the last factor goes to corroborate 
the argument that increased disposal activity is the catalyst that triggers seismic events. There 
are insufficient disposal wells to contain such large percentage of hydraulic fracking fluids 
that returns to the surface repeatedly within fracking sites. For example, on the one hand, the 
lack of available suitable geology in Pennsylvania has led to hauling flow back water to Ohio 
for disposal in Class II injection wells. On the other hand, studies have revealed that injection 
activities in Arkansas have been connected to nearby earthquakes.207 
3.4.5 Community Impacts 
The development of oil and gas like every other industrial activity is not exempted from its 
own share of local impacts. These industrial processes involve the use of heavy equipment. 
For example, hydraulic fracking requires hundreds to thousands of truck trips to deliver water 
as well as chemicals to execute the entire fracking processes. The intensity of traffic exerts 
unforeseen pressure on the local roads; such heavy loads were not contemplated during initial 
construction. This can result in congestion which might become a source of frustration to 
frequent local users. The movement of heavy equipment, in addition to normal rates of traffic, 
can also be noisy and visually unpleasant to residents. The value of local property, especially 
in residential areas, can be affected negatively due to the beehive of activities taking place 
around the area. Very few people might want to live around such potential risky and disturbing 
surrounding. 
A clear example of a community impact caused by fracking was illustrated in the case between 
Hamblet v. James Martin in his official capacity as a Director, Office of Oil and Gas, West 
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection; Office of Oil and Gas and others.208 In the 
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case of Hamblet, the plaintiff, EQT, a production company holding a valid oil and gas lease 
executed in 1905 encompasses the property owned by Matthew Hamblet, filed a permit 
application with the West Virginia Office of Oil and Gas of the West Virginia Department of 
Environmental Protection (WVDEP) to drill a shale well with “horizontal leg into the 
Marcellus” Shale formation. However, on 7th of April 2010, the plaintiff submitted comments 
to the WVDEP complaining of a prior damage and disturbance to his property from at least 
four other wells in the area. He went further to complain that the erosion and sediment control 
plan was inadequate and that the proximity of drilling waste to surface water presented a 
failure to protect fresh water resources.  
Although the WVDEP was satisfied with all the application requirements after an inspection 
was carried out, the plaintiff filed his “Petition for Appeal of Issuance of a Well Permit” on 
May 27, 2017, seeking to nullify the drilling permit and stating that the state regulators had 
not done enough to protect his land and environment. He claimed that EQT personnel were  
“driving around and off the access roads, parking in the meadows in an unorganized 
way, taking more time than is reasonably necessary to construct the well site, leaving 
chemicals and trash all over the ground, allowing for the silting of creeks away of 
meadows and destroy creek lives and habitats.”209 
Therefore, this kind of situation can contribute to enormous community impacts resulting in 
severe health and safety risks. 
3.4.6 Climate Impacts 
The contribution of shale gas extraction operations to climate change has been quite a 
controversial subject. Proponents claim that it presents positive benefits for the climate. As a 
result, this proposition has been supported to promote the idea that shale gas can provide a 
suitable transition fuel, allowing us to shift from carbon intensive fossil fuels to a cleaner 
energy mix. Advocates of this claim say that burning gas in power stations releases roughly 
half the carbon emissions of coal, making shale gas a more environmentally-friendly option 
compared to coal.  
Nevertheless, advocates on the other side of the divide assert that the issue of climate change 
is challenging and enormous that even if we halve the emissions from coal, it will not be 
enough.210 A study produced by DG Clima under the auspices of the European Commission, 
corroborated the fact that shale gas activities were more carbon-intensive than conventional 
gas and oil fuels.211 The GHG emissions released when shale gas is burnt, adds to the 
increased levels in the atmosphere. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a low carbon source 
of energy and based on growing body of evidence, it could in fact be as damaging to the 
climate as coal.212 
In 2010, GHG emissions were the highest in recorded history, taking atmospheric levels well 
over 350 parts per million (ppm) which is considered the safe threshold level to stabilise 
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warming at around 2 degrees Celsius.213 What this means is that a gradual transition promoted 
through a dependence on gas is no longer a viable option. The IEA illustrated that a global 
energy mix dependent on natural gas would result in atmospheric levels of GHGs at 650 ppm 
CO2 – resulting in catastrophic consequences from the resulting, long term global temperature 
rise of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius.214 
The impact of emissions from gas has resulted in concern at both the national and global level. 
Evidence through scientific research has suggested that shale gas could in fact be as damaging 
to the climate as relying on coal. This is because the methane released during the extraction 
process is quite unusual. Although evidence shows that unconventional gas extraction causes 
small emissions compared to the case of shale gas (0.2-2.9 percent of combustion 
emission).215 Increasingly, fugitive emissions from methane are caused by ‘flow back’, 
returning to the surface, accompanied by large amounts of methane. Methane is likewise 
released through leaks, in processing, and during transportation. Nevertheless, these channels 
where methane is released can be limited using best practices but cannot be completely 
avoided.216 
When compared to carbon-dioxide, methane is a much more potent GHG. Its contribution to 
climate change is 32 times greater than carbon-dioxide over a 100 year time frame and over 
shorter time frames, its impact is even greater. On average, 3.6-7.9 per cent of the total output 
of a shale gas well is lost through fugitive methane emissions.217 In addition, the U.S National 
Academy of Sciences reported that it is likely that natural gas leakages at individual well sites 
is high enough when combined with leakages from  down steam operations, to make the 
overall leakage exceed the 3.2 per cent threshold beyond which coal for at least some period 
of time.218 
 3.4.7 Land Contamination and Use 
The drilling and fracking process also impacts on the landscape, and pollution can affect 
surface soil and sub-soil219 because of contamination from the following: 
 Chemicals from fracking can cause further toxic risk when mixed with naturally 
occurring hazardous substances underground; and 
 Heavy metals and NORMS found underground, which can pollute the flow back liquid 
from the fracking process, or which can build up underground. 
Like every extractive resource process, other aspects of the extraction process could be a 
conduit through which pollution may emanate: from tank and pit fire, explosions, well 
blowouts,220 transport accidents, leaks and spills of methane, natural gas, and chemicals. In 
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April 2011, a Chesapeake well in Bradford County suffered a massive blowout. It was the 
onshore natural gas version of what happened to BP in the Gulf two years previously: a 
wellhead flange failed, and toxic water gushed uncontrollably from the well for several days 
before workers were able to bring it under control. Seven families were evacuated from their 
homes as 10,000 gallons of fracking fluid spilled into surrounding pastures and streams. 
Pennsylvania fined the company $250,000 – the highest penalty allowed under state law.221  
The large number of wells used results in a vast area222being affected by fracking. Each 
individual well has several drill/pump heads, sludge ponds where flow back fracking fluids 
and water are stored, storage tanks and compressor stations. All these led to a high visual 
impact, noise pollution which impacts on residents, farmers, the natural habitat and 
biodiversity. In areas where the demand for land is high, the impacts on land caused by 
fracking could be a trigger for potential conflicts especially where population density is higher 
than in the U.S.223 
3.4.8 Impacts on Population 
In areas where the population density is high, and the possibility that shale gas wells may be 
geographically proximate to population centres can present variety of environmental, health 
and safety risks. While this is likely to be a consideration for problems in countries such as 
the Netherlands where there are 1,285 inhabitants per square kilometre,224 it is may not be a 
consideration in parts of the U.S where the population density is low. 
With fracking driving severe boom and bust cycles in local economies, in the U.S, concerns 
have surfaced about the socio-economic impacts. Although, the arrival of a new well can be 
beneficial to local economies because of the drilling and related fracking activity, problems 
can erupt when large numbers of migrant workers move into small communities. This can 
create a potentially limiting syndrome for local workers in terms of opportunities. The job 
boom drilling activity disappears very quickly as the well depletes faster than imagined and 
the workers leave as the economic bubble bursts.225 
3.4.9 Economic Rivalry for Solar, Wind, and Other Renewables 
An understanding of the dynamic of the global energy market and the factors that determine 
the prices of energy commodities reveals that an increase in the supply of natural gas and oil 
would result in a decrease in prices. In other words, fracturing diminishes the motivations for 
the conservation of energy. Aside from the diminishing effect of price, the question is: does 
shale gas extraction accordingly hamper the smooth development of renewable energy such 
as geothermal, solar and wind? The answer is open to interpretation by the reader. Arguably 
from the authors stand point, the answer is in the negative. This is on the premise that shale 
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gas is not renewable and cannot be compared alongside with other renewables. Government 
can carve a space through its policy objective and programmes to ensure a percentage of the 
energy market to renewable energy.226 
Excluding the protection that can be afforded by such policy initiatives, shale gas is construed 
as a bridging (or transition) fuel for the international energy mix, which will assist in meeting 
international energy demands to the point where renewables can compete favourably.227 In 
addition, the fact that solar and wind are intermittent sources in themselves, an alternative 
source of base load energy is needed to fill the gap when they become unable to meet growing 
demands. Natural gas fits perfectly as the immediate solution when solar energy is not 
sufficient to supply the entire market.228 
Nonetheless, there is an inherent risk that lower natural gas price will be a great disincentive 
for the political support the renewable sector needs and, more specifically, the lower price in 
natural gas will give a strong competitive advantage so much so that renewables will never 
become economically viable.229 Parties against fracturing have not come out expressly to 
demand for the strengthening of the competitive position of renewables. They have, however, 
implicitly suggested placing moratoria and stringent new regulatory structures for the 
governance of fracturing. 
If the shale gas and oil industries are the only industries bearing the burden of this tax goal 
excluding other carbon fuels like coal for example, with all due respect to proponents of such 
a one-sided decision, it does not make proper sense. The logical platform upon which this 
dissenting position is opined is that where fracturing is banned or is enormously expensive, 
whereas coal remains cheap, the effect will not be a dash for more solar and wind energy, 
instead more coal will be consumed.230 On a lighter note, such boomeranging outcome is not 
what environmentalists would be obliged to favour considering the truce that natural gas burns 
cleaner than coal as sources of energy. Therefore, any bargain to promote a reduction in the 
consumption of carbon fuels should be discouraged. 
The nature of the global climate further reiterates this point. Hypothetically, if the U.S banned 
fracking activities, would this serve to discourage other countries from using it? The answer 
is ‘yes’ because other countries would be willing to follow the trend. The various bans and 
moratoria is a clear indication of this assertion. There are large deposits of shale oil and gas 
in China, Argentina, Ukraine, Poland, Libya, and Algeria and in other nations. Although, this 
might take a considerable period of time for them to develop their ability for shale drilling, in 
the end they shall carry out commercial development of these resources.231  
From the above, if this resource has the potential to dissuade the development of renewables, 
it will make no difference if the U.S alone can forfeit shale gas development. What this single 
sided effort could do to the economy, is to preclude the U.S from the benefits of fracturing 
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228Global Insight HIS, (2012). America’s new energy future: The Unconventional Oil and Gas Revolution and the 
U.S Economy: National Economic Contributions 12 p .16 
229Tracy, R. (2013). States cooling to renewable energy, Wall Street. Journal.  
230Susan L. B & Meyendorff A, Op-Ed. (2013). The facts on fracking, New York. Times [Online] 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/opinion/global/the-facts-on-fracking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
[Accessed March 28, 2016]. 
231Gold, R & Kruk, M. (2012). Global gas push stalls, Wall Street. Journal., at A1 (Noting that other nations lag 
the U.S in technical capacity as well as in knowledge of geological conditions, and that the U.S. property rights 
system, which vests landowners As opposed to the state with mineral rights, creates added Incentive to drill). 
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without a corresponding commitment to renewables from a global standpoint. Having 
discussed the general impacts of hydraulic fracking, it is pertinent to examine a unique risk 
associated with fracking. This is unique because the rate of occurrence is quite frequent and 
leaves a transgenerational impact on the victims and the environment. This risk centres on the 
issue of water contamination. 
3.5 Water Contamination as a Unique Risk to HVHF 
Ground water is as essential to humans as energy resources. However, the oil and gas industry, 
using the technique of fracking, has threatened the quality of ground water around shale gas 
sites. The risk is unique to fracturing in contrast to conventional extraction techniques. In 
recent times, the risk of hydraulic fracturing as a threat to ground water has attracted 
significant passion for resistance on both local and international platforms where shale gas 
development is the subject of discussion in media and environmental forums.  
Although there are regulations governing the exploitation of shale oil and natural gas 
resources in every legal system, since ground water contamination is unique to hydraulic 
fracturing there is said to be a regulatory vacuum in the area of addressing the issue.232 It is 
upon this backdrop that this thesis focuses on designing a regulatory framework to determine 
how the issue can be dealt with even though discussions are in progress within various legal 
jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, the important challenge for policy makers is the degree to which this fracturing-
specific risk is uncertain. In any event, experience on ground presents that the risks are limited; 
together with the fact that the practice is sufficiently novel, it is difficult to draw a definitive 
conclusion on the issue. Having said that, this study will proceed to examine the various 
aspects on how ground water contaminations take place. 
3.5.1 Drilling and Fracturing Fluid as First Risk Relating to Water Contamination 
No matter what coherent scientific explanation the industry may advance to justify the use of 
toxic chemicals in fracturing fluids, the truth is that we do not need toxic chemicals to seep 
through shale formations during drilling and subsequent fracturing into water wells and 
underground aquifers. However, one wants to look at it, the fact that industry claims that only 
5% of the total volume of fracturing fluids are composed of toxic chemicals does not in any 
way preclude the migration of these toxic chemicals to water wells located near shale oil and 
gas sites.233  
Again, in as much as technological advances may reduce the use of toxic chemicals in shale 
oil and gas drilling, leaks and spills would be completely eradicated if the use of toxic 
chemicals are excluded from the fracking process. In this regard, it would be completely out 
of place to assume that it is impossible to exclude toxic chemical use in fracturing because 
Halliburton has tested a fracturing fluid that uses enzymes and acid from food.234 A senior 
Halliburton executive attracted media attention when he was shown drinking the diluted form 
of the fracturing fluids.235 Moreover, several other companies are also working hard in 
                                                          
232Wiseman, H. (2009). “Untested waters: The rise of hydraulic fracturing in oil and gas production and the need 
to revisit regulation”, 20 Fordham Environmenta  Law Review, 115, 122–23 [Hereinafter Wiseman, untested 
waters] at p.134–35 (discussing fracturing’s exemption from the Safe Water Drinking Act). 
233Bateman, C. (2010).  A Colossal Fracking Mess, Vanity Fair [Online] 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/06/fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006. [Accessed March 28 
2016]. 
234See supra Ruven, C. F & Leonie, R. (2016) footnote 150. 
235Hargreaves, S. (2011). Clean fracking: Moving to replace chemicals, CNN Money [Online] 
http://www.money.cnn.com/2011/11/16/news/economy/clean_fracking/index.htm. 
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developing “eco-friendly” fracturing fluid.236 To a large extent others are even hoping to 
explore options where neither water nor any water substituting liquid propane, carbon dioxide 
and gas will be used for fracking shale formations.237 If successful, it will go a long way in 
addressing the risks associated with the transportation of water to and from shale oil and gas 
sites. However, in contrast, it may still be necessary to inject the production zone with toxic 
biocides to prevent the degradation of oil and gas by bacteria in the zone.238 
Thus, should such scientific and technological advancements tentatively prove positive, they 
do not provide a complete representation of the much-needed solution in mitigating water 
contamination risks. The key question therefore is: how will toxic chemicals that are used in 
fracturing migrate into drinking water wells? The five possible fracturing-fluid risks are 
described accordingly. 
3.5.1.1 Fracturing Fluid Risks: Migration through Subsurface Cracks  
One distinguishing characteristic of unconventional reserves and conventional oil and gas 
reserves is the reduced permeability of these reserves. To produce permeability, existing 
cracks are either enhanced or more cracks are opened in unconventional oil and gas reserves. 
This is where the fracturing technique becomes necessary in producing the said cracks in 
underground shale formations for the easy flow of oil and gas to the surface. The concern with 
this is that fracturing fluids might follow the opened cracks into water wells and aquifers. This 
is one of the usually viewed risks in hydraulic fracturing.  
According to the proponents of the technique, it is said that the occurrence of this risk is very 
remote from a geological stand point. This is on the premise that fracturing of shale beds takes 
place at 5,000 to 10, 000 feet, whereas the water table is typically only 500 to 1,000 feet below 
the surface.239 However, multiple layers of rocks and clay, some of which are highly 
impermeable, are positioned in between the water well and the actual shale formation that is 
being fractured.  
Looking at this argument from a very logical perspective, such an argument does not really 
hold water. The question the proponents and the industry must answer is as follows: Is there 
the possibility for migration of the fracturing fluid? If yes, then the argument that there exist 
highly impermeable rocks in between these shale formations where fracturing takes place 
becomes simply total guess work to garner cheap support. Fluids, by their very nature, are 
highly migratory and with time, would certainly find their way to an available water table. 
                                                          
236Carroll, J. (2012). Chesapeake testing ‘Green’ fracking fluids in shale wells, Bloomerg News [Online] Available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2012-10-02/ [Accessed May 23, 2016]; Chesapeake-Testing-Green-
Fracking-Fluids-In-U-S-Shale-Wells Html; Press Release, Business Wire, New EPA-Approved Fracking Fluid 
100% Green (2012). [Online]  Available  http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 20120110005568/en/epa-
aproved-fracking-fluid-100-green; Press Release, Family Joule Holdings, Eco-Friendly Fracking Fluid Set For 
Debut (Dec. 6, 2011), Available at http://www.prlog.org/11743014-eco-friendly-fracking-fluid-set-for-
debut.html (announcing release of nontoxic fracking fluid made from waste tallow from beef processing by family 
joule holdings, inc.) [Accessed 23/05/2016]. 
237Bullis, K. (2013). Skipping the water in fracking, Mit Technical. Review. [Online] Available 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/512656/skipping-the-water-in-fracking; [Accessed 23/05/2018]; 
Galbraith, K. (2013). Waterless Fracking Makes Headway In Texas, Slowly, NPR [Online] 
http://Stateimpact.Npr.Org/Texas/2013/03/27/Waterless-Fracking-Makes-Headway-In-Texas-Slowly/. 
(Accessed March 28, 2017). 
238Sapien, J. (2009). “With natural gas drilling boom, Pennsylvania faces n onslaught of wastewater”, Propublica 
p. 29 [Online] Available http://www.propublica.org/article/wastewater-from-gasdrilling-boom-may-threaten-
monongahela-rive (Accessed 12/12/2017). 
239Nicot, J. P & Scanlon, B. R. (2012). “Water use for shale-gas production in Texas”, U.S., Environmental. 
Science. & Technology. Volume 46, at p.40 Table 2.4.  
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Other sources share the same view with the above study, but unfortunately believe that if there 
are instances where fracturing fluids have migrated into water wells and aquifers, there are 
few documented instances of such migration.240 The bottom line is that, it can happen. Further, 
if it was to happen, it would not be possible to recover the quality of the water wells or aquifers 
to its original state.241  
To sum up, cracks do take place and fluids do migrate whether downward or upward through 
cracks/openings, and these activities of oil and gas exploitation take place over a considerable 
length of time. That in mind, fluids can equally migrate. So, the industry should stop 
advancing all manner of excuses to evade the responsibility of arriving at a safe and better 
means of extracting oil and gas resources. Further, individuals cannot adequately predict with 
all certainty what goes on underground because the geological conclusions are based on 
simulations which might be correct or incorrect. 
3.5.1.2 Surface Spills as a Fracturing Fluid Risk 
Surface spills of fracturing fluids are another pathway in which fracturing fluids could migrate 
to water sources. The realistic nature of these individual risks cannot be over emphasised.242 
Accidents could happen on site and fracturing chemicals may spill on the surface prior to or 
following the drilling process and might subsequently seep down into the water table around 
shale gas sites.243 Accidents can also happen involving trucks that convey toxic chemicals to 
and from sites.  For instance, the chief minerals resource regulator in North Dakota’s mineral 
institution clearly put it this way: “You have got thirty gallons of biohazard at a well site that 
can be very dangerous in its concentrated form.”244 It is true that the same surface spills can 
be evident in other industrial and commercial activities that deal with toxic chemicals either 
by transporting them or storing them in a presumably safe place. 
The frequency and typical causes of these spills are still unclear245 despite reports in the media 
regarding these spills.246 This risk of surface spills, however, is not peculiar to fracturing 
alone. However, it is the issue of water contamination that draws the line of difference in 
terms of impacts and peculiarity.   
There exists variety of regulations already governing surface spills which require spill 
prevention plans and rules that govern the storage of the toxic chemicals in the U.S. But when 
we consider the total volume of toxic chemicals that are transported, it can be seen that 
                                                          
240See supra Betts, M. (1991) foot note 88 at p.3-19. 
241See supra foot note 88. 
242Fisher, K. (2010). Data confirm safety of well fracturing, AM. OIL & GAS REP., p.1-2, 
[Online]http://www.halliburton.com/public/pe/contents/papers_and_articles/web/a_through_p/aogr%20article%
20data%20prove%20safety%20of%20frac.pdf. [Accessed March 29, 15]. 
243National Research Council, the Natinal Academy’s., (2012). Induced Seismicity Potential in Energy 
Technologies 156; Keranen K. M et al., (2013). Potentially induced earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links 
between wastewater injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 Geology 699, 702 (concluding, 
based on survey of reports of violations of state standards, that the most pressing risks arise not from injection of 
fracturing fluid underground but from other stages in the well development process and the higher rate of well 
drilling spurred by fracturing). 
244Thong, M. (2018). An assessment of the potential for the development of the shale gas industry in countries 
outside of North America, Heliyon, Volume 4, Issue 2, Article e00516. 
245Ground Water Protection Council on September, (2009) Titled “State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations 
Designed to Protect Water Resources, US Department Of Energy [Online] Available 
http://www.fracfocus.org/…/state_oil_gas_agency_groundwater_investigation p.31-32 (Accessed 20/02 2016]) 
246Lustgarten, A. (2009). Frack fluid spill in Dimock contaminates stream, killing fish, Pro publica, 
http://www.propublica.org/article/frack-fluid-spill-in-dimock-contaminates-stream-killing-fish-921. (Accessed 
2804/2017). 
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fracturing now poses a greater measure of surface spill within the entire industry play. The 
summary of the story is that fracturing fluids ought to be conveyed from one point to the other 
and stored more carefully since each of these risks presents a more realistic risk.247 
3.5.1.3 Flow-Back and Produced Water as a Fracturing Fluid Risk 
As cracks are produced in the shale formations, the gases that escape through the cracks 
forcefully push fracturing fluids back up to the surface.248 Also, water that had accumulated 
naturally in the shale formation known as produced water is pushed up too.249 However, this 
water does not necessarily contain toxic fracturing chemicals but has natural contaminants 
such as salt, organic compounds, silt, clay, oil grease, and NORMs.250 So, shale oil and gas 
operators are expected to capture these fluid when they come up, so they do not seep through 
to the water table. More often than not, these fluids eventually find their way into water tables 
before the lifespan of the fracking activity.  
One thing this study finds rather disturbing is the claim advanced by the industry that 
produced water does not contain toxic fracturing chemicals but contains other organic 
compounds and NORMs. The conclusion is that if the produced water can carry NORMS, 
what makes toxic fracturing chemicals different, having in mind they are all pushed up to the 
surface?  
3.5.1.4 Through Cracked Well Casings as Fracturing Fluid Risk 
Having established the fact that substances underneath could be pushed upward to the surface 
through cracks produced by fracturing, it is also crucial to note that well casing-layers of steel 
and concrete encasing the well could crack, allowing fracturing fluids, gas, or oil inside the 
wellbore to leak out. Due to this eventuality, it is expected that the concrete and steel layers 
are thick, deep enough and set properly to prevent leaks close to the water table. The 
effectiveness of well casing in hydraulic fracturing operations is a phenomenon oil and gas 
regulators are quite familiar with, having in mind it is applicable even for conventional drilling 
practices. However one wants to look at it, a poorly cemented casing could result in a potential 
source of leaks irrespective of whether hydraulic fracturing has been done in that well.251 
3.5.1.5 Blowouts as Fracturing Fluid Risk 
Consequently, blowouts can happen inside the well which involves the uncontrollable release 
of gas and fluid in a gushing manner either to the surface or inside. The major cause of 
blowouts are due to unexpected pressure differences during drilling phases, well testing, well 
completion and during production,252 There are different types of blowouts. Some of these 
include surface blowouts and underground blowouts.253 As most hydrocarbons are lighter than 
rock or water, they tend to migrate upward through adjacent rock layers until either reaching 
                                                          
247See supra Mantell, M. E. (2010) foot note 192. 
248Entrekin, S. et al., (2010). Rapid expansion of natural gas development poses a threat to surface waters. 
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, Volume 9, Issue 9, pp503-511, doi:10 1890/110053. 
249Rebecca, S. R & Soeder, D. J. (2015). Evolving water management practices in shale oil & gas development. 
Journal of Unconventional Oil and Gas Resources, Volume 10, pp.18-24 
250U.S. Geological Survey, Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (Norm) In Produced Water and Oil-Field 
Equipment—An Issue for The Energy Industry, (1999). [Online]  Available http://www.pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0142-
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251See supra  Howarth, R et al., (2011) foot note 210 
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the surface or they become trapped within porous rocks. Further, the process is influenced by 
underground water flow, which invariably causes the hydrocarbons to migrate hundreds of 
kilometres horizontally. Having discussed the first risk relating to water contamination in 
hydraulic fracturing, the fracturing fluid’s ability to contaminate ground water as well as the 
various avenues these fluids can migrate to cause the water risk. This work will now discuss 
the second risk associated with water contamination. 
3.5.2 Contamination of Ground Water Well and Aquifers with Methane as Second Risk. 
Methane, as a predominant constituent of natural gas apart from fracturing and produced 
water, can also be a risk to ground water quality. This risk is more critical than the migration 
of fracturing fluid as fractured wells have been contaminated by methane as well as 
conventionally drilled wells according to some reports.254 The incident of methane 
contamination is indeed an old situation, and one not peculiar to fracturing alone. As part of 
an effective response mechanism to address the issue, states should regulate on the thickness 
and depth of well casings because methane has the ability to leak out through cracks in vertical 
well pipes that run through aquifers.255 A typical example is the enactment of legislation in 
Texas to update its well casing regulation in 2013.256 Here it is important to note that even old 
wells that have been in existence prior to fracturing and horizontal drilling can have leakage 
problems if not sealed properly. 
Fracturing might present a possible methane migration from the fractured shale seam through 
natural fissures in the overlaying rock, or fissures created by the fracturing process into 
aquifers above or near the seam. Now the understanding that the mere presence of methane in 
water wells is a product of fracturing is altogether not true.257  
Moreover, methane can occur naturally and there is the likelihood for shallow methane 
deposits to migrate up into the water table on its own volition.258 For example, from 1997 
through to 2005, a U.S Geological survey in forty-seven counties in West Virginia conducted 
prior to the commencement of gas drilling operations found the presence of methane in 131 
out of 170 residential wells that were tested.259 In addition, a study carried out in Pennsylvania 
in 2011, in an attempt to establish baseline levels of contaminations, showed that methane 
was found in 40% of wells prior to shale gas drilling.260 By way of comparison, the study then 
went ahead to compare levels of contamination after shale gas drilling but found no statistical 
significant difference. 
                                                          
254Steffen, J & Alberto, J. L. (2013). Shale gas vs. coal: Policy implication from environmental impact 
comparisons of shale gas, conventional gas, and coal on air, water, and land in the United States. Energy Policy, 
Volume 53 pp.442-453. (“Methane Leakage from Producing Wells into surrounding drinking water wells…Is a 
greater source of concern [Than leakage of fracturing fluid].”).  
255Ibid at p.41 (“The protection of groundwater aquifers is one of the primary objectives of state regulatory 
programs, and it should be emphasized that good oil field practice, governed by existing regulations, should 
provide an adequate level of protection from [methane leaks].”). 
256The Energy Institute, University of Texas, EIUT (2012), Fact Based Regulation for Environmental Protection 
in Shale Gas Development Summary of Findings. The Energy Institute, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, 
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However, an academic study carried out in 2011 claimed to find the connection between 
drilling and methane contamination, basing it on the conclusion that there are said to be more 
methane in Pennsylvania wells that are within a kilometre of ongoing drilling sites than those 
that are more than a kilometre away from drilling sites.261  
A close consideration of the above study, however, leads to two developments that question 
the study’s conclusions. First, no baseline testing of the wells was done to establish whether 
the well had methane prior to drilling. Second, a disturbing factor is that none of the fracturing 
chemicals used for fracturing was found in the well which ought to be present in the fracturing 
fluid make up.262 Be that as it may, the study discussed above, taking its cue from a 2013 
study, concluded that a reason why methane can be present in water is principally based on 
the topography as well as the geological composition of the area in question, than the presence 
or not of shale gas production. 
3.5.3 Sludge and other Residues Disturbance in Wells due to Fracturing 
This is the third risk relating to water contamination in hydraulic fracturing. This source of 
water contamination is triggered by vibrations and pressure pulses from fracturing operations. 
One very vital aspect of this risk is that the contaminants are already in the well. Fracturing is 
such that the drill bits moves in a rotary manner and as a result, bring up all iron, manganese 
and other contaminants from the bottom of the well into the water wells.263 Logically, this 
reveals why water wells near drilling sites turns out dirty but might not necessarily include 
fracturing chemicals in some cases. Resident’s water wells living around shale oil and gas 
wells are often dirtier beyond their realisation, irrespective of shale gas operations. This could 
arise if rural wells do not have a sanitary-caps or they are situated close to septic tanks that 
have not been pumped regularly. For instance, a survey carried out in Pennsylvania suggested 
that only 16% of rural wells have a sealed sanitary well cap, and more than half were near 
septic tanks that had not been pumped with sufficient regularity.264 In conclusion, whilst it is 
possible that fracturing can stir up contaminants already present in water wells, different 
activities can do so. This can also include running multiple faucets at the same time.265 
3.5.4 The Injection of Fracturing Waste and Produced Water into Injection Wells and 
Sewage Facilities. 
In some cases, fracturing fluids that have been used by energy companies do not need to be 
reused. As such, energy companies ought to dispose of it. In addition, produced water which 
                                                          
261Stephen, G. O et al., (2011). Methane contamination of drinking water accompanying gas-well drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’LACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172 (claiming to “document systemic evidence for 
methane contamination”). 
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is a by-product of all oil and gas production is disposed of too. The efficient and proper 
disposal of these wastes is very important. However, some disposal methods are risky while 
others are not.266  
The land application as a disposal method seem to be the worst form of disposal. This is where 
fluid is practically poured into the ground. This eventually creates the risk where fluid could 
seep down into the water table. If this is the case, this method of disposal should be utterly 
prohibited. Another way in which the fracturing water or produced water could be handled is 
that it could be relocated by truck to a waste treatment plant for disposal. Here, if the waste 
treatment facility only dilutes it and discharges it into a body of water, there is certainly going 
to be a risk of water contamination reason being that the fluid is not going to be diluted to a 
point where the toxicity is eradicated completely or present in the water body at an accepted 
limit. This practice was tenable in the past in Pennsylvania.267 
Conversely, recycling of these fracturing fluids at a more sophisticated treatment process does 
not pose the same risk mentioned above. It helps to minimise the total volume of waste 
created. The storage of fracturing fluids and produced water deep underground injection wells 
is another sophisticated treatment and disposal method.268  
To further ensure that these disposal injection wells do not constitute a threat to the water 
table, there is a requirement for energy companies to use well casings which are sufficiently 
thick enough, and the well itself should be considerably deep enough, so that wastes are 
situated far below the water table. Some say the risks related to the disposal of hydraulic 
fracturing wastes and produced water are quite similar with those of injecting carbon dioxide 
from coal-burning power plants into deep geological fissures.269  
Accordingly, having discussed what the hydraulic fracturing technique is, and the various 
available fluid based hydraulic fracturing methods, this has shown that there are better 
alternatives which could have been taken. Instead, industry chose the slick water based 
hydraulic fracturing principally due to the fact that it cost less (this will be discussed below). 
This thesis so far has also been able to show certain general health and environmental issues 
that slick water hydraulic fracking shares with conventional exploration and exploitation 
activities as well as the issue of the use of toxic chemicals which raises the high probability 
rate of water contamination. This Chapter will now address one of the core key questions of 
the thesis by first reviewing the purpose of regulation and liability as a tool for ensuring safety 
and reducing risk.  
Before analysis what regulation and the role of liability from a law and policy making 
perspective is, by exploring new innovative options in reducing the attendant risks involved 
in activities such as shale gas extraction, it is expedient to look at the various forms of fluid 
based hydraulic fracking techniques.  
This exposition is important in that it exposes the motive behind why the slick water hydraulic 
fracking technique was chosen by industry. To achieve this, the advantages and disadvantages 
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of each of these forms of fluid based hydraulic fracking will be investigated. The reason for 
this is to lay the foundation for the justification for stricter regulatory and liability options.  
3.6 Forms of Formation Stimulation and their Potential Advantages and Disadvantages 
This section will quickly consider some of the various forms of formation stimulation through 
utilising the hydraulic fracturing technique. Further, the advantages and disadvantages will be 
investigated with a view to drawing a conclusion as to why water based hydraulic fracturing 
was chosen above the other forms. Moreover, this section will lay the foundation for Chapter 
IV which contains the argument for the subjection of the shale gas industry activities to a strict 
liability regime as well as other policy options meant to address the information asymmetry 
syndrome which makes regulation and liability as tools for environmental protection lacking 
in managing the risks associated with fracking. These options were carefully formulated with 
the overall goal of observing the tenets of precaution. 
By way of digression, it is important to say something about the relationship and the difference 
between the Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP) and the Precautionary Principle (PP). Generally, 
PPP is a policy tool whereby the polluter or potential polluter is made to internalise the cost 
of carrying out a polluting activity either to the environment or the health of the immediate 
community where extractive activities are undertaken. In contrast, the PP espouses the idea 
that prior to the commencement of any industrial activity which has the possibility of inflicting 
harm to the environment or to human health, adequate precautions should be put in place. 
Absence of scientific certainty as to the level of damage is not a preclusion to take 
precautions.270  
When one look at both elements, it can be seen that the point is to completely forestall harm 
where necessary or to reduce the risk to the environment as it affects human health and 
endangered species, biodiversity and soil. 
The various forms of hydraulic fracturing techniques that are in existence within the oil and 
gas industry have different advantages and disadvantages for operators to decide which one 
to apply. However, it is necessary to understand the term hydraulic fracturing as it is widely 
used nowadays to mean the process of fracturing rock formations with water-based fluids.  
In applied science and engineering, hydraulic fracturing is a topic which deals with the 
mechanical properties of liquids, not just water.271 Apart from hydraulic fracturing, there exist 
other types of technologies which can be used to extract oil and gas resources from oil bearing 
rocks. These types may include pneumatic fracturing and fracturing with dynamic loading, to 
mention a few of them.272  
Therefore, one can define hydraulic fracturing as the technique which makes use of a liquid 
fluid to fracture reservoir rocks. With this understanding, the following techniques of 
hydraulic fracturing shall be discussed: water-based fluids; foam-based fluids; oil-based 
fluids; acid-based fluids; alcohol-based fluids; emulsion-based fluids; and cryogenic fluids.  
It is pertinent to note that the usage of water as a base fluid for hydraulic fracturing is a more 
recent development.273 The performance of the first fracture treatments were carried out with 
                                                          
270Mead, J. S. (2004). The precautionary principle: A discussion of the principle’s meaning and status in an attempt 
to further define and understand the principle, 8 n.z.j. envtl. l. 137, 141–143 (reviewing the challenges drafters 
face in the international law context in defining the level of certainty needed to trigger a precautionary approach). 
271Ketter, A. A et al., (2011). Field study optimizing completion strategies for fracture initiation in Barnett shale 
horizontal wells. SPE 103232.  
272See supra Alan, O. S. (2007) footnote 32 at p.40. 
273Montgomery, C.T & Smith M. B. (2010). ‘Hydraulic Fracturing: History of An Enduring Technology’,  
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gelled crude and later with gelled kerosene.274 Towards the end of 1952, fracturing treatments 
were performed with refined crude oils.275 These fluids were inexpensive which permitted 
greater volumes of production at lower cost. Nevertheless, in 1953, water became popular as 
a fracturing fluid and a number of gelling agents were developed to be used alongside water 
as a fracturing fluid.  
Consequently, what makes fracking technique a serious issue is its increased frequency levels 
of certain health and environmental risk and not whether the process of extracting gas is 
dangerous. The use of water in hydraulic fracking has contributed to one of the increased level 
of risks associated with shale gas development activities: the large quantity of water being 
used and lost underground; the need to contain flow backs; the potential contamination of 
aquifers by leaks of chemicals employed in the fracturing fluids. At this juncture, one point 
needs to be established which pertains to shale formations. Shale formations are fraught with 
great variability. This variability has posed a complex phenomenon such that no single 
hydraulic fracturing technique has universally succeeded in all shale plays.276 The reason for 
this is that each shale play has unique properties that are required to be addressed through 
fracture treatment and fluid design. As such, it is important to provide a brief overview of the 
various forms of hydraulic fracturing and their merits and demerits.  
Nevertheless, one key question that should be asked is: what has motivated the oil and gas 
industry’s interest in choosing the water-based form of hydraulic fracturing technology and 
not one of the other forms? The answer lies in the usual phrase being used by policy makers 
each time they want to attract investments whether such venture could have negative impacts 
on the environment or human health.  
This is the “cost effective measure” phrase which has found its way in all forums where the 
need to arrive at solutions for the protection of the environment and health of citizens comes 
into conflict with the investor’s interest and duty to protect the environment whilst carrying 
out his legitimate right to do business.  
First among the forms to be considered is ‘foam-based hydraulic fracturing as a fracturing 
treatment fluid’. Most of the controversial environmental issues associated with shale gas 
fracking are attributed to the use of water as a fracturing fluid. The uniqueness of foam as a 
fracturing fluid is based on its low-density and high viscosity characteristics. In formations 
that are water sensitive and in places where water is quite a luxury, foams had long been 
considered as one of the best fracturing fluids.277  
Foams are also viewed as ideal for fracturing shale gas reservoirs because they require lower, 
or no water consumption, create less damage in water sensitive formations, and the amount 
of liquid that returns to the surface is less than what was injected into the ground and can be 
handled without much logistical stress after the fracturing process. The foam-based fluid has 
been applied as a displacing agent in porous media and drilling fluids.  
                                                          
274Mistre, M. M. (2018). Shale gas production cost: Historical development and outlook Energy Strategy Reviews 
volume 20 pp.20-25 (discussing about the formation stimulation of hydraulic fracking). 
275Ibid at p.122. 
276Lifeng, Q. L et al., (2018). The fractured- controlled Reserves” based stimulation technology for 
unconventional oil and gas reservoirs. Petroleum Exploration and Development, Volume 45, Issue4 pp.770-778; 
Crawford, M. (2013). “Hydraulic fracturing: Mature technology, modern marvel”. American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers”. [Online] http://www.asme.org/engineering-topics/articles/fossil-power/hydraulic-
fracturing-mature-technology-modern-marvel (Accessed 02/12/2017) 
277Komar, C. A et al., (1979). Practical aspects of foam fracturing in the Devonian shale. SPE annual technical 
conference and exhibition. Las Vegas, Nevada, not subject to copyright. This document was prepared by 
government employees or with government funding that places it in the public domain.  
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In fact, the foam fluid based hydraulic fracturing has proved to be more effective in coalbed 
fracturing in Canada on dry coalbeds than water-based techniques.278 In environmentally 
sensitive regions, there are claims that the use of foam fluid for shale gas operations require 
less amount of water when compared to the conventional water based hydraulic fracking 
operations. By this there is little potential health hazards due to chemical additives in 
fracturing fluids.279  
Nevertheless, this is not to say that this type of formation stimulation is without some 
disadvantages. These disadvantages range from low proppant concentration in fluid and 
difficult characterization of foams. This entails that the flow behaviours are difficult to predict 
and understand. High cost is involved in using foam-based fluids in fracturing. Also, it 
requires a higher surface pumping pressure.  
The Oil based fluid hydraulic fracturing was the first high viscosity fluid deployed for 
hydraulic fracturing operations. Its compatibility with almost all formation type is what gives 
it the major advantage as a fluid technique for fracturing. The potential disadvantages hinge 
on the concern for personnel safety, environmental impact and of course the high cost 
associated with it. Acid based fluid hydraulic fracturing is another form of formation 
stimulation technique.  
The difference between acid and proppant fracturing is dependent mainly on the way fracture 
conductivity is created. Whilst propping agents are used to create fractures, acids are used in 
acid fracturing to ‘etch’ channels in the rock that comprise the walls of the fracture. For this 
process to work effectively, the rock must be partially soluble in acid so that channels can be 
etched in the fracture wells.  
At this juncture, from the above-mentioned types of fluid based hydraulic fracturing 
techniques, two observations can be made. First, it can be concluded that it is possible to 
overcome the shortcomings and challenges associated with the other forms of fluids used for 
hydraulic fracturing, if adequate attention is channelled toward more research and 
development with a view to finding scientific solutions by the industry.280  
However, one disadvantage that kept on recurring in other forms of fluid-based fracturing 
apart from water based hydraulic fracturing is the actual high cost involved in their 
application. Therefore, rather than governments rushing for technologies that have grave 
impact on health and the environment, policy makers and regulators should adopt a 
precautionary approach that gives preference to expensive technologies which are 
environmentally friendly and decent to the human health than encourage cost effective 
technologies with grave health and environmental consequences.  
Until this is addressed in the policy making process, the essence of the precautionary principle 
will be defeated. Surprisingly, we see a sharp contrast to the true tenets of the principles in 
that the term ‘cost effective measures’ could be adopted to promote sustainable means of 
development. What this cost-effective measure has done is to promote and encourage 
economic actors of potential and polluting activities to come up with the cheapest forms of 
technologies to achieve the demands of extraction for economic goals.  
                                                          
278Gupta, S. (2003). Field application of unconventional foam technology: extension of liquid co2 technology. 
SPE annual technical conference and Exhibition. Denver, Colorado, Society of Petroleum Engineers. 
279Edrisi, A. R & Kam S. I. (2012). A new foam rheology model for shale-gas foam fracturing applications. SPE 
Canadian unconventional resources Conference. Calgary, Alberta, Canada, Society of Petroleum Engineers. 
280See supra Global Insight HIS. (2009) foot note 160 at p 63-64. 
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From the point of view of this author, the PP should be redefined to a point where 
precautionary measures should be adopted prior to the commencement of an industrial activity 
which has the potential to impact the environment and health of humans. By this, we mean 
technologies that are costly but are environmentally sound should be given priority over 
technologies which are cheap to operate but not environmentally sound. The foam based 
hydraulic fracking technique is a ready example in this direction.281 Where this is not possible 
a stricter liability regime should govern the attendant risks that emanate from such activity. 
This is where the strict liability principle takes credence to forestall the challenges associated 
with the slick water hydraulic fracking as a relatively new technology.282  
It is also pertinent to analyse the U.S legal regimes applicable to shale gas extraction, to 
understand the dynamics and the gaps inherent in the legal framework in order to justify the 
proposition for the policy intervention options for which the thesis seek to identify for 
mitigating risks associated with the development of shale gas.  
3.7 Summary 
Although there is still difficulty in determining the actual degree of risk to people and the 
environment, the health hazards associated with shale gas fracking are substantial. Multiple 
factors are responsible for the degree of risk and threat to health and environment associated 
with unconventional gas development through fracking. A comprehensive health impact 
assessment must mandatorily take into cognisance the different possible effects and pathways 
and assess the additive and compound effect of multiple risks. The health impact assessment 
must be tailored along the lines of the geological, economic, environmental and social 
characteristics of each surrounding shale play. 
A high level of unpredictability is caused due to the uncertainty created by the multiplicity of 
factors involved in shale gas extraction activities. For example, a study from North eastern 
Colorado found that air pollutant emissions associated with shale gas extraction increased 
after tighter emission standards had been implemented, contrary to what would have been 
expected, and indicating that regulations cannot be guaranteed to reduce risks.283 Therefore, 
there is no clear confidence regarding the system’s robustness and protection toward human 
and ecological health.  
Fracking is also a disruptive and intrusive activity that will damage the natural environment, 
create noise and light pollution, and impose variety of social and economic stressors onto 
surrounding communities. While most of the experiences and evidence of the impacts of 
fracking has been generated from the US and other countries, the risks associated with 
fracking could be severe in UK due to geological factors, the density and size of surrounding 
populations and the proximity of agricultural and tourist activity.284 
It is also pertinent to note that in countries where shale gas development intends to commence, 
like the UK, a growing body of literature shows that fracking cannot be carried out with 
                                                          
281See supra Mead, J. S. (2004) foot note 270. 
282Morton, M. Q. (2013). “Unlocking the earth-a short history of hydraulic fracturing” Vol 10, No 6  GEO Expro 
Magazine on North West Europe and new technologies  [Online]  http://www.geoexpro.com/magazine/vol-10-
no-6 (Accessed 25/03/2017). 
283Thompson, C et al., (2014). Influence of oil and gas emissions on ambient atmospheric non-methane 
hydrocarbons in residential areas of Northeastern Colorado. Elementa. 2, 000035.  
284Hays, J & Shonkoff, S. (2015). Toward an understanding of the environmental and public health impacts of 
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complete safety via any regulatory framework in regions that are densely populated.285 From 
the analysis of the impacts of shale gas fracking, some of the risks associated with shale gas 
can be minimised and some cannot. However, the key question is whether the risks associated 
with shale gas fracking can be curtailed to an acceptable limit. For now, the regulatory systems 
for fracking in most legal frameworks is not clear, complete and robust enough to 
accommodate this evolving change. 
It is also the finding of this work that, considering the health and environmental risks involved 
in fracking, most countries have concluded that the risks and harms associated with fracking 
outweigh the potential benefits. To this effect, an outright ban of the process is evident in 
some countries.286 Based on the foregoing risks and harms associated with shale gas fracking, 
this study therefore calls for at least a three moratorium on all activities related to fracking as 
part of a precautionary approach to:  
(a) Learn from research that will be published in due course; 
(b) Argue and manage the uncertainties surrounding in the current regulatory system 
as well as deal with the problems of the inevitability of risks occurring; and 
(c) Carry out a holistic health impact assessment that incorporates all potential risks to 
health, including their cumulative and compound effects on each other for them to 
be directed toward the specific geological, economic, environmental and social 
characteristics of the areas targeted for fracking. 
Furthermore, the development of unconventional shale gas is likely to displace renewable and 
low carbon sources of energy rather than displacing dirty coal. Invariably an economic 
environment that is inappropriate and non-conducive toward renewable energy development 
is created because of the current abundance of relatively low-cost natural gas, coupled with 
heavy subsidies and a lax regulatory environment for fossil fuels in the U.S and other parts of 
the world.  
The way forward is for industry to begin balancing commercial interests with environmental 
and social economic responsibilities such that the industry is willing and should be 
incentivised to engage in technologies that are more sustainable before introducing them to 
the market. Operators of shale gas sites should endeavour to integrate environmental and 
social justice into their performance. They should definitely arise above commercial interests 
to deliver and carry out their operations in a sustainable way. Engagement in continuous 
intellectual dialogue and interactions aimed at finding answers and solutions to the risks 
associated with shale gas should be strengthened in the field of energy law and policy. 
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Chapter 4 
4.  Regulatory Design: A Review of Regulation and Its Alternatives in Risk Mitigation  
The utility of deterring environmental and health harm from potential violators engaging in 
risky activities has been dependent on regulation in recent times. The principle of regulation 
to achieve compliance to safety standards is gradually losing its relevance for effectiveness in 
risk governance. This is partly because these risks producing technologies accordingly are 
highly dynamic and complex to understand even by the inventors and regulatory institutions.  
To this end, there is need for flexible, innovative legal and regulatory approaches that present 
great value as they hold potential violators accountable at every level for their actions. 
Another ramification is that they redefine the concept of compliance because compliance 
reflects effectiveness in regulation. Regulatory agencies will not only assess effectiveness 
based on the willingness of potential violators to adhere to prescriptive regulatory standards, 
rather the ability of potential violators to anticipate the likelihood of harm and act though that 
measure is not included in the initial prescriptive regulation. 
This prescriptive regulation creates a huge problem for effective risk mitigation. Where 
potential defaulters of environmental standards know that they are shielded from eventual 
liability having applied and followed these requirements, it encourages technology inventors 
and product manufacturers to settle for the most cost-effective option where alternatives 
exists. From observation, and as this thesis has examined in detail in section 3.6, other 
alternatives of extraction are more eco-friendly. However, industry is instinctively inclined to 
act in a way to avoid extra cost. Hence, the cheapest option is preferred among the list of fluid 
based hydraulic fracking techniques.  
It is based on these assumptions, that this Chapter examine the properties of the alternatives 
to traditional regulation such as self-regulation and liability regimes. These alternatives to 
regulation have an in-built mechanism to compel operators of risky activity to mitigate risks 
to a socially optimal level. To achieve this, this thesis will first review the principles of 
regulatory design to clarify the rationale behind making regulation for industry. . Having done 
that, it will give a comparative overview of the various alternatives to regulation. To this end, 
the potential benefits and criticism of each of them will be analysed. So, the reader sees why 
these alternatives fits well in mitigating the contentious risks associated with fracking such as 
water contamination.  
4.1 Introduction 
There has been an evolving phenomenon in the field of environmental regulation since its 
establishment in the 1960s.287 When the earliest generation problems were first addressed, 
new obstacles were presented which revealed the limits of traditional safety environmental 
systems to tackle these new problems. As part of the way forward in arriving at a sustainable 
solution in tackling these challenges, institutions saddled with the responsibility of regulation 
proposed guidelines for reforming environmental regulation and liability. Despite the 
divergence in each of their points of view, they are still without some very strong convergence 
in terms of the recommendations they present. This section aims to establish a detailed list of 
principles for environmental liability from the contributions made by several scholars with a 
view to ensure effectiveness in environmental regulation. It is important to mention upfront 
that for any environmental regulation to become effective in mitigating the risks associated 
with energy extraction, they must include the following: strict liability issues; participatory; 
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decentralised; adaptive to change; rigorous on enforcement; induce innovation; multi-
instrumental; performance-based; planned and gradual; measured and communicated; ability 
to strike a balance between conflicting interests; induce self-regulatory approaches; and be 
reflexive.  
Having said that, it is important to discuss the concept of regulation and liability as systems 
for tackling and managing risks associated with shale gas extractive activity to see how it 
helps address fracking risks. The reason for this is that these two systems forms the basis for 
the bulk of the arguments for the effective management of the risks associated with extracting 
for oil and gas through hydraulic fracking.  
In this regard a definition of each of these systems shall be attempted; their characteristics, 
the roles and the factors that inhibit the proper application of the system towards its desired 
designed objective in managing risks from industrial activities like fracking, the benefits and 
cost of liability regimes, certain alternatives to regulation, the limits of safety regulation and 
the need for liability to fill the vacuum and the justification for regulation. 
The idea of regulation and liability in tort as it were with regard to safety terms represents two 
different approaches for managing activities that creates risks of harm to others.288 The 
principle of liability under tort is private in nature and does not function at the whims and 
caprices of the state but rather it works indirectly through the consciousness in the minds of 
operators that once their actions results in harm, liability is therefore provoked too. It has this 
in-built deterrent effect of damage code.289 On the reverse side, prohibitions, standards and 
other safety regulations are public in nature and change the conduct and behaviour directly 
through the imposition of certain obligations and requirements, at least independently of, and 
prior to, the actual occurrence of harm. 
Thus, as a matter of simple description, it goes without saying that the nature of the activity 
to be governed considerably determines the variableness in terms of the emphasis to be 
employed between liability and safety regulation. For example, whether someone is running 
to catch a bus and eventually collides with another road user will be influenced more by the 
possibility of their tort liability than by any prior regulation of their behaviour. 
In the same vein, whether my neighbour’s roof is damaged because of a tree I cut down is 
affected more by a prospect of a tort suit than by direct regulation. However, other decisions 
may be determined substantially, although not entirely, by safety regulation. For instance, 
where a truck owner drives through a tunnel when it is loaded with explosives or a situation 
where a store owner marks the fire extinguisher, or whether an electricity company includes 
certain safety features in its nuclear power plant. 
The effective regulation of shale gas must provide enough protection to human health and the 
environment and must improve upon what has been developed in the past. Looking at the 
regulatory arrangements surrounding shale gas development, it is glaring that they are 
accomplished within a solid framework of laws and regulations that have been developed over 
many decades for conventional oil and gas.290 The USA is a typical example of this scenario 
and in some regions as will be illustrated in the subsequent Chapter. 
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Despite the fact that these regulatory structures were put in place prior to the advent of major 
shale gas production, they are still applicable. Taking a cue from the experiences of shale gas 
development in the U.S where the principal regulatory authority lies with the states, 
compliance with regulatory requirements for shale gas development is being accomplished in 
many states through additions to and modifications of existing regulations. Hence, the 
significance of this work is to develop certain policy options in conjunction with the existing 
conventional oil and gas legal frameworks that regulate the shale gas industry for reducing 
the inherent risks associated with gas fracking. 
4.2 Definition of Regulation Attempted 
Regulation can be defined as obligations imposed by public law designed to induce 
individuals and firms’ outcomes which they would not voluntarily reach but are in the public 
interest.291 Regulation is enforced by public officials and compliance is aided by the threat or 
imposition of certain sanctions.292 Generally speaking, regulation is a principle or rule (with 
or without the coercive power of law) employed in controlling, directing, or managing an 
activity, organisation, or system. From a law perspective, it is a rule based on and meant to 
carry out a specific piece of legislation (such as protection of the environment).293 Regulations 
are therefore enforced usually by a regulatory agency formed or mandated to carry out the 
purpose of promotion of a legislation. This is also called a regulatory requirement.294 
4.3 Principles of Regulatory Design 
At this juncture, it is necessary to identify the core principles underpinning regulatory design. 
This is not in any way purporting to prescribe specific solutions to environmental threats. 
Rather they provide the guidelines and road map that will equip policymakers to arrive at 
those solutions. These principles shall be discussed sequentially below.  
To achieve this, the Chapter will first begin by arguing the usefulness of using combinations 
of instruments which is meant to conserve resources and avoiding unnecessary proliferations 
of such combinations. Second, the work states that in choosing those combinations, there are 
compelling reasons of efficiency, effectiveness, and political acceptability for preferring the 
least-interventionist combinations that will work. Third, this study recognised that whether a 
particular measure for risk mitigation will work or not is not always apparent in the abstract 
rather an inclusive escalating response up an instrument pyramid in order to achieve more 
responsive regulation and to achieve greater dependability of outcomes. Fourth, this thesis 
argues that to effectively redeploy government’s resources in areas where they are better used, 
it is suggested that a broader array of parties should be involved (most notably business and 
commercial and non-commercial third parties) who will act as surrogate regulators within 
specific industries like the shale gas sector. Finally, a redesign of the regulatory and liability 
systems as mechanisms for environmental and health protective tools is demonstrated to 
achieve a win-win outcome and broaden the range in which such outcomes are achievable. 
Hence, the most relevant principles analysed in this thesis in this section that shapes regulatory 
design in improving compliance should be centred around principles that support policy 
regulatory mix strategy (self-regulation and C&C regulation) and those principle that are built 
around a pyramid schematic representation escalating up an instrument to the extent necessary 
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to achieve policy goals (i.e. deploying less drastic means of achieving compliance first before 
imposing a more drastic means of regulatory strategy for controlling irrational firms behaviour 
that leads to recurring risks from an activity. These two principles are assumed to be most 
important and will prove most successful in the regulation of risks in the field of energy law 
and policy in that it underscores the complementary interdependence of co-operative and 
punitive regulation in accomplishing compliance for mitigating risks from resource extraction 
activity.295 Also, these principles are most effective and important in regulatory design in that 
it prevents the possibility for regulatory failure in achieving its outcomes. Regulatory failure 
could arise from the inability of states regulation to interact with pre-existing “indigenous” 
normative orderings in the target population including management systems and 
organizational cultures, etc.296 These principles (1&3) further reveals that a good 
understanding of compliance and regulation entails not just an understanding of regulator’s 
strategy, but involves the understanding of “regulatory space” in which traditional regulation 
operates.297  
Shearing’s explanation of the understanding of regulatory space is worth quoting for a good 
understanding of what this means in regulatory design. He explains:  
One way of thinking of about this is to imagine regulation as taking place in a space in 
which different regulatory schemes operate simultaneously. The occupants of this space 
may change but it is never empty. If one set of regulatory influences diminishes this simply 
changes the relationship between occupants of this space…regulatory space is a terrain in 
which the state must compete for control of regulation with other regulatory entities.298 
Thus, regulatory pluralism and regulatory instrument mixes in regulatory design principles 
value to energy law and policy parlance was summarized by Rees when he explains that 
pluralism is a perspective that sees: 
The forms and courses of regulatory ordering… not just as unitary and state-centred, but 
as diverse and multi-centred. Just as health care is not found primarily in government 
agencies; rather, it is to be found in the normative systems indigenous to a variety of 
institutional settings…-universities, union’s facilities, hospitals, business corporations, and 
many other corporate groups. Like the state, these indigenous regulatory systems also have 
the capacity to make rules and induce compliance amongst group member.299 
Having articulated the most important regulatory design principle that contributes to the 
effectiveness of regulation, it is important to analyse each principle to have a definite and 
broad understanding of each principle. They include the following: 
4.3.1 Principle 1. Prefer Policy Mixes Incorporating Instrument and Institutional 
Combinations. 
It has been argued by Gunningham and Grabosky that there are very few instances where a 
single regulatory instrument and option have likely resulted in efficient or effective means of 
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addressing a particular environmental problem.300 For example, a ban on the manufacturing 
of certain highly toxic substances is a ready instance where a single regulatory instrument 
may be a highly effective means of preventing their use, without the requirement of invoking 
additional instruments.301 Nevertheless, single regulatory instruments have both strengths and 
weaknesses and none are successfully flexible and resilient to be able to adequately address 
all environmental problems in most cases.302 
The dependability and predictability characteristic which the command and control regulation 
has if adequately enforced can never be over emphasised, but the downside of being inflexible 
and inefficient cannot equally be jettisoned.303 Conversely, economic regulatory instruments 
tend to be efficient but lack the virtue of dependability in most cases. Although information- 
based strategies and self-regulation have low reliability when used in isolation, they tend to 
be non-coercive, un-intrusive and cost effective. However, the success of the two strategies 
depends heavily on the extent of the gap between members of the public and private 
interests.304 
Thus, the best means of taking advantage of the strengths of single instruments and 
overcoming their deficiencies is through the design of combination of instruments such as 
‘regulation’ and ‘liability’ systems. The norm in most jurisdictions is that regulatory 
responsibility and processes has been artificially confined within the purview of government 
and industry. This further exemplifies the outmoded problem of government as an exclusive 
source of regulatory authority. Hence, there is the need for a wider range of innovative options 
which have the indirect effect of compelling actors ranging from commercial third parties, 
such as banks, insurers, consumers, suppliers, and environmental consultants, and non-
commercial third parties to assist in taking such a huge role off the hands of government. This 
automatically gives government the leverage to redirect its limited resources to genuinely 
stubborn companies and become the chief facilitator and broker of third party participation in 
the entire regulatory process. In addition, the idea of multi regulatory parties involved makes 
the entire regulatory process to be mutually strengthened because they serve as check to one 
another. 
The challenge of using combinations of instruments and participants as a regulatory approach 
is that it lays a foundation whereby all conceivable policy combinations will be put in one 
policy design on the bases that the severity of the environmental problems we seek to address 
and their likely impacts on humankind are such that they require virtually any level of resource 
input.305 This approach however is likely to be suboptimal for a variety of reasons.  
First, the capacity of industry to comply with a large range of regulatory and quasi-regulatory 
requirements will be limited due to regulatory overload which is now a well-recognised 
phenomenon.306 Second, it automatically means that the responsibility to cater for the running 
of this type of combination of instrument is imposed on the public purse as well as putting 
excessive demands on public resources. Third, some instruments and institutions will not 
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serve the complementary aim envisaged here because some combinations are either inherently 
made to soothe a particular risk from an activity.  
As a result, they end up being counterproductive, duplicative, or suboptimal. These negative 
effects could be because of poor design at the policy level or through political misfortunes.307 
Braithwaite provided an example of the latter: “[Suppose] there are two coherent policy 
packages on offer: ABCD and WXYZ. One constituency lobbies for the first because it likes 
features A and B of this package. Another constituency lobbies for the second because it likes 
Y and Z. The politicians then try to give everyone what they want by opting for a policy 
package ABYZ. Unlike the original two policy packages, ABYZ turns out to be totally 
incoherent. For example, A and Z are mutually contradictory: the purpose of A is defeated 
when it is put together with Z.308 
On the premise of these pitfalls, it is imperative to establish innovative approaches that will 
foster the design of combinations that are complementary. The following innovative 
approaches on how to reduce the risks associated with shale gas fracking will be examined in 
some detail by way of enabling a complementary mix of policy instruments, where necessary 
to escalate up to higher levels of coerciveness and intrusiveness, and to foster for a design for 
certainty while maximising the potential for economically beneficial outcomes in the 
regulatory process. The complexities involved in designing such an all-inclusive regulatory 
process are so challenging that very little attention has been given in the policy and regulatory 
literature. 
4.3.2 Principle 2. Prefer Less-Interventionist Measures  
Prior to any discussion here, it is crucial to define the term intervention that comprises of two 
principal components: prescription and coercion. While prescription refers to the threshold 
and manner to which external parties such as regulatory bodies and civil society groups dictate 
the level, type and method of environmental improvement and quality,309 coercion, in contrast, 
refers to the threshold to which external parties or instruments determines a firm’s 
improvements and its performance by placing negative pressure on it.310 Some have argued 
for instance that self-regulation is higher in terms of its prescriptiveness than its coercion.311 
That is to say, under the prescriptive style of intervention, it may be required for firms to 
address specific issues and adopt certain behaviours, as contained in codes of practice.312  
However, the corresponding external enforcement mechanism is designed to ensure that their 
obligations as firms are observed. In contrast, economic instruments such as taxes and charges 
are low on prescription and high on coercion.313 What this actually means is that by and large 
firms cannot avoid the exigencies that comes with the price signal through which coercion is 
exercised. The firm’s decision on how to react to the price signal is outside the purview of 
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external influence.314 Accordingly, they may opt to pay higher taxes or change their conduct 
so as to limit the impacts they pose to health and the environment. If they choose the former, 
then they have no control over the type of remediation implemented. Thus, to rank the 
categories of instrument according to the level of intervention is based on balancing or 
assessing each of the constituent components that prescription and coercion presents.315  
From a general consideration, it has been agreed by scholars316 that where all other things are 
equal, there are variety of factors why less interventionist approaches should be given 
credence to more interventionist ones. Most of these reasons can be understood from the 
evaluation criteria which range from: the unique characteristics of the environmental 
problems being addressed; the range of potential regulatory participants and policy 
instruments; the opportunities for consultation and public participation and the desired policy 
goal(s); and the trade-offs necessary to achieve it. 
It is on these premises that this thesis takes a cue to embark on designing a framework that is 
geared toward a less interventionist approaches through developing an innovative self-
regulatory system to further govern shale gas development operations. In particular, the issues 
of efficiency, effectiveness, and political acceptability are some of the reasons why highly 
interventionist approaches are rated badly. In efficiency terms, highly coercive instruments 
most of the time require huge administrative resources in terms of policing and monitoring, 
of which without them they might be inefficient.  
Moreover, instruments that are highly prescriptive lack flexibility and do not encourage cost 
solutions. Most traditional C&C options possess both prescriptive and coercive characteristics 
which often account for the criticisms this approach face. As a result, there is the temptation 
to unnecessarily deploy resources for highly interventionist strategies to police those operators 
who ordinarily would be quite willing to voluntarily comply under less-interventionist 
options.  
On the one hand, sometimes the irony is that enterprises being regulated are forced to spend 
substantial amounts of money in order to satisfy highly prescriptive environmental and health 
requirements that do not actually present the least-cost effective option to the environmental 
problem in question. On the other hand, enterprises that uphold good environmental standards 
may eventually suffer under highly interventionist approaches which often result in hindering 
them from going beyond the compliance requirements as prescribed by regulatory agencies. 
Given these evaluations, highly interventionist approaches are generally less efficient and 
effective than viable innovative policy alternatives. 317Just like conscripts generally respond 
less favourably than volunteers, high interventionist options are also unlikely to be an 
effective alternative policy option in resolving the risks of harms associated with energy 
resource extraction.318  
Regulated enterprises are responsive to positive economic incentives like tax credits and 
subsidies than to negative measures such as taxes and charges imposed. Therefore, high 
coercive approaches can be counterproductive in that they may create resentment and 
resistance from those who view them as unjust and an intrusive intervention by nature, than 
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the practical resolution of environmental problems. In addition, the response of the relevant 
regulatory agency determines the success of the C&C interventionist approach.319  
For example, American enforcement agencies characterised by adversarial legalism may 
spawn a culture of regulatory resistance among regulated enterprises.320 The culture of 
regulatory resistance will most definitely result in the consumption of enormous resources for 
both regulator and the enterprises being regulated in wholly unproductive administrative and 
legal challenges.321 It is not surprising that high intervention is also criticised negatively in 
terms of political acceptability.  
This is often the case in the energy sector, with a proven historical independence from, and a 
strong resentment of, government regulatory intervention.322 For example, taxes and clearing 
controls can produce considerable resistance in the oil and gas sector, and this makes it 
extremely difficult to monitor and enforce direct regulation considering the lack of 
information asymmetry that exists in the operation of extracting these resources. This, makes 
it impossible for regulators to determine the conduct of operators therein.323 Also, due to the 
powerful lobbying strategies of oil and gas companies, highly interventionist approaches have 
been avoided by policymakers. However, quite recently they have preferred the provision of 
information and persuasion in place of direct regulation. 
Conversely, low interventionist approaches provide greater flexibility to enterprises and their 
response, greater ownership of solutions that they are directly involved in creating, less 
resistance, greater legitimacy, greater speed of decision making, sensitivity to market 
circumstances, and lower costs than the problems associated with a highly interventionist 
approach as described above.324  
To this end, Muir argued in his book titled ‘Under What Circumstances Can Law Bring about 
Attitude Change’ that there is enough evidence to show that policy combinations that are non-
coercive are more likely to produce both compliance and a positive attitude change.325  
Therefore, the underlying implication in this principle of “commencing with the least 
interventionist policy approach” 326should be the presumption that the approach is going to 
work. In other words, the instrument is equipped to deliver the identified environmental and 
health outcomes from the relevant resource extraction activity. For example, tradeable permits 
are likely to be effective only when they can be readily monitored and verified and there is 
good trading prospect.   
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4.3.3 Principle 3: Escalate Up an Instrument Pyramid to the Extent Necessary to Achieve 
Policy Goals. 
The previous principle proposed the idea that a least interventionist approach that will seem 
to work should be given preference. The mystery in the equation is that policy designers 
apparently do not know whether a particular approach they choose will work or not, for two 
principal reasons. First, given the different behaviours of regulated enterprises, an instrument 
may be effective in influencing the conduct of some behaviours but not for all. This dynamic 
exemplifies the need for regulation to be responsive to the mix of regulated companies and 
their behaviours. Second, a seemingly likely viable instrument may prove not to be so viable 
through practical experience thereby creating the urgency for deploying stricter regulatory 
measures to increase dependability. Given these concerns, the strategies needed to address 
them should invoke a far-reaching mix of instruments and harnesses a wider range of parties 
in the regulatory process.  
To address the first problem, John Braithwaite provided a window of opportunity in building 
regulatory responsiveness in his enforcement pyramid where he conceived of responsive 
regulation crucially where regulation promoted the culture of dialogue in which regulators 
express to industry their commitment to escalate their enforcement response whenever lesser 
levels of intervention do not achieve its intended objective.327  
Under the model proposed by Braithwaite, regulators respond by offering cooperation as a 
way of showing virtue. The virtue assumed by regulators changes with progressively punitive 
and deterrent-oriented strategies against the regulated enterprises when their expectations are 
not met until the regulated enterprise comply accordingly.328 Such progressive punitive 
response measure can commence by persuasion or issuance of warning letters as the next 
stage. Where that does not get the regulated firm to conform, administrative notice is issued 
too. Where that seems not to work, civil penalties could be invoked against them. This can be 
followed with a criminal penalty. Regulators can use license suspension as a more severe 
measure where the former fails. Where the suspension is defeated, the final punitive measure 
which is license revocation can be deployed. 
The need for gradual escalation up the face of the pyramid and the existence of a credible 
peak or tip, which, if activated, will be sufficiently powerful to deter even the most egregious 
defaulters. These are the two considerations that are central to Braithwaite’s model. The 
former is a laudable mechanism by which regulators can build responsiveness (rather than 
any abrupt shift from low to high interventionism) because it resonates the ‘tit for tat’ response 
as part of the regulation.  
Under this strategy, the regulatory agency deals with each oil and gas company in a 
cooperative, flexible manner but turns to punishment when the company clearly defects from 
cooperation. Once the firm begins to cooperate again, the agency does so too. Nevertheless, 
the latter is crucial in that it has this deterrent value, but it actually ensures a level playing 
field because the virtuous companies are compensated and not disadvantaged.  
A critical look into the dynamics of the energy industry like the shale gas extractive sector, 
there is every possibility to reconceptualise and go beyond the Braithwaite’s pyramid in two 
important considerations. First, the pyramid model is interested in the behaviour of, and 
interaction between, two parties: (state regulator and business) regulated enterprise when there 
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is considerable scope for third parties such as commercial and non-commercial entities to act 
as quasi regulators in the regulatory process. In the same vein, second parties (specifically 
businesses) may themselves carry out a self-regulatory role under programs such as 
Responsible Care whereby operators see themselves as having a social responsibility to carry 
out their activities sustainably.  
Consequently, a typical regulatory enforcement pyramid for the present purpose can usefully 
be conceived of having three faces: each of the three faces representing, respectively, first 
parties (government), second parties (business), and third parties (commercial and non-
commercial). Unlike Braithwaite’s model where coercion comes only in government’s action, 
escalation (i.e. increasing coercion) would be possible up any face of the pyramid. That is, it 
is possible to increase the level of coercion by escalating up the second face through self-
regulation or up the third face through a variety of actions by commercial or non-commercial 
third parties or both.  
To illustrate a situation how escalation can occur from up the third face of the enforcement 
regulatory pyramid, the following example will use the developing Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), a global environmental-standards-setting system for forest products. The FSC 
is overseen by the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). It is a coalition of environmental 
groups, timber traders, indigenous people’s groups, foresters, and community forestry groups. 
To certify forestry products to be sustainably managed, the FSC will both establish standards 
and will ‘certify the certifiers’ These practical standards rely on its influence in changing 
consumer demand by creating strong buyers groups and other mechanisms for 
institutionalising green consumer demand.329 In other words, the ability of this platform to 
influence consumer demands shows the success. The involvement of government through 
formal endorsements and procurement policies that support the FSC makes it valuable. 
Nevertheless, the scheme is entirely a freestanding one and is entirely a third party based 
initiative: from base to peak, ranging from consumer sanctions to boycotts. This scheme 
invariably creates a new institutional system for global environmental standard setting which 
is independent of government. 
Second, Braithwaite’s model of enforcement pyramid is fashioned in such a way that a single 
instrument category is adopted to best tailor enforcement responses, specifically, state 
regulation, instead of being concerned with how best to utilise ranges of instruments to 
achieve the same sets of objectives. Conversely, the expanded pyramid proposed here 
contemplates the possibility of regulation introducing variety of various instruments across 
several phases of the pyramid or dimensions. It includes the escalation to higher thresholds of 
coerciveness not only within an instrument but across combinations of instruments and across 
various faces of the pyramid. Thus, the three dimensions of regulation encourages the 
possibility of escalating degrees of coercion through interaction among different and 
complementary instruments by beginning with one less intrusive instrument, such as business-
initiated voluntarism or education (i.e. using second parties) but transcends to another 
instrument where the first exhausts its responsive potential by using third parties to audit the 
company or government mandated community right to know.330 In the event that all prove 
abortive, higher coercive instruments such as government enforcement (command and 
control) or third party foreclosure of a loan is introduced to create conformity. Be that as it 
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may, the switch from one level of coercive instrument will not work effectively unless they 
are connected so as to enable a strategic escalation to the top when less coercive approaches 
fall through. 
Joseph Rees, in his article “Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety 
since Three Mile Island”, provided a graphic illustration on how exactly this can occur when 
he analysed the highly sophisticated self-regulatory programme of the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operators (INPO), which, post Three Mile Island, constituted may be the most laudable 
and effective scheme worldwide.331 In spite of this scheme, it is incapable of working 
efficiently if it operates in isolation. Having done all, it is evident that there will be some 
industry non-conformists who do not respond to education, persuasion, peer group pressure, 
gradual nagging from regulatory agencies in the oil and gas industry, shaming, or the other 
instruments of informal social control at its disposal. 
Even with this scheme, little progress was achieved in changing the behaviour of this minority. 
However, INPO encountered a dilemma as a handful of plants were ignoring the challenges 
INPO had identified yet going tough was not an option in the equation because that might 
result in forcing the non-conformist out of the association.332 The INPOs only option after 
five years was to turn to the government regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC). NRC involvement led to the dismissal of top executives, substantial improvements on 
safety and eventual plant shutdown. Calling the powers of the NRC which had the exclusive 
capacity to bring criminal proceedings and shut down plants made it possible for INPO to 
achieve these heights. Had the recalcitrant few not been dealt with by taking effective action 
against them, and in the longer term and free riders were permitted to continue with the 
necessary sanction, then INPOs authority over the firms would have been destroyed? What 
this portrays is that for the lower levels of the pyramid to function effectively, it might depend 
on the introduction of a peak, which in this sense is something only the government can do. 
Just as Rees pointed out that the achievement of the INPO was largely because they climbed 
on the shoulders of the NRC in dealing with the recalcitrant few.  
Thus, the case above further exemplifies the importance of integration between the different 
levels of the pyramid. The same way the NRC did not result to threatening actions against the 
recalcitrant but were in touch with INPO which in effect, is a tiered response of education and 
information, escalating through peer group pressure and a series of increasingly threatening 
letters, ultimately to the threat of criminal penalties and incapacitation, of which criminal 
penalties can only be imposed by government. However, INPO in this regard could explore 
the option of issuing threatening letters to achieve its goal from operators. 
This is an example of one of the most successful schemes of self-regulation ever documented, 
the presence of the regulatory gorilla in the closet was what made it successful. This is why 
this thesis tends to explore both regulation and liability schemes to achieve the much-needed 
sustainable shale gas development in terms of mitigating the highly probable risks of water 
contamination and use. A mix of government mandated information which is a modest 
interventionist strategy in integration with third party pressure at the higher levels of the 
pyramid might also be a veritable approach. For example, government should require fracking 
companies to disclose various information about the chemicals used for fracking operations, 
leaving ample opportunity for victims of frack accident to know who is responsible as well 
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and so non-commercial third parties would have evidence to bring pressure on poor 
environmental performers.333  
In sum, two general conditions make it unsuitable to adopt an escalating response up the 
instrument or enforcement pyramid in regulating shale gas extraction risks. First, in 
circumstances of serious risk of irreversible loss or catastrophic damage, a graduated response 
is inappropriate for the reason that the risks are too high: the victims of shale accidents may 
not be restored to the status quo, before the regulatory agency may be able to determine how 
high up the pyramid it is necessary to go to escalate to enforce compliance or change the 
behaviour of the target group.334 In such situations using a horizontal rather than a vertical 
approach may be ideal where regulatory safety nets can be imposed simultaneously rather 
than sequentially.335  
4.3.4 Principle 4. Promote Participants that are in the best position to act as Surrogate 
Regulators 
For every regulatory process there are number of second and third parties, both commercial 
and non-commercial, who act as quasi regulators that contribute immensely to the success of 
the entire regulatory structure. These quasi regulators may range from industry associations 
who administer self-regulatory schemes in conjunction with financial institutions to 
environmental and other pressure groups. Regrettably, policymakers have completely ignored 
or for some reason avoided their valuable contributions to the point that they treat government 
as the sole regulator. For example, in the UK a move to a more determinative style of 
regulation decision making, whereby policy goals are prescribed by legislation and the role 
of the regulator is essentially to implement these goals, has removed much discretion from 
the regulatory process. Thus, even though greater rights for public participation have been 
introduced, many of the environmental standards the regulator must enforce have largely been 
predetermined at the legislative level, and expectations of what can be achieved through 
community participation may well be frustrated. If the regulatory structure can be expanded 
in a manner that accommodates additional players, the most serious vacuums that characterise 
the traditional regulatory approaches may be addressed.336 
There are a few positive indices why the introduction of third parties into the regulatory 
process may provide for effective outcomes. First, companies respond more swiftly to the 
demands of quasi regulators than government interventions regarding an anomaly.337 Take for 
example a threat issued by a bank to foreclose a loan to a company with low levels of liquidity 
is most definitely expected to have a greater impact in that, it will force the recalcitrant to 
heed policy requirements than existing government instruments or a combination of 
instruments. Second, there is this preconceived notion amongst firms that government 
mandated requirements are majorly built around political bias and compromise an influential 
few.338  
Second, where such mandated imperatives come from commercial institutions, firms see them 
as legitimate per se. For example, the recent research note by The Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (HSBC Bank) a commercial bank in the UK dated July 18 said a second 
                                                          
333Mondello, G. (2015) Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third-party liability role. Energy Economics, Volume 
51 pp.553-559. 
334Nuttall, W. J et al., (2017). Compensating for severe nuclear accidents: An expert elucidation. Process Safety 
and Environmental Protection, Volume 112 pp131-142. 
335See supra Gunningham, N & Young M. D. (1997) footnote 304, pp.3-98. 
336See supra Grabosky P. N. (1994) footnote 315 pp.419-48. 
337See supra Yap, N. et al., (2007) foot note 322 at p.283. 
338Ibid. 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
80
Buhari (The incumbent Nigerian President as at 2017) term “raises the risk of limited 
economic progress and further fiscal deterioration, prolonging the stagnation of his first term, 
particularly if there is no move towards completing reform of the exchange rate system or 
fiscal adjustments that diversify government revenues away from oil.”339 Hence, the 
involvement of third parties in the process may well be important in terms of gaining political 
acceptability. Third, as already mentioned in the previous principle, government resources are 
limited especially in an era of fiscal constraint.  
Consequently, it makes good business sense for government to set aside these resources for 
situations where no viable alternative exists but direct regulation. Fourth, even though 
resources are readily available, still government is not omnipotent because most areas of 
commercial and industrial activity like shale gas fracking are comprised of a myriad of small 
players that affect the environmental performance of industry where direct government 
influence is impractical. These small industry players are even difficult to identify let alone 
to regulate all of them.  
Fifth, it is preferably advantageous to work in partnership with markets rather than against 
them. This interpretation does not mean a retreat into ‘free-market environmentalism’. Rather 
this thesis acknowledges the place of market’s power in changing and shaping industry 
behaviour and the extent to which this potential influence remains untapped. Accordingly, 
harnessing the power of the markets is a function of the involvement of second and third 
parties as opposed to direct government regulation. 
4.3.5 Principle 5. Maximize Opportunities for Win-win Results. 
One major setback that firms face in the conventional style of regulation is that there are 
hardly incentives for continuous improvement for environmental performance. For example, 
where the emission standards are placed at 100 ppm, no rewards are given to the firms to 
substantially make attempts to go beyond the set standards. The failure of the system to 
encourage companies to adopt pollution prevention approaches over end-of-pipe solutions 
(the same standard can be met by putting scrubbers on the chimney rather than developing 
cleaner technologies).  
This also can be said of shale gas development where among the various fluid based hydraulic 
fracking techniques where the ‘slickwater’ fluid based hydraulic fracking technique is adopted 
by industry because of its cost effectiveness rather than going for the foam based hydraulic 
fracking technique which is safer but more cost intensive. If the industry had gone for the 
foam-based technique, it would be a good environmental performance criterion that regulation 
must consider. 
The win-win outcomes principle encourages the ideal that the opportunities for both 
continuous improvement and accident prevention will be considerably enhanced to the extent 
that companies can achieve higher levels of environmental performance at the same time as 
increasing productivity or profits. This reiterates the justification for the need for innovative 
approaches for risk reduction in shale gas extraction activity. Therefore, once these innovative 
framework policy options are discussed, it will go a long way in ensuring that regulatory 
solutions optimise the opportunity for win-win results that facilitate and reward firms for 
going beyond compliance, while also maintaining a statutory baseline and a ratcheting up of 
standards. This, of course, happens to be a key challenge for policy making objectives and 
goals. 
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4.4 The Limits of Safety Regulation  
To enforce safety requirements for the purpose of reducing the occurrence of harm resulting 
from a particular activity, regulators have adopted various approaches. These approaches 
could come in the form of a classical command and control approach. This style is such that 
the regulator sets specific standard requirements for regulated companies and enterprises, 
comprising of specific technological measures which ensure that the prescribed standard 
requirements are implemented in a satisfactory manner through regular inspection routines. 
This approach seems to promote fairness and clarity in the requirements. However, it suffers 
from some inherent problems which will be described below.  
The second prescriptive one size approach to regulation could be the ‘goal-based or outcome 
based’ approach. Here the specific goals or outcomes are established by the regulator for the 
regulated firms without specifying how these goals and outcomes will be reached. This style 
encourages flexibility in allowing regulated companies to opt for the most effective approach 
to reach the objectives set by the regulator. But there appears to be difficulties in identifying 
accidents that have occurred for a long while. An example, is the contamination of ground 
water source where several operators are concentrated around the contaminated groundwater 
source. There is also the ‘Process based’ approach of regulation. For this, it the principal 
responsibility of the regulatory agency to identify key processes that are expected to engender 
safety performance by the regulated company. Such a process could be the establishment of 
a safety management system which requires regulated companies to implement them 
effectively.  
This approach incorporates the regulator to be part of the stakeholders to observe and discuss 
management–level activities in regulated companies, but this might not be necessarily 
effective in ensuring good overall safety performance. Also, the ‘self-assessment’ approach 
requires the regulated firms to establish self-assessment programmes and identify areas 
relating to their activities and safety management that need extra attention. Likewise, they are 
given the opportunity to improve on the areas of weaknesses identified. This promotes a 
continuity in improving safety management but is ineffective if used as the sole regulatory 
requirement. 
Having said that, it is important to note that these prescriptive one-size regulatory approaches 
have factors which inherently limits the effectiveness of regulation in general. These issues 
include: 
4.4.1 Technological Innovation leading to Outdated Regulations 
The shale gas industry through the innovation of the slick-water hydraulic fracking technique 
further reveals the static nature and outdated characteristics of regulatory approaches which 
sometime take a long time to be updated by the government. The changing technological 
landscape is often quick and rapid. As a result, these outdated processes can no longer adapt 
to dynamic innovations and end up requiring firms to implement techniques that are cannot 
address the issue of risk. For instance, decades-old regulations managed by the US 
Department of Transport require the headlights of cars commercialised in the USA to have a 
high and a low beam, and nothing else. This prevents manufacturers from introducing 
innovative new headlight designs which detect the presence of incoming traffic and adapt the 
beam shape to avoid dazzling incoming drivers.340 
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4.4.2 Regulator’s Lack of Information on Risks. 
A look at the activities of exploring for and exploiting for oil and gas resources deep 
underground, there a lot of complexities involved in terms of technological expertise, not least 
when talking about the new technique known as slick water hydraulic fracking. These and 
many more considerations make the industry highly technologically advanced. As a result, 
the regulators of such industries often find it difficult to appreciate the risks associated with 
the entire value chain of the activity or a product as well as the effectiveness of safety barriers. 
This leaves the regulator at the mercy of one who is knowledgeable in the field or at the whims 
and caprices of operators providing such risk information before the regulator can certify and 
give their approval regarding the safety design. However, this set back is less severe, or non-
existent, in industries whose techniques are not relatively new as some have argued. 
4.4.3 Regulators’Lack of Information on Costs and Benefits 
For both the firm and affected parties to arrive at decisions which are compatible with the 
socially optimal level of prevention, regulators need to determine the costs of prevention 
required for each regulated activity and dividends of improved safety for potential victims. If 
companies do not shoulder the same costs due to their size, the productivity or the age of the 
facilities, regulators should ordinarily set different standards. Where same standards are set 
for companies, it would lead to over deterrence, whereby they meet standards that are too 
costly given the benefits or under-deterrence syndrome (having to meet more stringent 
standards at reasonable costs). It is expedient that regulators have to get information on 
victims’ preferences as long as benefits are concerned. This is important because some victims 
prefer to experience more risks in as much as they pay less for the goods and services sought 
to be produced and rendered respectively by hazardous activities or more production and 
consequently more job opportunities. In real terms, the regulator is not privy to this 
information which makes the regulator formulate uniform industry standards that apply across 
the board, in spite of specific circumstances. 
4.4.4 Regulatory Capture or Subversion 
To adapt to these information disparities, there is this cooperation that is needed by regulators 
with firms and potential victims of hazardous activities to incentivise them to make known 
their costs and preferences respectively. As a result, this cooperative tie may result in the 
‘capture of regulators’341 because the regulator relies on the firm and the victims to make an 
informed decision as to the compatible socially optimal level of risk reduction. This breeds a 
feeling of domination over the regulator by the firms or by the victims.342 
Whilst regulatory capture regarding ethical lapses may appear extreme in the example given 
above, it leads to a situation whereby the regulator depends on the industry standards and 
expertise to make decisions. The industry formulates standards for which regulators regularly 
incorporate as voluntary industry standards.343 In particular, this trend is prevalent in areas 
with a rapid pace of technological change. The effects manifest in loss of expertise and 
capability to independently assess the risks of operations involved.344 Also, firms can escape 
                                                          
341Portman, M. E. (2014). Regulatory capture by default: Offshore explanatory drilling for oil and gas. Energy 
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fines or other penalties for regulatory non-compliance when public institutions become 
vulnerable to subversion orchestrated from bribery or intimidation. As Glaeser and Shleifer 
asserted, this can even lead to subversion of the legal system, and thus avoid civil liability by 
avoiding civil liability which is a more dangerous risk than that of subverting regulators.345 
4.4.5 Verification Cost 
During verifying a company’s activities, regulators must embark on visits to sites, control and 
audit regulated facilities. These activities are costly and are supported by society. This is 
somehow surprising that regulators from an economist perspective they argue that regulations 
attract different costs whose costs exceed its social benefits.346 Also, that this cost generates 
market inefficiencies and undermines economic growth. Regulators often lack the resources 
to monitor compliance with safety rules.347 
4.5 Alternatives to Regulation 
It is a fundamental basic prerequisite for regulation to be consistent and equitable, meaning 
that the same conditions apply across board within similar industrial operators and activities. 
This sparks off the situation for a detailed and prescriptive regulatory process, which requires 
specific types of technology for instance. This category of regulation is known as ‘command 
and control’ which have the tendency to impede incentives for technological and 
organisational innovation concerning safety. An intermediate approach that can address the 
loop-holes that C&C regulation is unable to meet is the use of legal standards in law. These 
standards attempt to provide adequate levels of safety especially in industries that experience 
constant change as it tends to integrate expert knowledge in a form which may change more 
rapidly than regulation.  
The shale gas industry shares the same changing dynamic. A simplifying viewpoint on the 
distinction between a rule and a standard is that rules are applied ex ante, and standards ex 
post. For instance, a rule might provide a list of specific toxic substances which may not be 
released into the environment, whereas a standard might only ban the release of ‘highly toxic’ 
substances and leave the determination of which substances are ‘highly’ toxic to expert 
judgment, after the fact.348 This is why this thesis seek to explore these alternatives to 
regulation. Industry players and professionals get involved to formulate the various rules and 
procedures that define what the current state of knowledge considers to be good practice in 
these regimes. The following are the three main alternatives to the traditional command and 
control regulation. 
4.5.1 Liability Regimes 
These regimes are applicable under the tort system. They can be quite punitive and rely 
ultimately on the coercive power of the state like the ‘command and control’ regulation.349 
Although they rely on the coercive influence of the state, they are not coordinated by the state. 
Rather they rely on private citizens to recognize injuries and enforce norms on one another. 
                                                          
345Glaeser, E. L. & Shleifer, A. (2003). "The rise of the regulatory state." Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 
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This alternative shall be dealt with in detail in the next section since it forms part of the 
approaches which the thesis sees as a veritable means to mitigate the resultant risks associated 
with the health and environmental impacts of shale gas. 
4.5.2 Market-Based Regulation 
In this type of regulation, the regulator, to achieve their regulatory objective, harnesses the 
power of the market through the use of incentives, regulatory taxes, trading and subsidies to 
encourage compliance to safety standards. A best-known example of this market-based 
regulation is emissions trading. This scheme works by the regulator creating and overseeing 
a market in pollution credits that can be freely traded among regulated companies. The beauty 
in this emissions trading as well as regulatory taxes and other price-based schemes is that they 
seek to influence the behaviour of companies350 in the market by distorting their incentive 
structure to take account of externalities. 
4.5.3 Self-Regulation 
These are voluntary programmes initiated by industry players that go beyond compliance, 
such as self-policing, auditing, information disclosures, contractual regulation, and 
stakeholder participation which shift responsibilities like standard-setting, monitoring and 
enforcement to private parties which have traditionally been assumed by governments.351 The 
idea to self-regulate has been in existence in some professions like law and medicine for a 
long period of time. This assumption stems from the professional pride and interest for 
maintaining the reputation of the profession. This illustrates that one’s own peers are the 
strictest regulators.352 
From a legal standpoint, the idea of corporate and professional self-regulation refers to rules 
and standards formulated by an industry association to enforce voluntary compliance by its 
member of the same profession or industry. These may include voluntary policing and 
reporting schemes, the use of audits, and schemes to increase the involvement of community 
stakeholders in the regulatory process. These kinds of programs attempt to internalise certain 
key aspects of the rule of law within regulated activities. A typical example in the safety area 
as the thesis is about reducing risks resulting into harm is the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) standards and recommended practices for oil and gas companies as well as the chemical 
industry’s Responsible Care programme.353 
Unlike liability regimes, self-regulation shares the same characteristics as it acts primarily ex 
ante, prior to the occurrence of any incident. The rationale is that the informational advantage 
industry experts enjoy over government regulators creates room for firm specific standards as 
against industry wide standards formulated by government regulators. Nevertheless, self-
regulatory schemes could act ex post, for example in situations where punishment is to be 
given to offenders for engaging in corporate malpractices.  
Although self-regulation as an alternative to traditional styles of regulation has generated 
heated debates in the legal community over the past decade because of the assumption that it 
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is subject to adverse selection, e.g. firms who participate in the programme do not improve 
their real performance in circumstances where there are no sanctions and lower quality 
companies will opt to participate in order to benefit from the reputational advantages the 
members enjoy without being made to bear the costs of change, self-regulation tends to be 
efficient in that private bodies have access to higher quality information than state regulators. 
This makes the former to monitor and enforce standards more cheaply and it is easier for them 
to update standards, so they meet up with the evolving industry technology. 
In addition, self-regulation of safety issues has suffered a lot of backlash from several 
authors:354 
1. Experience since the industrial revolution suggests that it does not generally 
provide a sufficient assurance of social control over the hazards caused by 
industrial activity.355 
2. It does not constitute a means of control which meets at least two legal criteria for 
fairness: 
• predictability of what is required of companies; 
• equivalent protection for workers and other persons at risk across different 
sectors of society. 
3. There is also the issue of protection of management discretion and propriety 
information in a self-regulated industry which makes the process opaque. What this 
mean is that public workers are not given access to company information, 
particularly those that reveal the trade-offs made between safety and production or 
profit in the conduct of company operations. Therefore, it encourages a business as 
usual mentality in arriving at how safe is safe enough for such operations and 
further neglects public contributions and interests as a way of participating in safety 
safeguards initiatives unless special safeguards are provided by government 
oversight and competence. Thus, such proprietary protection of company 
information and discretion is completely at odds in many evolving democracies and 
negates the very idea of transparency, stakeholder participation and company 
accountability in handling risks. 
4. In addition, it is a general norm for self-regulation to adopt voluntary codes of 
practice or standards initiated by industry or trade organisations. However, where 
member organisations put some short-term pressure on industry bodies who do not 
have the required sufficient level of independence responsible for the formulation 
of high quality standards, they end up reducing such self-regulatory voluntary 
standards for members to follow. This invariably makes standards weak for 
reducing the associated risks. 
5. To ensure the sufficiency of each company’s safety management system, there is 
need for government to oversee the self-regulated approach adopted by the 
industry. This oversight inspection function can be carried out by the agency, by 
third party inspection and certification or by review of self-audit reports.  This 
inspection and certification exercise is difficult because the effective evaluation of 
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the extent of compliance lies in the agency’s expertise and access to company held 
information. 
In spite of these backlashes, self-regulation is advantageous in that it can engender a degree 
of ownership of regulation within industry. Traditional C&C type of regulation centres on the 
imposition of explicit standards backed by criminal sanctions. The idea behind it at the end of 
the day is to apply criminal sanctions by an external regulator or court after a violation has 
occurred. Whereas, the focus of self-regulation which gives a sense of complete ownership of 
regulation to the regulated to ensure compliance is focused on performance or outcome based. 
It is about making sure the policy objective is achieved rather than the means through which 
it is achieved. By focusing on results (outcomes) rather than on the means for achieving them 
(inputs), self-regulation and other alternatives to traditional C&C regulation permits entities 
greater freedom of action to find the lowest-cost or best means of complying for itself. 
Outcome oriented standards can improve compliance by mitigating the costs of compliance 
with technical rules nd fostering innovation to source the most effective means to reach 
socially desired outcomes.  
A typical example is the Amoco Yorktown experiment. In this experiment, it was found that 
if the EP had applied outcome standards for benzene emissions to the whole of Amocco’s 
Yorktown plant, rather than specific rules mandating certain technology in the smokestacks, 
Amocco would have been able to achieve greater emissions reductions at much lower cost. 
The U.S. EPA, had a rule which require specific equipment be installed in smokestacks to 
filter benzene. Amocco spent $31 million on compliance in its Yorktown, Virginia refinery.356 
A partnership in 1990 between Amocco and the U.S EPA was formed to study the pollution 
reduction possibilities at the refinery. They also commissioned a non-profit environmental 
research group to peer review their findings. It was discovered by the study that the refinery 
was emitting the most significant volume of benze not via the smokestacks but at the loading 
docks where gasoline was being pumped into barges. Ironically, Amocco would be able to 
achieve the same level of emissions reduction required under the U.S Clean Air Act for a 
quarter of the cost (USD$10 million instead of USD$40 million) if the EPA would allow 
Amocco to decide where the money should be spent through innovations in process 
engineering, rather than applying specific rules requiring smokestack technology.357 
Another example where self-regulation proved successful in fostering compliance is through 
the efforts of the U.S Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in Maine 
known as the U.S OSHA’s Maine 200 Programme. In this information analysis to identify 
possible targets for inspection and improve compliance in a particular risk group within the 
work place. There was a compliance problem and as such an agency within the US 
Department of Labour seeks to protect the life and health of American workers primarily 
through direct regulation of employers. The regulatory enforcement system does not address 
the unique hazards of each work site. New standards are constantly being made to apply to all 
worksites and an adversarial approach is taken to inspections. Yet OSHA has only limited 
financial resources. It has been estimated that each worksite can expect a random visit once 
every 87 years on average. 
The state of Miane had the highest rates of workplace accidents in the United States-71% 
above the national rate. Maine OSHA identified three problems with its traditional regulatory 
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approach of targeting inspections without regard to worksite conditions at individual 
establishments:358 
o The inspections system (which relied on national industry data to identify industries 
with higher accident rates for targeted inspection) rarely targeted large employers 
outside of manufacturing, where many injuries occur. 
o Once chosen for an inspection, the firm was evaluated only for regulatory compliance 
with OSHA standards and not workers safety and health outcomes. 
o Inspections were designed to place OSHA in an adversarial role, looking for violations 
rather than working with well-intentioned managers who would have addressed a 
hazard upon learning of it. 
To address these problems of traditional regulatory approach, an innovative solution was 
devised. The Maine OSHA office used workers compensation database to identify the 200 
employers with the highest number (not rate) of injuries and illness in their area. Rather than 
instituting adversarial inspections, OSHA requested their co-operation in improving work 
conditions by committing to a comprehensive safety and health programme that includes 
employee participation, self-inspections, identification of worksite hazards, and training 
programme to mitigate and prevent hazards and quarterly reporting to OSHA. Thus, 
employers who chose to accept OSHA’s request received a significant lower priority for 
inspections and higher priority for technical assistance. The others would be targeted for 
inspection due to their risk prioritisation. All but five of the firms chose to submit adequate 
health and safety plans. OSHA maintained authority to address serious problems through 
regulatory enforcement, but this was to be a last resort against recalcitrant employers, not a 
standard procedure. In this way OSHA sought to leverage its authority and address hazards 
specific to the worksite through a partnership that gives employers and employees ownership 
of workplace health and safety regulations. The result of this innovative solution is as follows: 
o As of December 1995 (nearly two years into the programme), participating firms 
identified 180 000 hazards and abated over 128 000 of those hazards (in comparison 
with the 36 780 that OSHA inspectors had discovered and cited in the previous eight 
years at those sites). 
o Total workers compensation claim dropped by 47.3% in those worksite during the 
programme between 1991 and 1994 (all Maine employers experienced a drop of 27% 
over the same period). 
o At least 320 worksite health and safety committees were established. 
o OSHA’s traditional inspection approach required the effort of six to nine inspectors to 
inspect all large paper plants in Maine. Maine 200 reached roughly 200 firms in a 
single year through self-assessment combined with traditional enforcement for the 
firms who did not agree to establish safety and health programmes.359 
The Rugmark Foundation is another handy example to sheds additional light to how self-
regulation and other use of standards for internal management systems as an alternative to 
traditional C&C regulation has proved successful in achieving certain level of compliance in 
a business environment. Although this example is not directly related to the energy industry, 
valuable lessons can be drawn for application in the energy industry especially the oil and gas 
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industry where compliance is an issue. The compliance in this instance was that it was 
discovered by the institution regulatory the codes of conduct of rug sellers in South Asian and 
rug and carpet industry that there was allegedly widespread child labour violations which 
negates international and many countries’ labour standards. Rugs and carpets are exported to 
Western nations where consumer concern about child labour is a critical subject. The situation 
became complicated because Western governments where this rugs and carpets where 
exported to had no jurisdictions or authority to interfere in the internal legal issues prevalent 
in South Asian countries directly. 
The Rugmark Foundation established in 1994 by a coalition formed between Indian human 
rights and industry groups and the United Nations Children’s Fund created devised an 
innovative idea where retailers and manufacturers bind themselves to a code of conduct whose 
aim was to replace child labour with adult labour and the provision of educational resources 
for former child workers. Licensing fees were paid to the Foundation by signatories which 
employs monitors to conduct inspections by these monitors. Hence, signatories who pass their 
inspections can comfortably affix the Rugmark label, a smiling carpet, to their products. As a 
result of this internal standard management codes of conduct, over 260 000 rugs were certified 
with labels since 1994 have been exported to Germany which accounts for more than 30% of 
the market.360 
As safety schemes are developed and often administered by firms, it can reduce administrative 
costs for government and compliance costs for companies. Rulemaking may be better 
equipped with the right information so that they can be tailored to specific needs, meaning the 
regulation of better targeted.361 These risks mentioned by authors above can be mitigated 
through effective designing of self-regulation. This comprises of a transparent process, 
introducing independent and accessible conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
getting a wide range of stakeholders involved in the rule making process.362 
4.6 Summary 
From the above discussion regarding the principle that shape regulatory design for risk 
mitigation, it is important to note that policy makers should understand that there is no one 
best method to design an effective regulatory framework. Environmental regulatory problems 
are highly complex in that there are issues of vested interests to meet. Thus, an effective 
regulatory design must take into account these conflicting interests so that all of those who 
might be impacted by that regulatory design have a level playing ground.  
However, there is one common trend that this thesis has observed that cannot be compromised 
whilst designing a regulatory framework. This common trend is that, whatever design adopted 
must have the ability to punish offenders and at the same time give incentives for performing 
companies. Again, this section has illustrated vividly that whilst some environmental or 
human issue require either one or two or a combination of all model regulatory design, some 
totally require just one model of regulatory design. 
More so, the sections has illustrated that certain group of firms and companies do not welcome 
some particular or alternatives to regulation. For example, it is often believed that small firms 
and companies are not comfortable with performance based regulatory policy design strategy 
because these market based performance regulatory alternative impose a greater responsibility 
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to develop appropriate compliance strategies and create uncertainty as to what is required for 
compliance.363  
An effective regulatory design or alternatives to regulation should necessarily require that 
those being regulated should have the ability to develop and implement compliance strategies 
based on a sound understanding of the objectives and standards set out in the regulation. 
Likewise regulatory design and alternatives for risk mitigation should take into consideration 
the peculiar characteristics and capacities of the regulated group and the possible effect of 
adopting such documents on compliance efforts and measures. 
Having shown the limitations in regulation, the thesis demonstrates that self-regulation with 
its dangers have the greatest advantage because it has the ability to ensure the effectiveness 
of regulation beyond mere compliance. It also has the incentive to achieve policy outcomes 
and self-sustaining.  Self-sustaining here simply means that it has the ability to be adaptive to 
the problems in future by proposing progressive changes to deal with new challenges that 
were not foreseen from the beginning. This is based on the idea that, where industry operators 
are given the right freedom to an extent, operators are likely to prove more effective in 
identifying hazards and developing lowest-cost measures than is a central regulatory authority 
under a traditional form of regulatory design.  
However, the work in this section reveal that self –regulation which is anchored on the 
premise of performance based regulation shows some disadvantages which include: the 
uncertainty regarding what constitutes acceptable compliance, the fact that it is only suitable 
in situations where the regulated firm is in a better position than the regulator to understand 
and solve the potential causes of accidents or problems that the regulation is supposed to 
address and it may be difficult for regulators to monitor and enforce compliance with broader 
standards, and it will generally be unsuitable where regulators cannot monitor the outcomes 
at all (e.g oil discharge on the open sea). 
From the above disadvantages it is clear that the push for a self-regulatory approach as a 
complement to C&C regulation in the energy industry fits perfectly based on the second point. 
The energy industry is such that suffers from this knowledge disparity between the regulator 
and the regulated entity regarding their ability in solving the potential causes of accidents or 
problems that regulation is supposed to solve. Because the regulated entity is in better position 
of understanding of these problems, the regulator can achieve little in enforcing full 
compliance even with the best monitoring strategies in place. Thus, a self-regulatory approach 
helps solve this imbalance.    
Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that if regulatory strategies such as self-regulation and 
internal management standards are to be deployed as alternatives to formal rules, they should 
be accompanied by government input, support, and monitoring to achieve the policy 
objective. This is crucial because results have shown that compliance with purely voluntary 
efforts is likely to be patchy unless they are backed by either sanctions or other incentives for 
compliance by government.364 These sanctions or incentives does not have to be legal. It could 
be a special recognition permitting such performing or compliant entity to use a logo such as 
the Japanese privacy mark, or, as a negative sanction could the naming of a company as a 
company that is out of compliance in Parliament or a press release. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Case Study Review of the Liability Regime and Problems of Liability and Regulatory 
Systems.  
This Chapter began to explore the arguments for and against environmental liability and 
regulatory systems as means for mitigating risks. Highlights the reasons why regulation and 
liability systems will turn out ineffective in managing the risks associated with gas fracking, 
particularly given the likelihood that states rich in shale resources are interested in relaxing 
the regulatory regimes applicable to the activity of gas extraction. Here the USA’s regulatory 
and liability regimes shall be examined to bring out the above preposition. Though from the 
review case study you would see that the liability and regulatory regimes are crafted in a 
manner that promotes strict environmental regulatory reform.  
This section lays the foundation for the arguments that water contamination claims should be 
subject to strict liability offence that does not require proof of negligence or omission before 
an operator can be held liable. This work in this section also explores the factors responsible 
for making liability and regulation ineffective in mitigating risks.  
5.1 Introduction 
The U.S play a major role in the whole issue surrounding shale gas fracking within the current 
energy extractive industry. This is because other shale gas rich states look forward to replicate 
the success of the U.S in the extraction of these resources. However, a close look at the factors 
responsible for this success is dependent on a lot of factors which are unique to the U.S 
experience. For example, the nature of mineral right ownership of the U.S is different from 
most civil jurisdictions, some of the locations where these shale resources are located are not 
as densely populated when compared to other regions, some provisions in the U.S oil and gas 
statutes governing the activities of shale gas fracking have been relaxed for the shale gas 
industry to mention but a few. 
Thus, it is pertinent to examine the relevant laws that relates to the liability of the operator of 
an activity like shale gas fracking. The aim of the thesis here is to show that the U.S legal and 
regulatory framework is in support of a strict environmental liability approach in tackling 
risks associated with fracking.  A comparative discussion of these various states regulatory 
approach shall be explored too in order to prove further that whilst some states are very strict 
in terms of regulation, other have relaxed their approach to attract investment. This case study 
shows that those states that impose strict environmental liability systems account for an 
effective regulatory shale gas extraction. For instance, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA) provided for limited defences for an 
operator, extended the definition of who liable parties are, proposed a strict, joint and several 
liability for a range of substantial response costs, etc.  
The other ambit of this Chapter is to bring to the reader the problems inherent in liability and 
regulatory systems. This thesis in this Chapter also explores the factors that should justify the 
application of strict liability to water contamination risk associated with shale gas extraction 
and gave certain legal principles to hinge this argument and contributions of this thesis. The 
overall aim of this section is emphasizing on the benefits of self-regulation which improves 
liability for the governance of shale gas extraction. 
In practice, direct traditional regulation has this inherent insufficiency to address many of our 
environmental problems, no matter the level of skills involved in drafting and how much is 
directed toward enforcing them.  Three different illustrations can be cited. The first relates to 
when the available legal and policy instruments are no long enough to address the challenge, 
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as for example air pollution issues, which are predominantly caused by mobile sources not 
suitable for command and control approach as industries smoke stack emissions. The other 
ambit relates to problems not suitable or contemplated by direct traditional regulation and 
when direct regulation standards are not appropriate to deal with them or are inexistent. The 
last centres on “new problems” for which individual action is not enough to address them. 
These problems include climate change effects.365 
5.2 Liability Regimes and Prevention 
Having seen what regulation means from the working definition above, the various forms, 
and alternatives to regulation as well as several factors limiting the effectiveness of regulation 
from an oil and gas industry perspective, it is pertinent to now examine what a liability regime 
is in relation to prevention as a principle in law in reducing risks in shale gas development. 
This section will also highlight the effects of liability law and how it either spurs or deters 
firms and individuals to take care. A consideration of certain factors which inhibits the 
effective application of liability as an incentive to invest in prevention shall be described too. 
With reference to corrective justice theory in law and ethics, the complementary nature of 
liability regimes and regulation is discussed here too. In the same vein, some indirect benefits 
of liability law shall be explored. As a way of comparison, the indirect costs of liability law, 
including their negative impacts on innovation will be analysed too. Accordingly, to achieve 
all of these, this thesis will begin by providing introductory definitions of important terms 
relating to tort law, civil liability and negligence. 
5.2.1 The United States’ Applicable Liability Regimes 
This section will examine the environmental liability regimes within the legal frameworks of 
various state’s jurisdictions in the US to ascertain the form of applicable liability in terms of 
environmental and health impact incidences resulting from certain hazardous activities. The 
US as a jurisdiction is explored due to the important competitive role it plays in certain 
economic fields. Also, the US jurisdiction is chosen because of its relevance in the context of 
advanced shale gas development as well as its importance in international debate on this 
subject.  
The comparative analysis here does not assert to be comprehensive. Rather it focuses on 
particular laws aiming to look at how they work in practice instead of simply looking at how 
they appear in the legislative texts. It is pertinent to note the applicable liability regime in this 
jurisdiction because it takes centre stage of discussion when one talks about hydraulic fracking 
and more, so such discussions could eventually shape the outcome of decisions in other 
nations for fracking activities. Therefore, if this thesis identifies the liability regime, it will 
help strengthen whatever form of liability regime that the thesis intends to propose as a 
precautionary measure to mitigate water contamination in fracking.  
At both federal and state levels, the USA evidences different environmental liability regimes, 
with differing rules for environmental activities. The danger with such a situation is that it can 
create problems of unpredictable enforcement for the regulated community. However, it has 
the advantage of allowing the authorities, at their individual level, the ability to opt for the 
most severe out of several regimes where they are averse to that activity. Generally, statute 
law at either federal or state level addresses environmental damage which contains a mix of 
administrative, civil and criminal provisions, whereas common law rules of liability govern 
traditional environmental damage.  
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The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972,366 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) of 1976, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA or Superfund Act) of 1980367 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990368 are 
the fundamental statutes containing liability and clean-up provisions. Despite differences 
among these laws, they carry some common characteristics, such as: wide disclosure and 
notification requirements; strong enforcement powers; exceptionally high administrative and 
criminal penalties; broad public participation; strict, joint and several liability for a range of 
substantial response costs; wide definitions of the liable parties; very limited defences; and 
liability irrespective of when the actual pollution occurred.  
CERCLA, also known as ‘Superfund’ is the most famous of these laws adopted in 1980 to 
address the highest priority issue of uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous sites. Liability 
under this law is strict, joint and several and retroactive. However, these terms do not appear 
in the statute. CERCLAs liability does not apply to personal injury or property damage, 
although plaintiffs in common law actions can leverage on the health studies and information 
disclosure requirements to support their claims. The standards for clean-up is very demanding, 
at least in principle, and the remediation process is a cumbersome one comprising procedural 
steps and powers, aimed at keeping the liable parties perpetually responsible even after the 
completion of the project through ‘re-opener’ clauses.  
Current owners and occupiers, past owners and occupiers, hazardous substance and generators 
and transporters are some of the categories of potentially responsible parties recognised under 
CERCLA. The addition of generators has widened the catalogue of liable parties at some sites. 
Liability may include individuals, associations, consortia and joint ventures, as well as 
secondary parties such as successor and parent companies, shareholders, directors and 
officers, trustees and others backed up with the decisions of many courts regarding the 
primacy of the statute over any corporate protections. In as much as the burden of proof 
saddled on the plaintiff is not formally jettisoned, the duty to prove causation, in a direct sense, 
is not always necessary.369  
However, there are three narrowly construed forms of defences which are almost worthless: 
(i) an innocent purchaser’s defence which is very demanding to prove, (ii) a ‘federally 
permitted releases exemption which also offers exceptionally narrow protection; and (iii) a 
long way short of permit compliance defence.’370 Under CERCLA, courts have routinely ruled 
that harm is not divisible when it comes to multiple party cases due to mixture of different 
parties’ substances in the ground. Nevertheless, a detailed scheme of settlement has been 
                                                          
366333 U.S.C. S.1251 et seq (1972) The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the basic structure for regulating 
discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States and regulating quality standards for surface waters. 
The basis of the CWA was enacted in 1948 and was called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, but the Act 
was significantly reorganized and expanded in 1972. "Clean Water Act" became the Act's common name with 
amendments in 1972. 
367The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known 
as Superfund, was enacted by Congress on December 11, 1980. This law created a tax on the chemical and 
petroleum industries and provided broad Federal authority to respond directly to releases or threatened releases 
of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment 
368Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) (101 H.R.1465, P.L. 101-380) was passed by 
the 101st United States Congress and signed by President George H. W. 
369Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. V. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) 
370Ibid 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
93
formulated, with liability mostly divided in line with equitable criteria and the authorities 
granting protection to settling parties.371  
Apart from CERCLA, other federal statutes such as RCRA, CWA and OPA all provide for 
similar liability regime standards though a narrower definition of a liable party. For claims 
touching on pure economic loss, it has been brought under OPA as a piece of legislation. 
Whereas claims for traditional damage have been brought under common law rules, which 
comprise a blend of strict and fault-based liability even though it varies from state to state. 
Large companies are always willing to settle strict liability actions for property damage, 
reason being that courts may alleviate the burden of proving causation and negligence.  
Now having seen that the above-mentioned laws also regulate the operations of shale gas 
development, why then should the shale industry not be subjected to a strict liability regime 
in order to achieve maintain the tenets of the PP that is missing in shale oil and gas 
development activity. Therefore, it is the postulation of this thesis to say that it would not be 
inequitable if shale gas development is subjected to a strict liability regime as it merits the 
abnormally dangerous activity status from time immemorial.  
It is important at this juncture for a brief understanding of the current regulatory and political 
environment surrounding fracking to further strengthen the proposal being sought in this 
thesis to govern the operations of shale gas development. Quickly, an examination of the 
exemptions the industry has enjoyed from a federal regulatory point of view in accordance 
with some legislative documents in the US is important. 
Under CERCLA potentially responsible parties comprise several categories inter alia 
including current owners and occupiers, past owners and occupiers, hazardous substance 
generators and transporters are some of the recognised categories.372 The addition of 
generators has widened the catalogue of liable parties at some sites. The liability regime may 
apply to individuals, associations, consortia and joint ventures, as well as secondary parties 
such as successor and parent companies, shareholders, directors and officers, trustees and 
others. This regime is backed up with the decisions of many courts regarding the primacy of 
the statute over any corporate protections. The duty to prove causation, in a direct sense is not 
always necessary as long as the burden of proof saddled on the plaintiff is not formally 
jettisoned. 
5.2.2 Approaches to Federal Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing 
Despite the extremely controversial debate regarding hydraulic fracking, it has received 
several significant exemptions from federal environmental regulations in the US.373 For 
example, according to SDWA, all underground injections within the Underground Injection 
Control (UIC) programmes are required to be regulated by the EPA. What this implies is that 
an applicant has to possess a permit to conduct underground injection activity.374 Prior to this, 
the applicant was only entitled to a permit once they had shown that the underground injection 
                                                          
371See Astm e1527-13 standard practice for environmental site assessments: phase 1 environmental site 
assessment process (Am. Soc’y Testing & Materials Int’l 2013), Available at 
http://www.astm.org/standards/e1527.htm. 
372Ibid. 
373U.S. Energy Information Administrative Department of Energy, Energy Price Impacts on the U.S. Economy 6 
(2001), Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/economy/energy_price.pdf; Wiseman H., (2010). Regulatory 
Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 Vill. Environmental Law Journal 229, 229–30 at p.243. 
37442 U.S.C. § 300h (B) (1) (A) (2006); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. Inc. V. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1474 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that it is “clear that congress dictated that all underground injection be regulated under the UIC 
programs”). 
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exercise will not endanger drinking water sources.375 The EPA did not include hydraulic 
fracking to be an underground injection before 2005 and as such the requirement for a permit 
was not necessary by the applicants.376 However, in 1997 a court in Alabama ruled that the 
EPAs interpretation of ‘underground injection’ was misleading and that hydraulic fracking 
should fall under the SDWA.377 
Consequently, the EPA issued a study on hydraulic fracking and its effects on the environment 
in response to the ruling of the court.378 The report of the study did not reveal any casual 
connection between contamination cases and injecting fracking fluid into coalbed methane 
wells.379 Due to this report, the conclusion of the EPA was that the environmental effects of 
hydraulic fracking did not merit further study. Nonetheless, several people within and outside 
the agency questioned the methodology and impartiality adopted by the expert panel that 
reviewed the EPAs findings.380 One of the issues raised was that the study was limited in 
scope and focused on the underground injection of fluids to ascertain the cause of 
contamination of underground sources of drinking water.381 Further criticism was that the 
EPAs study failed to investigate the effects of fracking in shale formations.382 
Despites these reasons surrounding the EPA study, hydraulic fracking was officially exempted 
by Congress from EPA regulations in the 2005 Energy Policy Act.383 This Act is famously 
known as the ‘Halliburton Loophole’ as the Act provided fracking leverage to continue 
whereas other types of drilling and mining had to be governed by EPA regulations.384 As a 
result of the effect created by the revamping regarding the SDWA, there was a brief pause in 
the legal and political debate over whether regulation should be provided by the federal 
government.385 The debate to repeal the exemption being enjoyed under the SDWA was 
renewed in 2009 when Democratic members of Congress introduced twin bills. This bill, the 
Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011386was targeted toward 
                                                          
375Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. 118 F.3d at 1474. 
376See supra Blackstone, A. (2012) footnote 65 
377Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation., 118 F.3d at 1474; Alabama Lawsuit Poses Threat To Hydraulic 
Fracturing Across U.S., Drilling Contractor, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 42, Available at http://www.iadc.org/dcpi/dc-
janfeb00/j-coalbed.pdf. (Accessed on 09/01/2017). 
378EPA, Evaluation Of impacts to underground sources of drinking water by hydraulic fracturing of coalbed 
methane reservoirs; National Study Final Report 1 (2004), Available At 
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_final_fact_sheet.pdf. (Accessed 11 January 2017) 
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380Environmental Protection Agency, EPA,  Findings on Hydraulic Fracturing Deemed “Unsupportable,” Union 
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381Wiseman, H. (2009). Untested Waters the rise of hydraulic fracturing in oil and gas production and the need to 
revisit regulation, 20 Fordham Environmental Law Review. 115, 128. 
382Ibid. 
383Mulkern, A. C. (2009). Industry Campaign Targets ‘Hydraulic Fracturing’ Bill, N.Y. Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/07/07greenwire-industry-campaigntargets-hydraulic-fracturing-
10572.html. (Accessed on 12/01/2017). 
384Editorial. “The Halliburton Loophole (2009). New York Times at 28; Regulation of hydraulic fracturing by the 
Office of Water, Environmental. Protection. Agency, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydroreg.cfm#safehyfr (last visited 
12/01/2017). 
385See supra Blong, R. (1996) footnote 73 at p.116. 
386(H.R. 1084, S. 587, dubbed as the FRAC Act) is a legislative proposal in the United States Congress to define 
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repealing the exemption for hydraulic in SDWA but they were never reported out of 
committee.387 
Even among environmentalists there are disagreements due to the complexity of the debate 
characterising hydraulic fracking.388 Some environmentalists are in support of fracking 
because they believe natural gas emits less GHG than either oil or coal.389 Also, that natural 
gas could become the primary source of electricity in the US and serve as a transition fuel, 
from carbon-heavy sources to renewable sources, while awaiting the development of 
renewable sources.390 Hydraulic fracking is also plagued with certain other statutory loopholes 
which can be found in other environmental statutes. For example, there is no requirement for 
oil and gas producers to make an annual report of their releases of toxic chemicals. This is 
contained in the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.391 Proponents of 
fracking argue that the fracking fluid does not have a chance to pollute ground water because 
it enters the earth far below the water table, not minding the fact that CWA prohibits oil and 
gas operators from discharging pollutants into US water without a permit.392 As a result, a 
number of states and towns affected by fracking are making efforts to regulate the process 
due to these gaps in the Federal regulation of hydraulic fracking.393  
5.2.3 Approaches to State Regulation on Hydraulic Fracturing 
While states in the US are at liberty to regulate the practice as they see it fit, the Federal 
Government, through the SDWA, currently exempts most hydraulic fracking activity 
regulations.394 In the past, regulatory programmes and state oil companies only focused on 
managing petroleum reservoirs, efficient production, and addressing mineral rights issues. 
However, in recent times, there has been a slight adjustment in the sense that these 
programmes focus more on environmental safety.395 The Ground Water Protection Council 
(GWPC) in conjunction with the Interstate Oil and gas Compact Commission (IOGCC),396 
reported that there are laws and regulatory requirements that protect water resources during 
oil and gas exploration and production activities which major oil and gas production states 
have and operate with. 
                                                          
387Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 1215, 111th Cong. (2009) (As Referred 
to Senate Env’t and Pub. Works Comm.); H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to the subcomm. on energy 
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388CKrauss, C & Zeller, T. (2010). When a rig moves in next door, New York Nov. 7 at   BU7; Ian Urbina., (2011). 
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390See supra Blackstone, A. (2012) footnote 65. 
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As a result of the unique role of the states as well as their collective effort on matters relating 
to the oil and gas industry, it has been proposed by some to remain the responsibility of the 
States.397 Therefore, the individual states have a vested unique interest in the protection of 
groundwater as the Federal Government, and as such will continually regulate the process in 
such a manner that will accommodate their interest. There is no “one size fits all” approach 
to effective regulation.398  
However, there are remarkable changes in the methods and technologies deployed in 
hydraulic fracturing over time as the technique has been increasingly used to develop more 
challenging formations, resulting in the amount of water and fracturing fluids required also 
increasing over time. Thus, the question now is whether state oil and gas programmes in the 
US effectively address issues concerning groundwater protection emanating from the 
heightened concentration and widened geographical extent of oil and gas resource 
development that depends on hydraulic fracturing in combination with deep horizontal 
drilling.399 
Most oil and gas states in the US have either revised or are considering revisions to their oil 
and gas laws and regulations as a way of responding to the challenges that arise from these 
new types and levels of oil and gas production with an overall aim of increasing the protection 
level of water resources. But this regulatory aspect has been lagging because the extent to 
which oil and gas agencies coordinate with their water pollution counterparts has been very 
ineffective. This is so because the regulatory approach adopted by the US government is such 
that most states have different agencies administering oil and gas programmes and 
environmental programmes.400 For example, most of the time the state UIC programmes are 
regulated by the environmental agencies, while separate oil and gas entities oversee oil and 
gas exploration and production activities. Alabama is an exception to this phenomenon.401  
In as much as states have a wide array of regimes in place to manage oil and gas development 
activities, the policies, regulations and practices relating to ground water protection can be 
uneven.402 A review conducted by the GWPC in 2009 revealed that state oil and gas 
regulations were adequately designed to protect water resources and not groundwater.403 In 
virtually all states, it is the same requirements that govern water resource protection covers 
permitting, well drilling and construction (e.g. casing, cementing, and test pressure 
requirements), well closure and abandonment, and waste fluid management.404 For example, 
                                                          
397Further policy positions and information can be found at the iogcc website: 
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398Ibid. 
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ten major producing states required the reporting of chemicals used in well treatments, twenty 
five states required operators to submit well treatment (including fracturing) reports, and 
twenty two states required operators to cement across groundwater zones.405 This kind of huge 
disparity in regulatory requirements leaves room for concern and attention. 
While the GWPC found that most states had quite an extensive catalogue of permitting and 
operating requirements for oil and gas wells, it has also noted that some important provisions 
in the oil and gas programmes in some states is missing. However, some states had well 
construction requirements that comprise provisions for cementing above oil and gas 
producing zones and across groundwater zones. Nevertheless, in terms of requirements for 
well integrity testing, cement specifications, baseline testing of nearby water well, and other 
groundwater protection practices, they vary considerably. 
5.3 Responsible Factors for an Ineffective Liability Regimes 
The dynamic behind the application of liability regimes is that it creates an incentive to invest 
in risk mitigation and serves as a compensatory mechanism for victims.406 However, several 
phenomena reduces the effectiveness of these liability regimes: 
The Victim’s Apathy is evident in situations when the people exposed to hazards or pollution 
from an activity do not have the motivation to sue the injurer. This is borne out of the 
ignorance of the victim regarding the harm, or they assumed that the damage seen has a natural 
cause or are not just aware of the consequences of an accident on their health or property. 
These issues deter the victims from going for trial. Thus, this acts to incentivise the injurer 
from reducing risks by investing in risk reduction through adopting best industry safety 
practices and so on. Another angle with regard to the victim’s apathy is the fact that the 
possibility of being involved in very lengthy and contentious proceedings with high legal 
costs, which in most cases is not recoverable, constitutes to dissuade the victim from seeking 
compensation in the first place. 
The Possibility of Injurer becoming Judgment Proof. An operator of a dangerous activity or 
the manufacturer of a product could become insolvent when his available assets cannot off-
set the damage caused. Where this is the case, the inclination of the operator to adhere to risk 
reduction measures by way of taking care may not be an effective reason because the operator 
will not typically consider taking measures which ordinarily exceeds his assets.407  
As a result, most firms in hazardous industries have seen that the ability to be judgment proof 
as an opportunity not to act right. To achieve this opportunity, operators create separate 
subsidiaries or spin-offs to house their hazardous activities.408 For example, the increase of 
liability for environmental damage caused by shipping accidents further exemplified the 
opportunity for shipping firms to divide their tanker fleets into multiple single-ship 
companies.409 A partial solution is to insist on compulsory insurance or by special public 
mechanisms of compensation of victims.410 
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Latency. For there to be a cause of action in law, there must be an actual injury. However, in 
most cases the appearance of symptoms as a result of a person having been exposed to risks 
may take a long time to manifest physically for the victims to contemplate suing for damages 
at the time of the incident. Thus, the waiting period weakens the deterrence effect which 
represents the object of a liability regime. This is compounded by some common law 
country’s legal requirements which have limitation periods that forecloses the right of the 
victim from commencing trial after the harmful action occurred. This kind of requirements 
have been overtaken by events in most jurisdictions. Now what is tenable is that the eligibility 
period begins at the time when the victim knew or should have discovered the manifestation 
of the injury. What this means is that the time begins to count the moment the plaintiff knew 
of his predicament caused by the operator’s activity in question. 
Causal Uncertainty. The nature of liability regimes are designed to serve as deterrence. 
However, this deterrence effect can only be provoked subject to the ability of the victim to 
demonstrate a causal connection between the damage and the injurer’s activities. This, 
obviously is very difficult to demonstrate and establish with certainty for many technological 
systems. For instance, the effects of latency and the widespread use of a specific pollutant 
may further put stress on the victim to prove causality concerning environmental implications 
associated with hazardous activities. 
5.4 The Symbiotic Nature of Liability Regime and Regulation 
When liability regimes and safety regulations complement each other they become more 
effective in mitigating risks. These complementary roles can fulfil two major goals: Effective 
regulation and liability regimes have the goal of deterring risk-creators as it provides an 
incentive for them to take optimal level of care in order to prevent accidents which may lead 
to harm;411 and the goal of compensating victims in the event of accidents (which is insuring 
the consumer).412  
Now it is pertinent to note that two major factors give credence to liability regimes than the 
attraction of regulation under the ‘social optimum level’ perspective: First, the administrative 
costs of developing and enforcing regulations are generally more than the legal costs involved 
in managing liability enforcement issues.413 This is due to the fact that liability applies after 
the occurrence of an accident, whereas regulation controls all potentially hazardous activities 
including those for which an accident will not occur.414 What this means is that while liability 
operates ex post, regulation operates ex ante. 
Second, the regulator is generally not privy to as good a quality of information as the risk 
creator in most cases regarding the potential cost of accidents and its prevention. As a result, 
the risk creator is the one who determines the optimal level of care instead of the regulatory 
body. Under a liability regime, the threat of being held legally responsible by the courts 
compels each risk creator to formulate and determine their own optimal level of care within 
the parameters of their private costs of prevention. Therefore, what forms the focal point in 
this thesis is based on the suggestion of the economist Shavell. He suggested that the choices 
observed to be made in the US between liability and regulation are, when broadly viewed, 
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socially rational with respect to the optimal level of prevention criterion already described 
above.415 It was concluded from Shavell’s observation that activities that are heavily 
regulated, particularly the ones that pose a significant hazard to health and environment, are 
the ones in which liability regimes demonstrate the most weaknesses.  
Whereas activities that create the risk of the typical tort and that are subjected to limited 
regulation characteristically show elements leaving us with the perception that they ought to 
be controlled primarily by liability. Since neither option gives the required optimal result 
independently, this research is in line with the suggestion proposed by Shavell that a 
combination of both strategies be deployed to mitigate the associated risks with shale gas 
development and other dangerous industrial activities. According to him, this solution where 
liability and regulation is used is superior to adopting a one style strategic approach.416 
It is pertinent to note that, particularly in the US, while the economic perspective has had a 
significant impact in influencing policy maker’s decisions,417 it does not mean that it is the 
only normative justification for the existence of liability law. R. Posner wrote concerning the 
field that he helped to launch that: 
“Economic analysis of law has grown rapidly, has become the largest, most pervasive 
interdisciplinary field of legal studies in the history of American law, has palpably 
influenced the practice of law and judicial decisions, has launched lucrative consulting 
spin-offs, has spawned courses and text-books in economic analysis of law, has influenced 
legislation (economic analysts of law played an important role in the deregulation 
movement), has made it de rigueur for law schools of the first and second ranks to have one 
or more economists on their faculty, has seeded a number of its practitioners in university 
administration and the federal judiciary, and has now crossed the Atlantic and begun 
making rapid benefits in Europe”.418 
However, Corrective justice theory419 is the most influential non-economic perspective on tort 
law, which was originally articulated by Aristotle.420.The crux of this idea is that in the event 
that there is a wrongful harm to another, the victim of such harm has a moral right to demand, 
and the injurer has also a moral right to request, that the victim be returned to his/her status-
quo prior to the occurrence of the injury, for example, through the paying of compensation.  
The corrective justice theory in tort law represents a system of first-and second-order duties. 
The first order duties are duties not to injure; they establish norms of conduct. The second 
order of duties are duties of repair arising from a breach of the first order duty. When one 
looks at this view, one would come to the conclusion that the rationale behind the formulation 
of this private tort law idea as being exclusively hinged on justice between individuals, and 
not with an objective of reaching public-policy goals such as promoting or discouraging 
certain kinds of conduct. 
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5.5 Regulation as an Environmental Protectionist Tool. 
The very essence of an effective regulatory system lies in its ability to enforce compliance 
among parties within potentially dangerous activities. Societies in recent times have seen the 
emergence of environmental regulation as a major activity of government. However, there is 
an increased incentive not to comply with these environment standards as the stringency of 
regulation increased too.421 This phenomenon has necessitated the need for adequate 
enforcement mechanisms. The challenge most of the time is that cost benefit evaluation of a 
particular piece of regulation which impliedly assumes full compliance is likely to be 
misleading especially if ‘slippage’ generically occurs during implementation. More so, if that 
‘slippage’ is substantial. 
As a result, regulatory enforcement becomes an aspect in which theory could and should 
inform policy.422 The concern is to know the appropriate assumptions to make about the 
objectives of enforcement agencies. Also, the question of how can politicians best design 
institutions to prevent the co-optation or capture of enforcement agents? What role is lobbying 
likely to play in the development of the enforcement area of regulation? The truth in these 
questions actually go a long way in determining the overall effectiveness of a regulatory 
structure in place.  
Hence, the need for the design of a complementary system that have the capabilities to 
function on its own, that forces operators within extractive activities to comply without 
enforcement agents pursuing them. This is what this work aims to achieve by distilling some 
of the defences put forward by industry proponents.  One of those innovative complementary 
safety approaches proposed by this thesis is the issue of compulsory disclosure of certain 
operational information within the value chain in the oil and gas sector. This work shall deal 
with this defence in Chapter VI by vehemently arguing for a compulsory disclosure policy 
option within the entire industry since the activities of extracting exhaustible resources has 
nothing mystical about it.  Prior to this, it is important that this thesis examines some of the 
inherent factors that are present in regulatory processes that calls for an alternative 
complementary approach in order to mitigate risks associated with the activities of extracting 
exhaustible resources as it occurs in the shale gas industry. 
5.6 Inherent Problems of Liability and Regulatory Systems 
How do both systems complement each other in achieving the desired effectiveness? When 
regulation is required, and when is liability appropriate and adequate in certain circumstance 
instead? Steven Shavell’s landmark article423 where four criteria were examined to base an 
evaluation of which tool is superior for a particular situation between liability and regulation, 
shall be used to answer the above questions. These include: 
5.6.1 Information Asymmetry  
According to this criterion, it is asserted that in situations where, in contrast to private parties, 
regulators lack knowledge about risky activities, liability is preferred over regulation as a tool 
for ensuring risk mitigation. This is due to the fact that regulation, without a greater knowledge 
of information than operators, is probably going to be either lax or too strict in the long run. 
In contrast, courts are in a better position to ascertain the required level of care and whether 
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the threshold is achieved in a particular case than are regulators across all actual and possible 
situations.424 
5.6.2 Ability to Pay Compensation 
On the other hand, the incentive to apply liability as the appropriate and adequate option over 
regulation to change the negative behaviour of operators in risky activities will be defeated in 
the long run where it is evident that those responsible for such harm(s) cannot not pay in 
damages to restore victim(s).  
5.6.3 Threat of Suit 
Here, liability is taken to prove inadequate and inappropriate for ensuring safety in risky 
activities where those affected are unable to sue either due to the widely dispersed nature of 
harms involved, or find it difficult to link the harm suffered to the probable creator, or lack 
the legal standing to sue and do not have what it takes to cater for a class action against the 
injury caused. 
5.6.4 Costs Implication 
Nevertheless, there are different aspects of costs associated with both tools. There is the 
litigation costs for liability systems, on one hand, and there is the administrative as well as the 
enforcement costs in case of breach of safety standards for regulation on the other hand.425 
While litigation cost implications could be high but only incurred in the event of harm, 
regulatory cost implications involves the spending of public funds in maintaining regulatory 
agencies and there are also private compliance costs.426 This is another criterion where 
liability is favoured over regulation in risk mitigation for risky activities.   
Therefore, Shavell, a Law and Economist scholar, argued that in most real world settings, a 
mix of liability and regulation is adopted. He said that generally, these criteria seem to 
influence the choice between liability and regulation because society most often, gets the 
regulatory or liability decision right.427  
Having seen the discussions that account for the appropriateness or inadequacy between 
liability and regulation in mitigating risk in activities, it is imperative that this work provides 
a discussion as these criteria relate to shale gas development. 
5.7 Shale Gas Development: Regulation versus Liability 
The aim here is to provide a balanced analysis in the context of the oil and gas sector 
particularly in the shale gas industry whether liability is appropriate and adequate when 
compared to regulation in addressing the associated risks. The identified problems just 
examined are probably true in the oil and gas context because there exist rapid changes in 
terms of technological advances and the big companies sponsor politician for elections. Just 
like risks associated with any given activity, private parties are well equipped with better 
information than the regulators of the most sophisticated state-level agencies.428 The shale gas 
industry is not exempted from such problems either. This gives credence for the application 
of a liability system. Moreover, the decisions of most operators of such activity’s decisions 
are made factoring in liability risks. 
                                                          
424See supra Bechara, A & Damasio, A.R. (2005) foot note 58 pp.60–61. 
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However, regulation may be favoured in other factors. Potential victim(s) do not possess the 
requisite information like the one available to operators. This is because the business of 
extracting oil and gas resources occurs deep underground with equipment being controlled 
and observed by the operator.429 This makes it quite difficult for courts to conclude whether 
operators exercised the level of care required.430 
Another issue which makes regulation more advantageous in addressing risks than a liability 
system is that major oil and gas firms have small independent companies just for the sole 
purpose of avoiding stringent liability penalties. These firms lack adequate resources to cover 
large awards in damages.431 
It is perhaps due to the nature of oil and gas activities that can lead to significant but widely 
spread harms that makes it a strong factor in favour of regulation than a liability system.432 
This is because the latter would be an ineffective and impracticable approach in tackling 
problems such as fugitive methane emissions, or contamination of rivers and streams with 
flowback fluids. This is not to say that this is unique to oil and gas drilling, but rather the 
majority of environmental regulations can hinge on the inability of the traditional liability 
system to address widespread dispersed harms associated with industrial activity as the main 
reason for playing down on liability systems. 
To determine whether regulation or liability is superior in cost terms for shale gas risks or any 
others is quite difficult. Having struggled with this issue, Shavell formulated some general 
principles in his 1984 article to determine which option is superior in terms of cost. He 
concluded by saying that, putting both options on a scale, liability is likely to be less costly 
because governments are not independent arbiters in the market of regulation, but are 
interested rationally-self-interested.433  
This is likely to be true if the case is a small-scale event that required a one-off cost. There is 
almost certainly a different cost issue when the resultant harms are dispersed because to 
commence and conclude class actions are seriously complex. Moreover, in commencing class 
actions lawsuits, costs of a pure liability approach may be very expensive.434 In fact, the threat 
of suit which is the third criterion in Shavell’s formulated principle could be seen as a special 
case of his cost pillar.  
Due to the high cost of legal action and collective action problems or procedural barriers that 
courts erect to protect against difficult-to-resolve suits, plaintiffs find it difficult to sue.435 In 
other cases, the lack of a threat to sue might emanate from information asymmetries. When 
plaintiffs do not know who for certain is responsible for the contamination of their water, for 
example, they are unable to sue. However, where private parties have access to relevant 
information and instances of harm are relatively scarce compared to the level of activity, 
                                                          
429Jimerson, C. B & Moss, M. F. (2013). Top 5 Issues in today’s Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation. P.A, 
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431Forbes, S.M. (2013). The United States and China Moving toward responsible shale gas development, 
Brookings Institute [Online] at http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2014/06%20china%20clean 
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liability might be significantly less costly than detailed regulation. Truck accidents and 
surface damage to landowners’ property are a good example to illustrate the less costly nature 
of liability than regulation as stated above. Such damage and accidents are generally 
negotiated within the shadow of the tort system. 
Therefore, Shavell’s principles that provide illumination regarding the division of labour, as 
it were, between liability and regulation, seem to be applicable in the oil and gas context as it 
was asserted that it does generally.436 However, this does not in any way infer that some 
activities presently regulated might not be better handled through liability, or that additional 
regulation is not required because the current liability system is adequate.  
Nevertheless, this thesis cannot delve into the dynamics of either claim as far more evidence 
is needed to do so, nor is it to say that this division of regulatory labour exists by design. 
Regulation is imposed as a substitute for liability systems when it is seen that it is inadequate 
in addressing a risk – usually in situations poorly suited to liability under Shavell’s criteria – 
not de novo formulation of regulatory regime anchored on a theoretical framework. Implicitly, 
a liability systems great virtue is that it is the default, meaning new activities and technologies 
are governed by it even if these technologies outpace top-down regulatory approaches.  
Now having seen the principles formulated by Shavell in his article regarding the issue of 
regulation versus liability, and having carried out a brief discussion to determine whether 
these criteria hold in the oil and gas context, it is now imperative to also analyse certain factors 
based on the principles formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in order to illustrate 
whether or not shale gas fracking qualifies as an abnormally dangerous activity sufficient to 
warrant stringent liability systems as a way of complementing the existing regulatory 
approach that the technology of fracking has outpaced on the one hand. On the other hand, it 
gives justification for the necessary policy options which this thesis seeks to provide to 
address the gaps between the environmental protection tools for reducing risks.  
5.8 Arguments Why Fracking’s Water Contamination Risks should be a Strict Liability 
Claim. 
This will now set out the argument of whether fracking should be subject to stricter liability 
as abnormally dangerous activity or, alternatively, whether a fault-based standard with a res 
ipsa loquitur rule is more appropriate. The theories of res ipsa loquitor and the fault-based 
rule for determining liability shall be discussed here against the backdrop of the factors as 
contained in section 520 of the Restatement. This analysis shall attempt to define what these 
theories mean in line with the requirement of section 520.  
One of the first questions that needs attention are factors (a) and (b) that talk about the degree 
of harm and the degree of risk that should result in harm to be majorly sufficient to subject 
fracking or any activity to strict liability as an abnormally dangerous one. A point must be 
mentioned here that there is a clear distinction between an abnormal substance and an 
abnormal activity. This is important because an operator of an abnormal substance is not 
subject to a strict liability rule merely because they engage in such with a clear proof of fault 
that resulted in harm. Rather what this thesis is about in this section is to bring out through 
legal analogies and operation of the activity whether it has residual risks that cannot be 
avoided by due care. 
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5.8.1 Factors (a) & (b) Great harm and high degree of risk 
The question at this juncture is what is great harm and the degree of risk needed to categorise 
an activity as abnormally dangerous? Fracking’s activity shall be weighed against these two 
factors (a) and (b) requirements in section 520. To answer this question and to make the 
comparative analysis of the other factors in section 520, the work shall rely on certain vital 
ingredients to make this comparison.  
The transgenerational harm factor, the frequency of risk of harm factor and the availability of 
other alternative fracking technique factors shall be used to explain the factors in section 520 
to show that fracking as an activity should be subject to strict liability rule as well as stricter 
policy interventionist options. 
The term transgenerational harm deployed by this thesis to explain what great harm should be 
was borrowed from the tenets of inter-generational equity principles under international law. 
The inter-generational equity principle is defined as conserving the diversity of the natural 
and cultural resources base. The conservation of quality implies the need to leave the planet 
no worse off than received. Conservation of access also implies the equitable access to the 
use and benefits of the legacy.437 Taking a cue from these definitions, harm that is 
transgenerational in nature is harm that impacts not only the host victim but extends to future 
generations. Therefore, where an activity presents such a harm and degree of risk, then it is 
justifiable to categorise that activity as an activity with great harm and high degree of risk. 
Put another way, a true understanding of what great harm and high degree of risk of harm is 
all about is a situation where future generations are affected by an impact of yesterday. 
Now the question is whether fracking activities portray a transgenerational harm and high 
degree of risk in the event of accidents. To answer this question, it is important to explore 
some examples showing this transgenerational impact of shale gas fracking. For example, a 
You-tube video captioned “Fracking Hell: The Untold Story” illustrated some of these 
statements that reflected the transgenerational effects. One of the interviewers stated: “Water 
is a commodity and once you lose it, it is gone”.438 
From this comment, it is evident that once this happens, there is never opportunity for 
remediation of the contaminated water resource. A second example that shows this 
transgenerational impact is the fact that there are few available underground disposal facilities 
to accommodate the high volume of fracking fluids originating from frack sites.439 Therefore, 
where there are no facilities to accommodate these fluids, the only option is to dispose of them 
in major rivers across the states thereby contaminating the water for life. These cases reveal 
that this activity presents a great harm effect.440  
The other limb is whether the risk of accidents that emanate from fracking is high. The answer 
is also in the affirmative. For this, the frequency factor theory shall be used to buttress the 
argument for strict liability. As the name implies, it determines the rate of incidents. Where 
the number of accidents of an activity that has an intergenerational impact is high, then that 
activity should be classified as an activity with great harm in accordance with section 520 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Tort Act. The following review analysing litigation involving 
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439Nicholson, B. R. (2014). Analysis of litigation involving shale &hydraulic fracturing, (compiled by the Norton 
Fulbright law firm). pp 1-26. 
440Ibid. 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
105
shale and hydraulic fracturing compiled by Barclay R. Nicholas in June 2014 will be used 
here to prove the assertion that the rate of accidents for fracking is quite frequent.  
For example, fracking has recorded accidents that affect water contamination, air pollution, 
and loss of victim’s property and wrongful disposal of frack fluids in contravention of the 
regulatory requirement claims.441 In fact, from 2009 to 2012, according to the analysis written 
by Nicholas, there has been over thirty cases filed by plaintiffs in various US courts seeking 
for damages and remediation.442 In fact, courts and states and local governments in Colorado, 
New Mexico, Alabama, Ohio and Pennsylvania have recorded over one thousand (1,000 
issues of contamination from hydraulic fracking).443 From the formulated transgenerational 
harm factor and the frequency rate factor, this corroborates the fulfilment of the first two 
factors of section 520, namely the classification of   fracking as an abnormally dangerous 
activity.  
Likewise, it seems unfair for a court to find that fracking does not pose a high degree of risk 
because scientific evidence presently at least has concluded that it does not. The right thing 
for a court to look is the preponderance of evidence reported in the media and the multiple 
cases filed against fracking operations by plaintiffs in the US; it is this that should now matter 
while reaching conclusion. 
                                                          
441See the cited cases on the issues raised that show the frequency of frack accidents and claims…Zimmermann 
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4:12-Cv-00500 (E.D. Ark., Aug. 10, 2012). See also, Butts, et al., V. Southwestern Energy Production Company, 
No. 3:12-Cv-01330 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2012). See also., Haney, et al V. Range Resources Appalachia, LLC., et 
al., No. 2012-3534 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl., May 25, 2012). See also., Roth V. Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation and Gas 
Search Drilling Services Corporation, No. 3:12-Cv-00898 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2012) (Originally filed in the court 
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also., Becka V. Antero Resources A/K/A Antero Resources Appalachain [Sic] Corp. S/K/A Antero Resources 
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5.8.2 Factor (c) Inappropriateness of the Activity to its Location444 
The next factor to consider in section 520 of the Second Restatement Act is factor (c) the 
inappropriateness of the activity to its location, to ascertain whether fracking activity qualifies 
as an abnormally dangerous activity. The intention of the craftsmen of these factors in the 
Restatement Act with regard to factor (c) is to determine whether an activity constitutes a 
natural use of the land where it is conducted.445 The wisdom for which the authors considered 
factors (a) and (b) with factor (c) is that some activities present great harm and high degree of 
risk when conducted in certain locations.446 For example, citing a large water reservoir in open 
country is not abnormally dangerous, but the same reservoir on a bluff above a large city is.  
In plain terms, the authors of this factor conclude that it is very difficult for courts to determine 
the degree of risk of great harm of an activity in isolation without taking into consideration 
the risk in the context of its location. In the opinion of this thesis, this is only a limited 
interpretation of the true tenets of factor (c). Confining the inappropriateness of an activity to 
only the location it is being carried out is altogether misleading.  
At this point it is important to consider the catch phrase in factor (c). The word “inappropriate” 
needs to be examined in its independent state. What makes a thing inappropriate is not limited 
to the location where it is being carried out. Rather it goes beyond that. The argument is as 
follows: an activity can also be inappropriate when a particular form of technique is preferred 
amidst alternatives with less disadvantages. This brings us to another factor formulated by the 
author of this thesis which is meant to shed more light to the reader to prove and extend the 
meaning of an inappropriate activity. A factor called the availability level of other forms of 
technology shall be explained to show that the slick water fracking technique is inappropriate 
when one considers other forms of fluid based hydraulic fracking techniques.  
Regarding fracking technology, the question is: are there other forms available that the 
industry players could have opted for aside the slick water hydraulic fracking technique? The 
answer is in the affirmative. The next ideal question that should follow is whether other 
alternatives are safer to operate in terms of health and the environment. The answer is also in 
the affirmative. For detailed examination of the various forms of fluid based hydraulic 
fracking technologies, their advantages and disadvantages as well as the rationale behind the 
industry choice is discussed sub section 3.6 of Chapter III. 
Therefore, fracking activity could become inappropriate in terms of its technique where other 
safer alternatives are available, yet the industry chose the slick water HVHF technique. It 
leaves one with no other option but to conclude that there is certainly going to be great harm 
and risk of harm as an inappropriate activity due to the choice of technique adopted though it 
is within the natural use of the land where it is conducted. 
Moreover, this thesis also argues that, considering the rate of aquifer and groundwater 
contamination, it is highly true that this fracking technique is inappropriate in its location with 
regards to factor (c). Taking a cue from the Harthman v. Texaco Incorporation case,447 where 
the court held that the storage of gasoline underground for fuel station purposes was 
abnormally dangerous due to the location of the storage tank: a fresh water aquifer that served 
                                                          
444See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 Cmt. G. 
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as a community’s primary source of drinking water was situated directly beneath the fuel 
station’s tanks.448  
By this precarious location of the storage tanks, it automatically increased the likelihood of 
harm, and established the possibility for great and imminent harm.449 The question is whether 
fracking in its present operation is appropriate considering the series of contamination claims 
filed in courts. All drilling activities in fracking take place close to fresh water aquifers or 
above groundwater reservoirs of a shale play, along similar lines to Harthman case.450  
Since the Harthman case failed factor (c) inappropriateness of the activity to its location, 
fracking should fail too. In fact, based on this case, the common thread running through these 
cases is how the location of an activity affects its riskiness. Under this view, there could not 
have been any appropriate location for fracking within areas densely populated.451  
In summation, based on the transgenerational harm factor as well as the frequency rate factor 
formulated by this thesis to explain what great harm and high degree of risk related to fracking 
should be, it is imperative to say that factors (a) and (b) weigh in favour of fracking qualifying 
as abnormally dangerous because most groundwater and fresh water contamination issues are 
irredeemable and the rate at which these contaminations take place is quite alarming. Second, 
factor (c) definitely indicts fracking strictly liable in the choice of technique and for the fact 
that it occurs virtually always around water resources belonging to an individual or a 
community.452 
5.8.3 Factor (d) Risk Not Eliminated by Reasonable Care 
To apply factor (c) to fracking, this sub section shall examine its operations by connecting it 
to the question of whether the risks are unavoidable even though the actor had taken all 
reasonable precautions in advance and had exercised all reasonable care in his operations, so 
as not to be negligent.453  
According to Boston, this is the most germane of the section 520 factors.454 Implicitly, Boston 
stated that in application, courts hold an activity as abnormally dangerous only at the instance 
where the residual risk is high or abnormal.455 In sum, this factor examines whether accidents 
are avoidable or not. Accidents are avoidable by the exercise of reasonable care.  
However, to assume that accidents are avoidable in all human activities is a complete 
misunderstanding of the intent of factor (d). Each activity must be examined on its own merit 
and the issues it presents. Therefore, if factor (d) is out-come determinative, it then means that 
risks in some activities are completely unavoidable.  
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Having said that, what one should be considering is whether fracking accidents are avoidable 
or not. To understand factor (d) further it is important to know how courts define the activity 
is the threshold question in this analysis.456 Courts may decide to look at the activity in a 
general sense and once that is the case, the court is more likely to find that reasonable care 
can eliminate the activity’s high risk. Whereas, if they describe an activity in a more specific 
sense, the more likely it is to find that reasonable care cannot eliminate the activity’s high 
risk. The former definition of an activity is in its benign, pre-injury-causing condition to avoid 
strict liability.457 It is important to remember here that factor (d) is outcome determinative in 
strict liability issues. If this is the case, why then would courts define the activity in its pre-
injury causing condition to avoid applying strict liability.458 The right thing to do is to define 
the activity by the harm it has already caused since the totality of factor (d) is outcome 
determinative. Take for instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court case State Department of 
Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.459 Ventron court, in its application of factor (d) 
found only “with respect to the ability to eliminate the risks involved in disposing of 
hazardous wastes by the exercise of reasonable care, no safe way exists to dispose of mercury 
by simply dumping it on land or into water.”460  
Whereas, in Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, the plaintiffs sued a liquid bleach manufacturer 
under a theory of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity for accidentally releasing a 
harmful amount of chlorine gas into the surrounding outside air. Assuming the plaintiffs in 
both cases urged the courts to examine the dangerous characteristics of chlorine gas as an 
issue. The Ventron court perhaps might have framed the issue as whether the release of 
chlorine gas into the air was abnormally dangerous. On the other hand, the Erbrich court 
might have framed the issue as “whether the manufacture of chlorine bleach constitutes an 
ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity.”461 
In both cases the subject of chlorine gas and chlorine bleach are all part of the activity. One 
cannot divorce the other to get a true characteristics and nature of an activity. Just like natural 
gas being flammable and as poisonous as chlorine gas and chlorine bleach in their 
characteristics, but the activities of extracting and manufacturing, respectively, might not be 
abnormally dangerous.  
The argument is therefore as follows: once the object of any activity has a dangerous 
characteristic then it reflects a great harm and high degree of risk. Put another way, it is 
dangerous in principle. Such activity becomes finally abnormally dangerous upon the 
existence of an outcome of an incident. It suffices at this juncture to assert that the existence 
of an abnormally dangerous object (natural gas, chlorine gas and chlorine bleach) 
automatically presents a situation where risks cannot be eliminated even though the actor has 
taken all reasonable precautions in advance and has exercised all reasonable care in his 
operation. Thus, it becomes a question of ‘when’ and not ‘likely’ harm occurring. 
In contrast, the Erbrich court, after analysing the case held that due care could have eliminated 
the risks of chlorine pollution during the defendant’s manufacturing activities. What the court 
meant was that it was an avoidable accident. The conclusion is this: the shale gas extraction 
process is flawed with multi claims of pollutions issues since the commencement of this 
activity. The outcome of accidents is with great harm, the risk of harm is high and the 
                                                          
456See supra Marcovici, M. (2013) footnote 353.  
457Ibid at 656. 
458Ibid. 
459State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
460Ibid at p.860. 
461Ibid at p.861. 
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inappropriateness of citing a shale well is visible and these risks cannot be eliminated by 
reasonable care because no one can say with certainty what takes place underground during 
drilling process. More so, the presence of dangerous substances in an activity already creates 
a high and abnormal residual risk factor which cannot be eliminated even with the utmost 
reasonable care package of the relevant actor.462 
5.8.4 Factor (e) Extent to which the Activity is not a Matter of Common Usage 
Indeed, it is quite difficult to examine factors (d) which talks about the inability of risks being 
eliminated by reasonable care (e) which talks about matter of common usage requirement and 
factor (f) which talks about the extent to which the activity’s value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Factor (d) in its interpretation tends to have a broad 
definition which could diminish its usefulness to courts.  
According to factor ‘e’, an activity is a matter of common usage “if it is customarily carried 
on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community”.463 From this 
understanding, common usage does not include where an activity’s action affects a great mass 
of mankind. Rather it is the extent to which others in the same industry or vicinity apply the 
said same activity. This was exemplified in the case of Sprankle v. Bower Amonia &Chemical 
Co.464 In this case the court decided that the extent to which fertiliser and hydrous ammonia 
was applied and stored in large quantities in a wide variety of agricultural, industrial and 
commercial manners fulfilled the common usage requirement in factor (e).465 Also, the fact 
that an activity was carried out in an established field or community where that activity is well 
known by a majority of people within that community cannot pass for the common usage 
criterion. This misconception of what the concept of common usage is was revealed in the 
case of Williams v. Amoco Production Co.466 Here, the court held that the drilling and 
operation of natural gas wells were a matter of common usage because it occurred in an 
established gas field where other similar activities were common.  
This decision could hold true only to the extent that the drilling and operation of natural gas 
wells was a matter of common usage but not because it occurred in an established gas field 
where other similar activities were common. The point is this: to ascertain whether indeed the 
slick water hydraulic fracking passes the test of common usage requirement in line with factor 
‘e’, it must be operational in virtually all countries of the world that have shale gas 
resources.467 To use one established gas field in a country or two as a yardstick to establish 
common usage is altogether restrictive because one country and one established gas field does 
not represent the ‘great mass of mankind’ ingredient in the interpretation of the common usage 
criterion. Present, shale gas extraction through slick water hydraulic fracking is being used in 
the USA and few presence in China and forestall because of environmental issues like 
earthquakes traced to shale gas fracking. However, other regions like the UK, Poland, Algeria 
and Bulgaria still attempting to overcome the hurdles involved.468 
                                                          
462See New Meadows Holding Co. V. Wash. supra footnote 455 (finding that once an activity has a residual risk 
factor, reasonable care is incapable of eliminating the occurrence of great harm to prevent the application of strict 
liability). 
463See Restatement (Second) of torts § 520 Cmt. I (1977). 
464Sprankle v. Bower Amonia &Chemical Co. 824 F.2d 409, 415–16 (5th Cir. 1987). 
465Ibid at p.416 (quoting Restatement (second) of torts § 520(D) (1977)). 
466734 P.2d at 1123. 
467For example, of countries that operate fracking as a technology for the extraction of oil and gas from shale 
formations…See U.S, Canada and Europe queuing to kick off although it has been attempted in some part in 
Britain. 
468See supra Schmitt, R. (1994) foot note 356. 
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5.8.5 Factor (f): Extent to which the Activity’s Value to the Community is Outweighs its 
Dangerous Attributes. 
This factor is malign in that it is irrelevant in determining whether a risk should be allocated 
to the defendant because of the activity’s dangerous nature. Due to this irrelevance, other 
writers and courts often do not determine this factor in their effort to know whether an activity 
is abnormally dangerous.469  
A critical look at this factor suggests that Texas and Oklahoma might not view oil and gas 
wells as abnormally dangerous, but the same oil and gas wells will turn out abnormally 
dangerous due to the reduced economic reliance attached to the petroleum industry in some 
states and countries that do not have these resources at all.470  
However, it is evident that an activity’s value to the community has been interpreted by courts 
to mean the potential to create jobs.471 This assumption appears subjective because the 
potential jobs in which the oil and gas industry may give to the people is something that only 
last during the lifespan of the well or the fracking process.  
Most oil and gas workers are often retrenched at the early stages of the operations. For 
example, after drilling, close to 20% of the work forces’ contracts end for the reason that they 
are just temporal.472 Also, experts from other work fields are transferred to do the same 
fracking jobs in new fields within the same country or from another country. These job figures 
in the true sense of it appears to be only a fraction as not all workers have permanent contracts 
in the true sense of it. 
5.9 Summary 
Activities that cause great harm of environmental pollution and health risks should be held to 
be unavoidable as a matter of law. Although fracking generally has been a common usage in 
the industry, but slick water hydraulic fracking technique is not a common usage yet in ‘oil 
and gas industry of the world.’ No wonder the EPA till now has not been able to come up with 
definitive proof to link water pollution to shale gas activities.473 Therefore, as the cases 
discussed here showed, an activity that causes frequent accidents that in most cases results in 
irreparable damage should be categorised as abnormally dangerous. The application of due 
care will not be able to eliminate such activities potential for harm. It will indeed be 
inequitable if such an enterprise is not held strictly liable as well as incorporating other policy 
options meant to reduce risks because empirical evidence reveals that it is not safe to conduct 
such an activity.  
Moreover, based on the empirical evidence fracking, does not qualify as an activity within the 
interpretation of what common use of land is. Nevertheless, it has been established by a 
                                                          
469For example, of countries that operate fracking as a technology for the extraction of oil and gas from shale 
formations…See U.S, Canada and Europe queuing to kick off although it has been attempted in some part in 
Britain. 
470Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 Cmt. K (1977). 
471See supra Zikargae, M. H. (2018) footnote 330, p.629 (Arguing “that factor (f) is not [appropriate for inclusion 
in the adjudicatory calculus]; and that, on examination, the decisions in the last thirty years support precisely that 
conclusion”). 
472Shawver, S. (2001). Perspectives: Expansion of oil, gas industry could mean more jobs, Marietta Times 
[Online] http://www.mariettatimes.com/page/content.detail/id/538695/perspectives%e2%80%94expansion-of-
oil%e2%80%94gas-industry-could-mean-more-jobs.html?nav=5002. (Accessed on 12/06/2017). 
473U.S. Environmental. Protection. Agency, evaluation of impacts to underground sources of drinking water by 
hydraulic fracturing of coalbed methane reservoirs 4-2 (2004) [hereinafter EPA usdw evaluation 2004]. 
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number of courts in the US that extracting oil and gas from gas lands is natural. It is entirely 
wrong to assume that this is a matter of common usage because that term is defined by the 
activity’s applicability level in the countries across the world and not based on the singular 
vicinity of an established field. Finally, fracking’s valuableness does not depend on the 
number of jobs it created because those jobs are short lived and the same set of workers are 
being recycled to execute future fracking jobs. This cannot stand as a justifiable bases for 
offsetting the activity’s residual risks. 
Therefore, the factors in section 520 vehemently weigh against fracking as an abnormally 
dangerous activity. This conclusion does not in any way suggest that the risks arising from 
fracking activities are unique to fracking alone, but the frequency with which these accidents 
occur in the case of fracking is alarming.474 For example, to identify potential scenarios of 
concern regarding human health risks surrounding the natural gas drilling industry a survey 
of industry workers and regulators was developed and implemented to quantify the frequency 
of failure incidents and near-miss accidents at the wellhead site. The goal of the survey is to 
better understand scenarios of concern for human health risks as a result of operational failure 
incidents and regulatory violations during natural gas drilling in the Marcellus shale region in 
the state of Pennsylvania.  Thus, an elicitation of health perceptions regarding unconventional 
shale gas development in the Marcellus region found that 22% of the 72 respondents perceived 
unconventional drilling as a health concern, while 42% attributed health symptoms to envi-
ronmental factors, the most frequently selected of which was unconventional drilling activi-
ties.475 
Also, to further illustrate to the reader the frequency level of shale gas incidents to justify for 
a strict liability regime, a study conducted by Vengosh et al. in 2014476 regarding contamina-
tion risks to water sources.  The study identified four scenarios where these risks can occur 
from shale gas extraction: stray gas leaking into shallow aquifers, surface water contamination 
from spills and leaks, soil and river sediment contamination from wastewater, and the overuse 
of freshwater for hydraulic fracturing.477 These four scenarios is only related to water con-
tamination risk. This accordingly, resonates a high frequency level of risk resulting in water 
contamination issues. This is why this thesis proposed for a ‘risk/segment based strict liability 
rule.’ By this, this thesis means that where a particular risk relating to an activity has an in-
creased frequency in its occurrence, that risk should be subject to a strict liability regime under 
the risk based strict liability rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
474See supra Osborn, S.G et al., (2011) foot note 186. (Illustrating the statistics of fracking contaminating water 
and other violations regarding regulatory requirements). 
475Saberi, P. et al., (2014). Field survey of health perception and complaints of Pennsylvania residents in the 
Marcellus Shale region. J Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2014 June; 11(6):6517-27. 
476Vengosh, A. et al., (2014). A critical review of the risks to water resources from unconventional shale gas 
development and hydraulic fracturing in the United States, Environmental Science Technology, Volume 48, Issue 
15, pp. 8334-48. 
477Ibid. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Why Hydraulic Fracking Water Contamination Risks should be Subject to Strict 
Liability Claim: Discourse 
The water contamination issue has taken centre stage of discussions in energy issues and is 
the fundamental criticism that shale gas fracking has had to and continues to face. Some have 
argued that we cannot continue to contaminate water resources considering its scarcity and its 
relevance to survival.478 To this end, there is a need to tackle this challenge through effective 
means. On way to do that is through a strict environmental regulatory reform. Consequently, 
this chapter aims to examine arguments that justify the application of a strict liability regime 
for water contamination claims. It is the argument of this thesis that if this is entrenched in 
the legal system that governs shale gas extraction activity, it would go a long way in forcing 
operators to adhere to best practices such as segregating drilling and exploitation in densely 
populated areas.  
Also, it will transfer the burden of proof to the party that is best equipped to prove otherwise. 
In this context, the operator may be the only one that knows the technical aspects of fracking. 
Thus, they will be in a better position to prove their innocence once the duty to prove has been 
placed upon them by law. This is based upon the premise that the scientific world advances 
faster than the regulatory agencies can keep abreast of technological developments.  
Last, it would further reduce the probability level for this risks to occur during shale gas 
extractive activities. This does not in any way suggest that water contamination does not 
happen in conventional oil and gas extractive activities. Rather, when compared with the level 
of occurrence, the former seem to have a frequency level that is beyond the socially optimal 
level of risk. Moreover, this is further complicated by the various avenues in which this 
contamination might happen as examined in Chapter III of this thesis. Roughly, there are 
about four possible ways fracking fluid can contaminate water aquifers and groundwater. 
6.1 Introduction 
The rush for natural gas coupled with technical advances in drilling has dramatically increased 
the number of hydraulic fracking projects, especially in the US. Volatility in energy prices 
and the need for domestic, relatively clean energy sources have made natural gas become 
extremely attractive as an energy source.479 Although in the US large quantities of 
conventional deposits are still being produced they are overall in decline.480 In recent years, 
the hydraulic fracking technique has provided an opportunity to fill the gap in the decline of 
conventional energy sources by opening access to unconventional deposits, thereby 
geographically expanding the “gasland” and unlocking, at least in some regions, a “Saudi 
Arabia of Natural Gas”.481 This expansion to other jurisdictions is likely to continue from all 
                                                          
478This is in accordance with the Millennium Development Goal MDG objectives and the Sustainable 
Development goal objective. It has being stated that nations of the world should make adequate safe guard 
measures to curb the water crisis in the world. 
479U.S. Energy Information. Administration Department of Energy, “Energy price impacts on the U.S. economy 
6 (2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/economy/energy_price.pdf; (Accessed on 14/06/2017) 
480Wiseman, H. (2010). Regulatory adaptation in fractured Appalachia, Villanova. Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 21, pp.229, 229–30 (2010). 
481Chesapeake Energy, Hydraulic Fracturing: Fact Sheet 1 (2011), available a 
thttp://www.chk.com/media/educational-library/fact sheets/corporate/hydraulic_fracturing_fact_sheet.pdf; EPA, 
science in action: hydraulic fracturing research study 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf. (Accessed on 21/06/2018). 
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indications, with predictions indicating that by 2020, twenty percent of the world’s natural 
gas will come from hydraulic fracking.482 
However, others are worried by the break neck pace of expansion, especially because of the 
environmental and health risks of hydraulic fracking, dire in the worst case and unknown at 
best.483 Chief among the threats that fracking presents is the environmental and health 
concerns related to clean water. In both developed and developing societies, water and energy 
are necessary in large quantities for them to continue to function and thrive. A Supreme Court 
justice in Texas recently wrote that while water, not oil, is the lifeblood of Texas, “oil and gas 
are its muscle.”484 Likewise, the world can survive without oil and gas but cannot survive 
without water because nature has played it out that water can flow from various sources such 
as rock top and natural fountains without the assistance of any technology. Whereas, oil and 
gas need the assistance of sophisticated technologies to discover and extract them.  
Be that as it may seem, the world will have to make some difficult and serious decisions about 
the world’s water and energy supplies, especially about hydraulic fracturing.485 Hence, the 
role of this Chapter is to attempt to analyse the current status of the strict liability doctrine and 
pertinent cases. It will finally argue for a likelihood of successfully applying a strict liability 
as one of the framework policy option to the pending agitations across the globe as a cause of 
action for water contamination.  
More importantly there ought to be a balance between the dividends an activity promises and 
the weight of environmental and health concerns surrounding that activity. This Chapter 
therefore concludes under this context that strict liability is legally appropriate and socially 
beneficial following complaints from numerous people living near hydraulic fracking wells 
alleging that the process is responsible for the contamination of their well water.486 Prior to 
this, it is necessary to set out the argument for hydraulic fracking water contamination harm 
to be subject to a strict liability rule; as such, it is important to ask the following practical and 
quite pragmatic question: Is it legally justified for fracking to be subject to strict liability rule 
or has any state adopted such a rule in the exploitation of natural gas from unconventional 
shale formations? The answer to this question above is certainly in the affirmative. A good 
example is New York which imposed strict liability for petroleum discharge by statute.487 
However, New York is also deciding to enact a similar law to apply strict liability to HVHF.488  
                                                          
482Ibid at p.1 (This trend is also apparent worldwide— “[d]espite rising prices, natural gas is forecast to continue 
to be the fastest-growing primary fossil fuel energy source worldwide.” sims et al. 
483Howell, K. (2009). More Oversight Sought For Hydraulic Fracturing, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/11/04/04greenwire-more-oversight-soughtfor-hydraulic-fracturing-
35961.html;‘ Fracking’ For Energy In Northeast: Boon Or Doom?, Environment on MSNBC (Nov. 11, 2010), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40135664/ns/usnews-environment [hereinafter, fracking boon or doom]. 
484Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. V. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tex. 2008) (Willett, J., Concurring). 
485Dye, L. (2008). ‘New’ Energy Sources Hard On Water Supply, ABC News.Com, 
http://abcnews.go.com/technology/story?id=4703865&page=1; Paul O’Callaghan, Energy Versus Water: (Nov. 
10, 2008)).  Is Blue The New Green? Clean Technica.Com http://www.cleantechnica.com/2008/11/10/energy-
versus-water-is-blue-the-new-green/. 
486Mall, A. (2011). Incidents Where Hydraulic Fracturing is a suspected cause of drinking water contamination, 
Switchboard: Natural Res. Def. Council Staff Blog, 
http://www.switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/incidents_where_hydraulic_frac.html. 
487See Oil Spill Prevention, Control, and Compensation Act, Newyork Navigation law§ 181 (Mckinney’s 
consolidated laws of New York). 
488Minn, P. (2012). Given the possible presence of petroleum distillates in produced water, one wonders whether 
§ Thomson Reuters 181 might eventually form the basis for imposing strict liability in the HVHF Context; See 
also Assemb. A02108, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (New York 2011). 
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Here, this work shall begin with a brief discussion regarding the regulatory vacuums using 
the US as a case study as well as social policy concerns that give justification for the 
application of a strict liability regime to HVHF.  
It is important to note here that because of the deficiencies surrounding the statutes and 
regulations that govern fracking, many authors, advocates and policymakers have called for a 
need for change in these statutes and regulations.489 This gives common law the credentials 
to play a role in remedying the two fundamental vacuums in statutory regimes that govern the 
roles in regulating shale gas activities in order to reduce risks. 
First, there are two broad categories of damage to be considered that fracking can cause in 
any shale play. On a larger scale, the cumulative impact of fracking operations on major 
watersheds around a shale play could affect the availability of clean water for millions of 
people living and depending on the water resource.490 On a smaller scale, where discrete 
accidents have occurred in sparsely populated places, this has resulted in rendering local water 
supplies unusable.491  
Large scale damage is more effectively redressed through statutory remedies compared to 
small scale damage, the reason being that statutory penalties and fines are paid to state or 
federal agencies, not paid to the victims directly in the USA,492 whereas common law 
attributes award damages directly to the victims. For example, if Cabot, an oil and gas 
company operating in Susquehanna County in the US merely paid the fine to Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP),493 the goal of the affected parties to be made whole and 
compensated for the damage done to their property is frustrated accordingly.  
Second, parties are given leverage to make their own value judgments regarding different 
courses of action under common law. For example, in situations where companies have 
discovered that the benefits of fracking outweigh the likely harms, it creates a scenario where 
operators would prefer to pay continuously for the injuries they caused. In addition, they could 
also indemnify themselves or decide to settle lawsuits outside of court to avoid tort liability. 
This invariably circumvents the issues relating to harm arising from breach of contractual 
agreements up front. These remedies afford the opportunity to companies to extract gas from 
shale beds and at the same time preserves the property rights and financial security of the 
property owners. Although large scale damage may not be redressed by using common law 
features effectively, it certainly ensures that individual property owners are compensated for 
the loss they suffered as a result. Thus, compelling participants to comply with statute 
requirements.  
This singular feature makes legal statutes a potent tool for preventing large scale damage and 
improving all round environmental quality, but in the case of the individual property owner 
                                                          
489Lustgarten, A. (2004). The hidden danger of gas drilling, B0&. W6, Nov. 24, 2008, at 77, 79, Available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_47/b4109000334640.htm (quoting one of the 2004 EPA 
Study’s Original Authors: “It was never intended to be a broad, sweeping study.”). 
490Sawyer, H. (2009). Final impact assessment report. Impact assessment of natural gas production in the New 
York City water supply watershed 49 (2009), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/12_23_2009_final_assessment_report.pdf (Accessed on 
12/06/2017). 
491Ibid  
492E.G., Oil & Gas Act, 58 PA CONS. STAT § 601.601 (2011) (“All fines, civil penalties, permit and registration 
fees collected under this act are hereby appropriated to the department of environmental resources to carry out the 
purposes of this act.”). 
493Alonso, P. W. (2010). Dimock, a town fractured, water contamination from shale, [Online] htpp;//www.water-
contaminantion-from-shale.com/story_3.php (Accessed 20/06/2017). 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
115
in an area with widespread drilling, where it is difficult to prevent harm, and the main focus 
is on compensating for damage already done,494 common law is the better tool. 
As a justification for the application of a strict liability rule, it is also important to note some 
advantages it has over a negligence standard. While strict liability does not involve the 
additional steps of ascertaining whether the defendant was negligent or breached a duty, 
negligence standards rely heavily on this resolve. As a result, a strict liability standard relies 
less on the facts of a case, and in order to achieve recovery, it does not require proof of the 
defendant’s negligent behaviour,495 on the basis that fewer facts need to be alleged. Therefore, 
the administrative cost of suits is reduced, and affected parties are further encouraged to seek 
relief in the first place if strict liability is applied. There is also an improvement in the 
uniformity and accuracy of judicial decisions.  
Strict liability is also advantageous over negligence because it tends to discourage excessive 
risk taking on the part of the oil and gas companies. This is simply because drilling companies 
are well equipped to know the risks involved in fracking and how to mitigate the dangers than 
landowners. As a result, it is preferable that the general public holds these oil and gas 
companies strictly liable instead of landowners to prove whether the company was negligent. 
6.2 The Statutory and Regulatory Concerns of Allowing HVHF 
6.2.1 Oil and Gas and Fracking Fluids Related Wastes are exempted from Regulation 
under RCRA. 
The RCRA was enacted by Congress in 1972 for managing hazardous waste.496 A temporary 
provision was made by Congress in 1980 exempting “drilling fluids, produced water, and 
other wastes linked to exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or 
geothermal energy” from the Act’s regulation.497  
Whilst it was the intention of Congress that the exemption should last for at least two years498 
during which the EPA was to conduct a study, Congress would “determine either to enact 
regulations for oil and gas related wastes… or that such regulations were unwarranted”.499 For 
some reason, after the completion of the study by the EPA in 1987500 and 1988, the EPA 
reached a conclusion by issuing a determination that regulation was unwarranted.501  
Hence, this exemption has been one of the components of the regulatory vacuum that is 
associated with the management of wastes linked to oil and gas field exploration and 
                                                          
494Baca, M. C. (2010). Pittsburgh bans natural gas drilling, P-!P0?1*4, 
http://www.propublica.org/article/pittsburgh-bans-natural-gas-drilling; Eric Boehm, (October,2010). 
Pennsylvania still only state without natural gas severance tax, Statehouse news online (2010), 
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495See Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. V. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 919–20 (Colo. 1997); Pioneer Natural Res. USA, Inc. 
V. W.L. Ranch, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 900, 907 (Tex. App. 2004) (Citing Broders V. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 149, 
152-53 (Tex. 1996). 
496See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Of 1976 § 2, 42 U.S.C.§D6901 (2006). 
497Sold Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980 §D7, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(B) (2) (A) (2006). 
498Ibid (stating that “Oil- and gas-related wastes are] subject only to existing state or federal regulatory programs 
in lieu of this subchapter until at least 24 months after [The date of enactment.”). 
49942 U.S.C. § 6921(B) (2) (B). Any such regulations would “Take effect only when authorized by Act of 
Congress.” § 6921(B) (2) (C). 
500Regulatory determination for oil and gas and geothermal exploration, development and production wastes, 53 
Fed. Feg. 25,446, 25,448 (July 6, 1988) (also stating that EPA did not begin the study until after the Alaska centre 
for the environment sued EPA in 1985). 
501Ibid at p. 25, 447, 25 and 456. 
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production operations,502 for which shale gas fracking shares similarity. This has also been a 
subject of criticism. The EPA underlying study of 1987 that resulted in the Agency’s 
determination of 1988 have been criticised as being politically motivated503 and some 
petitions were filed against the Agency to reconsider its position.504 Still, the determination 
that the regulation of oil and gas related wastes under the RCRA remains unwarranted is the 
law of the land today.505 
6.2.2 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Exempts Fracking from Regulation, Except 
When Diesel is used as a Fracking Fluid Additive. 
The EPA reached an agreement with three major fracking companies in which the companies 
agreed to voluntarily eliminate the use of diesel fuel in fracking fluids,506 while the EPA 
conducted a study of fracking in CBM fields in 2003.507 The study’s recommendation in 2004 
discussed the potential danger of the use of diesel fuel in fracking.508 However, the study 
down played the dangers posed by CBM fracking overall.509 The voluntary diesel elimination 
agreement between the Agency and relevant companies in 2003 was used as a justification 
for downplaying the threats CBM fracking posed and stated that companies “no longer use 
diesel fuel as a hydraulic fracking fluid additive”.510 
The Act expressly prohibited an underground injection not approved by a permit issued by 
the EPA511 as well as prohibiting the promulgation of any rule authorising any underground 
injection which posed a threat to drinking water sources.512 Despite the ruling of the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1997 and 2001 which viewed fracking as an “underground 
injection” activity that ought to be regulated under SDWA,513 In 2005 Congress specifically 
                                                          
502Cox, J. R. (2003). Revisiting RCRA’s oilfield waste exemption as to certain hazardous oilfield exploration and 
production wastes, Villona Environmental Law Journal Volume 14, 1. 
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1987 study that her findings were altered because of pressure from the office of legal counsel of the White House 
under Ronald Reagan”) 
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(Accessed 4/02/2017). 
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exempted fracking from regulation under SDWA in 2005.514 Moreover, the exemption does 
not cover the use of diesel fuel for fracking as it is still considered an underground injection.515 
6.2.3 Under other Federal Statutes, Oil and Gas Related Activities and Substances are 
exempted from Regulation. 
Aside from the RCRA and SDWA, discussed above, which constitute the main examples of 
fracking exemptions from the entire gamut of federal regulation, there are other federal 
statutes containing their exemptions and exclusions for different elements of the natural gas 
exploration process. These statutes comprise CERCLA,516 the Clean Water Act,517 as well as 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).518  
As will be seen in the subsequent sections, these regulatory lee-way show that some oil and 
gas related activities and wastes have been exempted from federal regulation, thereby leaving 
the tasks to state and local governments to deal with.519 
6.3 The Social Policy Concerns of Allowing HVHF  
The final three factors under the Restatement (Second) of Torts are clearly fact sensitive and 
touch on the social policy issues520 that define whether strict liability should be applicable to 
the harms caused by fracking operations. Factor (e) the extent to which the activity is not a 
matter of common usage, from the discretions of the court’s interpretation, limited the 
doctrine of strict liability. This factor from case law assumes that a common activity will be 
“a well-developed technology with reciprocal risk exchange between participants and 
bystanders”.521  
                                                          
Decision), Cert. Denied, 537 U.S. 989 (2002), Superseded by Statute, Energy Policy Act Of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
514Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §D322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (Codified at 42 U.S.C. §D300h (D) 
(2006)). while the bill was being debated in 2005, amendments proposed by representatives Diana Degette and 
Hilda Solis, which would have preserved some federal oversight of fracking, failed in committee. h.r. rep. no. 
109-215, pt.1, at 491 (2005) .II The Senate, Senator Jim Jeffords introduced a separate bill that would have 
subjected fracking to SDWA’s provisions. s. 1080, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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The first duty of the court is to determine whether hydraulic fracking is a matter of common 
usage at the location. Comments from the Restatement infers that oil drilling could be 
abnormally dangerous if it is done in other areas instead of designated oil lands.522 There is 
no clarity yet as to how common an activity must be in order to succeed the common usage 
test. In the same vein, there is no clear delineation as to what locations are appropriate for 
hydraulic fracking.523 Oil and gas companies have been held strictly liable by previous courts 
for wells in densely settled communities524 but not in rural areas.525 The definition of ‘rural’ 
is particularly open to a broad interpretation. For purpose of illustrating this, towns where 
contaminations occur that are located approximately thirty minutes away from a major 
populated city is deemed sufficiently rural.526 What is expected of the court is to evaluate the 
nearness of the hydraulic well to the plaintiffs’ property and water supply in any fracking 
cause of action.527 
The case of Branch v W. Petrol., Inc,528 showed something very interesting in the sense that 
the well was drilled less than 2,000 feet (0.38 miles) and others as low as 400 feet from the 
residence of the plaintiffs and water supplies.529 From the above case, it is fair to say that the 
well drilled at that distance makes fracking to be inappropriately located. This is because 
distance plays a role in arriving at what is appropriate when it comes to determining an 
activity’s abnormally dangerous character vis-à-vis factor (c). Therefore, strict liability should 
apply to fracking as one of the policy options proposed in this thesis. This is without prejudice 
to a defendant’s claim to have exercised reasonable care because risk cannot be eliminated at 
a depth where a well was drilled only 400 feet from a person’s water supply.530 
In addition, fracking qualifies as a non-natural use of land based on the history of where 
fracking currently takes place. Fracking transports minerals from the bedrock to water located 
above the bed rock, which ordinarily would not have happened.531 A similar decision was 
reached by the court in Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry532 where the defendant was held strictly 
liable for oil drilling operations carried out close to the plaintiff’s residence that brought salt 
water to the surface which later led to the contamination of the plaintiff’s drinking water.533  
                                                          
522See Restatement Cmt, I (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). 
523See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 Cmt. J (1977). 
524See Green V. Gen. Petrol. Corp., 270 P. 952, 956 (Cal. 1928) (awarding plaintiffs damages for oil contamination 
of their residential property); Tyner V. People’s Gas Co., 31 N.E. 61, 62 (Ind. 1892) (affirming an injunction 
against a natural gas well 200 feet from plaintiff’s domicile). 
525See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 Cmt. K (1977). 
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527Branch V. W. Petrol., Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah 1982) (Taking into account the proximity of the plaintiff’s 
well to the activity in holding the defendant strictly liable); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt. K (1977) 
528Ibid. 
529See Complaint for petitioner, Berish et al,. V. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., No. 210-1882CP, 2010 WL 4230599 
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/ images/blogs/greeninc/complaint.pdf 
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TIV, 2010 WL 931974 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Fiorentino Complaint]. 
530See Branch, 657 P.2d at 270 (Imposing strict liability because dumping formation water adjacent to plaintiff’s 
property was too close). 
531See also, ‘Fracking’ (2010). Mobilizes Uranium in Marcellus Shale, Eurekalert! 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2010–10/uab-mu102510.php. (Accessed 24/06/2017). 
532Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry 11. U.S 322 (1885). 
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The rationale behind the court’s decision was that “the salt water had been harmless as long 
as it was left in the ground, but once it was raised to the surface of the earth it became a 
harmful solvent”.534 The court added that [t] he right to recover results from the company 
having the harmful substance on its land and permitting it to escape to the damage of 
plaintiff.”535 The unnatural minerals brought to the water level by fracking shared lots of 
similarity with the salt water in the Berry’s case536 which produced harm that gives credence 
to need to apply strict liability under factor (e).  
Finally, factor (f) deals with the importance attached to the activity. Here, what is applicable 
is that it provides the opportunity to weigh the importance of domestic energy and local 
economic growth against the importance of clean water.537 What this means is that if fracking 
operations are sufficiently valuable to a community or a nation, the court may not see it as 
abnormally dangerous because of the value of the activity itself.538  
Regardless, what is valuable is also open to wide interpretation. It is a relative term if certain 
idiosyncrasies of individuals are taken into consideration. What is valuable sometimes is 
based on the choice of the individual and any attempt to impose it would be a negation of 
what is fair and just to that individual. In the opinion of this thesis, what is valuable should be 
dictated by an involuntary phenomenon, something that one does not have the requisite will 
to resist or where there is no close substitute to that seemingly valuable commodity.  
For instance, the air we breathe is a very valuable commodity like the water we drink. One 
does not choose to breathe, you breathe in oxygen involuntarily to survive. It is not out of 
choice.  Take for example the need to understand what the value of an activity like fracking 
is. For instance, by virtue of the location of the fracking activities, the land owners around 
where a prospective hydrocarbon source was discovered will be entitled to the payment of 
royalties.  
To some, they may simply refuse granting those rights to the oil and gas companies either by 
choice or by the perception they have formed regarding the negative implication that such 
activities create. Whereas, there are some individuals who might be willing to bequeath such 
right to these companies but because they do not have actual title to land they cannot enjoy 
such royalties that might accrue from such. It follows from these conflicting scenarios that 
what is valuable depends on the choice of the individual involved, their willingness and the 
availability of the land to be entitled to such benefits coming with fracking activities.  
The contamination that fracking causes to drinking water is enormous compared to the 
benefits it gives to the community. Water is a commodity that no one can do without, whereas 
the said job opportunities and the royalties that accrue to citizens of that community and land 
owners, respectively, are dictated by certain factors. These factors include: job vacancies and 
the qualification of the individual desirous of working for the oil and gas companies.  
Due to the limited job vacancies available in an oil and gas drilling company, not everyone 
qualified might work in that community at the time when such developmental activity is 
taking place. The aged and those physically challenged or those suffering from health 
conditions might not benefit from the job opportunities that resource extraction claims to 
present. However, it is a known fact that water as a commodity is sought and beneficial to all 
classes of people at all time, irrespective of age and the disability of the individual. Hence, 
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the contamination of ground water affects all the residents within that community that depend 
on it as a source of drinking water.  
Water is a unique commodity that should not be compromised at any level. Before the advent 
of human civilisation, humans have survived without electricity, without jobs from oil 
companies, but one is yet to find an individual who has survived through time without access 
to quality water. There must be the outbreak of water related disease in the long run where 
water is contaminated.  
Therefore, based on these arguments it is clear that an activity like fracking that has the ability 
to contaminate ground water and water resources suggests that the activity is abnormally 
dangerous, and that the risks outweigh the benefits. This is because a great mass of mankind 
absolutely need water and there is neither a substitute to groundwater nor is there a remedy to 
such dangerous contamination. The number of people who involuntarily need this water for 
sustenance is not based on choice, but those who might derive benefits from fracking is based 
on choice and some other factors already identified above. 
Thus, an application of strict liability as a policy palliative in mitigating shale gas associated 
risk is necessary to make the plaintiff whole, as well as to show the truce that the dividends 
of achieving water quality outweighs the benefits of fracking which are temporary. As a result, 
the threat of contamination from hydraulic fracturing is not an issue that is the exclusive 
preserve of the plaintiff(s) in a case; but any other party interested in the future water quality 
within that community where fracking is taking place. 
Interestingly, the application of strict liability would not result in the termination of hydraulic 
fracturing in countries where it is ongoing nor in countries intending to commence because 
the industry knows that what it will gain will always outweigh the cost of a strict liability 
regime. Rather it would address the challenges encountered by drilling companies regarding 
acquisition of private land. Land owners would be more willing to lease their lands for such 
purposes knowing that the defendant is strictly liable for any damage therein.539  
In the same vein, it creates a significant incentive on the part of the defendants, and makes 
them more likely to explore not only the best alternative drilling technologies, but also explore 
alternative drilling areas based on best practice.540 As the doctrine imposes cost for accidents, 
a compromise is reached between those who want to drill and explore oil and natural gas 
through fracking and those agitating for a ban on fracking.541 
6.4 Difficulties Inherent in Some Theories of Law Determining where Defendant’s 
Liability Lie Vis-À-Vis Fracking 
As the future regulation of fracking still remains uncertain in some regions blessed with these 
resources, certain theories of law offer steps in the right direction for victims who may have 
been impacted negatively to recover for environmental damage or loss to chattel caused by 
HVHF.542 Among these theories are include private nuisance, trespass and negligence which 
may be applicable to cases related to fracking. However, in order to successfully promote the 
application of strict liability involving fracking operations kind of harm, particularly water 
                                                          
539Jones, W. K. (1992). ‘Strict liability for hazardous enterprise’ 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1705, 1709 (detailing how 
Ryland’s established the strict liability doctrine). 
540See Industry Harbor Belt R.R. Co. V. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177–78 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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contamination, it is pertinent to examine the difficulties and challenges inherent in the other 
theories of proof of private nuisance and trespass. 
6.4.1 The Unclear Nature of the Law of Subsurface Trespass with Respect to Fracking 
and Other Underground Injections 
Applying the law of trespass to oil and gas related activities is quite difficult.543 This is because 
most oil and gas operations like fracking take place beneath the surface, and this leads to the 
next question one would want to ask, whether the rule of trespass applies at all. The notion of 
law that states that ownership is the same on, above, and below the surface when it comes to 
rules relating to surface and subsurface trespass has lost its potency in current civil legal 
systems.544 Although the same rule of law is being applied for over sixty-five years in 
jurisdictions where common law doctrines still have a contribution in dealing with certain 
liability issues, it is no longer tenable.545  
The court in the case of Fiorentino V. Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation’s546 rejection of the 
doctrine where ownership is the “same on, above and below surface”547 by the regime has 
resulted in a situation where courts are not inclined to apply the law of trespass to oil and gas 
suits except where some degree of harm has occurred on the surface.  
A case at hand is Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, the Texas Supreme Court 
in an obita dicta said that if chemicals were found to have been spilled on the surface, trespass 
would then be applicable, but held that fracking is a subsurface activity and did not constitute 
trespass in that instance.548 Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Crawford v, 
Hrabe that injecting salt water into the ground to enhance production is a right that the well 
operator has, even where consent is not given by the lessor, and that this act of injection was 
not seen as trespass.549Just like Justice Willett’s concurrence in Garza, in holding for the 
defendants, the court referred to drilling as economically beneficial in nature.550 
However, in some limited situations, the law of trespass may still be applicable. For example, 
in Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy, a court in California held that an act of 
migration of water from an oil drilling activity onto cotton-growers’ land was a continuous 
subsurface trespass.551 Also, the Tenth Circuit held that a lower court had sufficient proof 
when it concluded that the migration of gas from one subsurface formation to another was a 
breach of trespass law.552 Therefore, it becomes difficult to find a clear cut position in these 
cases. While in the cases of Crawford and Garza,553 courts have adopted a broad interpretation 
of the rights of mineral lessees and as such, have permitted them to continue activities like 
drainage and underground injection because of their economic benefits, whereas, in cases like 
                                                          
543Keeton, W. P et al., (1984). Prosser and Keeton on the law of torts 72 (5th Ed., Lawyer’s Ed. 1984) (discussing 
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552Beck V. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 1999). 
553See supra Crawford V. Hrabe foot note 549.  
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Starrh and Beck,554 companies were held liable for the consequences of water and gas 
migration. Thus, the difficulty of determining where fracking cases that contain features of 
both fit on this spectrum. 
6.4.2 For Private Nuisance, Proof of Intent May be Difficult to Establish in a Fracking 
Case  
The doctrine of private nuisance allows for recovery for unreasonable conduct. Nuisance is 
the interference with “another’s interest in private use and enjoyment of land” either 
intentionally and unreasonably, or unintentionally and otherwise actionable under the rules of 
negligence.555 Because intent is a key requirement to be fulfilled in private nuisance cases, it 
is therefore imperative that it is established fully. However, it is easier to establish intent in 
many ways, but to prove specific intent is often a hard nut to crack. In Hughes v. Emerald 
Mines Corp., where a mining operation resulted in the contamination of water wells belonging 
to a nearby landowner, the court allowed them to recover by applying private nuisance.556 
Although the specific intent requirement was not fulfilled, the mining company was held 
liable because of the knowledge of substantial certainty that the mining company had 
regarding an imminent contamination in the event of an accident was enough to satisfy the 
requirement of intent.557   
To prove private nuisance, intent can also be established when a defendant intentionally 
carries out an activity that was not originally meant to interfere with another’s interest.558 
Hence, the three varieties of intent: specific intent; substantial certainty; and intentional 
continuation of an initially unintentional act is key in establishing intent in private nuisance 
cases. All of these are not easy to prove by the plaintiff in any cause of action for recovery. 
Also, to prove intent alone is not sufficient to establish private nuisance; the alleged 
interference must be unreasonable in action.559 The ease with which the plaintiffs proved 
intent in the Hughes Case cannot be the same way intent would be proven in fracking cases. 
Likewise, plaintiffs in fracking cases will be unable to establish the ‘specific intent’ 
requirement for the application of nuisance. More so, plaintiffs in fracking cases will find it 
tough to also prove that the defendants drilling companies were substantially certain that their 
operations would result in harm. Drillers will conclude that fracking is safe based on the 
studies in order to defend themselves against accusations of substantial certainty if wells are 
drilled properly and no accidents occur.560  
In the face of a lack of a further scientific evidence that might help the plaintiffs, proving 
substantial certainty will be difficult. Nevertheless, to establish that drilling companies 
intentionally continued a harmful act is achievable if plaintiffs can also show that the drillers 
continued that harmful act despite a prior knowledge that it was causing a contamination 
                                                          
554See supra Marcovici, M. (2013) footnote 353. 
555Restatement (Second) of Torts'& §D822 (1979). 
556Hughes V. Emerald Mines Corp., 450 A.2d 1, 8–9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
557Ibid at p.6-7. 
558Anderson. O. (2009) Subsurface trespass after coastal v. Garza 30, available at 
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anyway.561 Accordingly, the inclusion of knowledge as an element further exacerbates the 
matter.562  
In the same light, in ascertaining whether the mining company ought to be held liable for the 
contamination, according to the Hughes Case, the value of the act must be weighed against 
the negative effects resulting from that act in determining its reasonableness.563 In sum, in 
order to establish the reasonableness component is quite easy to apply to a fracking case than 
intent; but the potential for water contamination in Hughes is similar to the potential that exists 
in place for fracking, and the economic utility of coal mining in Hughes parallels the utility 
of fracking.  
6.4.3 The Difficulties of Defining Due Care and Determining Whether Exercising such 
Care will Prevent Harm makes the Application of Negligence Problematic. 
Regarding negligence claims, the requirement for the proof of intent is not necessary.564 
However, the plaintiff is required to show not only that the defendant did cause the harm, but 
the plaintiff further has to prove that the defendant acted negligently by doing so.565 This is 
an additional obstacle for the plaintiff. In this regard, for determining whether the plaintiff has 
overcome this obstacle, the courts balance the severity and probability of injury against the 
burden of prevention. In the case of Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,566 Judge 
Richard Posner articulated that for negligence to be a workable regime, an activity’s hazard 
can be avoided by exercising care. What it then means is that there is no need to resort to strict 
liability where the exercise of care can prevent an activity’s harm.567 
An application of negligence to fracking related health and environmental challenges requires 
a Judge to first conclude that the dangers of fracking can be avoided while exercising due care 
by the defendant. The courts are faced with two tasks. First, due care must be defined in 
relation to drilling, fracking and with respect to other activities like surface-water withdrawal, 
flow back water disposal, and well construction. Second, the court must ascertain whether 
when drilling companies adhere to the standard of due care, and the threat of environmental 
damage can be avoided. Moreover, to determine the standard of care in negligence cases, 
courts typically rely on expert testimony.568 
It was held by a Texas court in 2004 that problems with drilling equipment in drilling oil wells 
is to be expected but cannot be the ground for a negligence cause of action.569 Thus, it is worth 
noting that there is no assurance from the oil well drillers that there will not be problems with 
                                                          
561See Burr V. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403 (Pa. 1956). 
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the drilling equipment.570 This sends a message that some accidents and complications are 
anticipated. Following the combined authorities of Judge Posner and the Texas courts, serious 
doubts exist whether being careful can avoid the hazards of an activity.571 Therefore, 
arguments for a negligence standard becomes more tenuous due to the complex geology 
involved in unconventional shale drilling.572 
6.5 Arguments to Show the Abnormality in Fracking Harms and the Application of 
Strict Liability vis-à-vis Water Contamination 
The plaintiff need not prove a breach of a duty of care by the defendant in order to apply the 
strict liability doctrine. What is expected of the plaintiff is to prove whether the defendant’s 
actions reasonably caused the damage.573 In certain legal regimes, it is the rule of negligence 
that is applicable.574  
On the other hand, strict liability is confined to an ‘abnormally dangerous activity’. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts captures the criteria for determining an abnormally dangerous 
activity doctrine: First, one who undertakes an abnormally dangerous activity is made liable 
for harm caused to the person, land or chattels of another as a result of the activity, even where 
there has been an exercise of utmost care to prevent the harm. 
Second, strict liability is limited to the nature of harm, and the definition of what makes the 
activity abnormally dangerous.575 Now what makes strict liability viable for fracking activities 
is borne out of the doubt about whether it is possible to avoid the dangers of fracking simply 
by exercising due care.576 Two fundamental questions require answers prior to the substantive 
argument for the application of a strict liability doctrine to fracking water contamination harm: 
(1) whether strict liability is a viable cause of action in fracking claims? (2) Whether fracking 
is abnormally dangerous to warrant a strict liability rule?  
For the first question, it is indeed a viable cause of action. However, for the second question, 
it is not an abnormal activity, but the kind of harm (water contamination) qualifies it to be an 
abnormally dangerous activity. Therefore, strict liability can be applied to address this 
obstacle. At this juncture, it is necessary to give some logical reasons for the answers 
proffered. 
6.5.1 The Viability of Strict Liability in Fracking Claims.  
The plaintiffs in the case of Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas, as part of the causes of action, 
included strict liability on the premise that the dangerous nature of the chemicals used in 
fracking fluid is abnormally dangerous.577 The defendant argued that as a matter of law, “the 
Superior court of Pennsylvania has viewed that petroleum related storage and transmission 
                                                          
570Pioneer, 127 S.W.3d at 907. 
571Industrial Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1177. 
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573Restatement (Second) of torts § 519 (1979). 
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575See supra State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp footnote 459. 
576Ibid at § 520. 
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activities are neither abnormally dangerous nor ultra-hazardous”578 with a view to discredit 
the cause of action filed by the plaintiffs as no specific claim was mentioned for relief to be 
granted.579 
The plaintiffs however, gave a counter argument that no precedent “pertaining to the drilling 
and operations of gas wells through fracking exist so far” and that the instant activities are 
nothing like those considered in the Pennsylvania cases Defendant cited”.580 The contention 
of the plaintiffs was accepted by the Judge and allowed the cause of action for strict liability. 
From the above case, it is evident that the notion that strict liability is a viable cause of action 
in fracking cases is obviously predicated upon the facts and precedents regarding the drilling 
and operation of gas wells.  
In this regard, there are no precedents regarding the level of risk and the degree of harm from 
the process. Therefore, as long as there are no established precedents regarding the operations 
of gas drilling through fracking, then strict liability becomes a viable cause of action which 
would be determined based on facts discovered for ascertaining where liability lies. 
In the case of Berish v. Southwestern Energy Production Co., it was the conclusion of the 
court that “since the determination of whether or not an activity is abnormally dangerous is in 
fact a sensitive argument, courts often wait until discovery is complete before making this 
determination”.581 In the interim, courts are refusing to see strict liability as a viable cause of 
action during pre-trial motions. Instead, courts prefer to wait until after all necessary facts are 
discovered. Nevertheless, their willingness to wait until after discovery of the facts suggests 
that the determination of strict liability to fracking will be based on relevant facts, not 
necessarily that it is an inappropriate option for all classes of cases in future. 
6.5.2 Fracking is not an Abnormally Dangerous Activity, but the Kind of Harm makes 
it Abnormally Dangerous. 
The hallmark of strict liability is dependent on the kind of harm an activity can cause. This 
makes the activity technically abnormally dangerous.582 The question is whether fracking 
harm qualifies as abnormal in the context of strict liability doctrine. The answer is in the 
affirmative when one look at the wide variety of environmental damages, particularly water 
contamination. For a discussion as to why water contamination harm makes fracking an 
abnormally dangerous process, see discussion relating to the social concerns of allowing 
hydraulic fracturing (section 6.3). Such possibility of damage is what makes fracking 
contentious and dangerous.583 
Thus, regarding the way forward on the controversies surrounding fracking operations, it is 
the recommendation of this thesis that fracking in its entirety in terms of the risks it creates, 
should not be subject to a strict liability doctrine on one hand. On the other hand, since strict 
liability is limited to the kind of harm, the abnormality it creates should be evaluated first 
                                                          
578Ibid at 16–17. Cabot relied on Melso V. Sun Pipe Line Co., 576 A.2d 999, 1003(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (Refusing 
to apply strict liability for pipeline under residential development), and Smith v. Weaver, 665 a.2d 1215, 1220 
(Pa. super. ct. 1995) (holding that strict liability does not apply to the operation of underground storage tanks). 
579Memorandum of law in support of defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint at 1, 
Fiorentino V. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-Cv-02284-TIV, 2010 WL 2286902. 
580Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss at 9, Fiorentino, No. 3:09-Cv-
02284-TIV, 2010 WL 2666301. 
581Berish V. SW. Energy Production Corporation., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (M.D. Pa., 2011) (Order granting 
motion to dismiss in part and denying in part). 
582Restatement (Second) of Torts' & § 519(2) (1979). 
583Ibid part I.  
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before subjecting the kind of harm to a strict liability cause of action.584 What this means is 
that water contamination harm related to fracking should be actionable under a strict liability 
theory because the possibility of it occurring is high from statistics and reviews of studies 
already analysed in Chapter V of this thesis.  
For example, if a person working at a gas well broke an arm in the course of duty, strict 
liability would not apply because that harm is very rare in most drilling operations, and does 
not have a transgenerational impact, and that a broken arm can be remedied through medical 
expertise. Water contamination claims alone should be subject to a strict liability rule since it 
tends to have a transgenerational impacts on victims. Having said that, the following 
assertions shall be examined to conclude the argument.  
6.5.2.1 Assertion 1: The Water Contamination Harm Attributable to HVHF is 
Significant both in Magnitude and in Likelihood 
The court often evaluates whether an activity portrays “a high degree of risk of some harm to 
a person, land or chattels of others”585 in order to determine an abnormally dangerous 
activity.586 It then proceeds to examine the “likelihood that the harm that results from the 
activity will be great”.587 Immediately upon finding that the harm is major in degree and 
sufficiently serious, and that others are exposed to an unusual risk, the court is then justified 
to hold the defendant strictly liable.588 
According to section 520 (a) and (b) of the Restatement, an evaluation of the magnitude and 
likelihood of the potential harm is required.589 For fracking cases, the magnitude has the 
potential to be significant, considering the possible harmful nature of some of the chemicals 
used in fracking,590 the incidental release of radionuclides into public water,591 and the high 
volume of flow back water to surface water resources near shale wells. The value of residential 
real estate is lost without clean drinking water.592 
The likelihood of the harm is also confirmed by the complex geological challenges that need 
to be surmounted prior to the safe fracking of a well.593 There is knowledge of the likelihood 
of drilling accidents in the oil and gas industries, because there is no concrete guarantee that 
equipment will not fail.594 These accidents and spills in most fracking sites suggest the real 
possibility that there are wells that have been poorly constructed. This is not to say that other 
oil and gas extraction techniques do not have the potential to contaminate groundwater. Rather 
when one compares fracking to other extractive techniques the likelihood is very high, and 
the chemicals used in other wells are not as hazardous as those used in the fracking process. 
                                                          
584See supra Fiorentino V. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp footnote 579. 
585See § 519 Cmt. E. 
586See supra Sprankle v. Bower Amonia &Chemical Co footnote 464 (quoting Restatement § 520(A). 
587Ibid at § 520(B). 
588Ibid at § 520 Cmt. G. 
589Ibid at § 520(A)–(B). 
590See supra Part I.A. 
591Judolf, C. J. (2011). Federal officials say they’ll examine fracking practices, New York. [Online] 
http://www.green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/federal-oecials-saytheyll-examine-fracking-practices/; press 
release, State University of New York at Buffalo, (Accessed on 29/06/2017) 
592Bateman, C. (2010). A Colossal Fracking Mess, Vanity Fair (*- (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/06/fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006. (Accessed 29/06/2017). 
593See supra note 456 at 2. 
594See Pioneer Natural Res. USA, Inc. V. W.L. Ranch, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 900, 907 (Tex. App. 2004). See Generally 
Documents: Natural Gas’s Toxic Waste, (Publishing over one thousand pages of state, federal, and corporate 
documents that discuss fracking’s potential risks). 
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6.5.2.2 Assertion 2: The Exercise of Reasonable Care Cannot Eliminate HVHF Risk 
In order to shift from a negligence-based cause of action to strict liability, the evidence of a 
risk of harm is a must requirement despite the fact that reasonable care has been exercised by 
the defendant.595 The phrase reasonable care might be elusive in interpretation. Thus, it is 
important to know the meaning of reasonable care. This term is closely related to the legal 
definition of negligence, generally defined as the failure to exercise the degree of care 
appropriate to a situation. However, whether a person has acted reasonably depends on the 
facts of the case. In addition, Black’s law dictionary (1990) defined “reasonable care” as 
follows: “the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the line of 
business or endeavour would exercise under similar circumstance.”596 
The fact that shale fracking is quite a new process, and if the numerous environmental 
violations witnessed in Pennsylvania within a brief period are any indication,597 companies 
are still finding it difficult to come up with what reasonable care is with respect to fracking 
operations. From the above definition, it is true to say that most of the contamination incidents 
are a product of the absence of reasonable care.598 Consequently, there exists a plethora of 
research that infers that though wells might be fracked and drilled properly, there are 
possibilities for migration of methane, discharge of flow back, and contamination of aquifers 
to take place.599 In conclusion, the lack of guarantee from drillers regarding freedom from 
accidents leaves one with no further option but to believe that even in the face of an exercise 
of reasonable care, preventing all accidents is still quite farfetched. 
6.5.2.3 Assertion 3: The Slick Water Fracking Technique Fails the Common Usage Test 
and Probably Inappropriate to the Location Where it is Carried On 
The next usual question to be determined from the Restatement comment is whether the 
activity in question is “a matter of common usage”.600 The term common usage simply means 
“customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the 
community”.601 A vivid understanding regarding the subject is necessary if one takes the 
example of driving a car as given by the Restatement’s comments:  
   “[A]utomobiles have come into such general use that their operation is a matter of 
common usage. This, notwithstanding the residue of unavoidable risk of serious harm that 
may result even from their careful operation, is sufficient to prevent their use from being 
regarded as an abnormally dangerous activity. On the other hand, the operation of a 
                                                          
595Restatement (Second) of Torts & § 520(c) (1979); See also Industrial Harbor Belt R.R. Co. V. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Sometimes, however, a particular type of accident cannot be prevented 
by taking care.”). 
596Garner, B.A. (2015). Balck’s Law Dictionary. (10th ed., by Bryan A. Garner) p.255. 
597Mocarsky, S. (2010). ‘Report: Firms Commit 1,500 Infractions in Pa. In 30 Months, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader 
[Online] 
http://www.timesleader.com/news/hottopics/shale/report__firms_commit_1_500_infractions_in_pa__in_30_mo
nths_08-02-2010.html  (featuring different opinions from land trust and industry officials on whether 
Pennsylvania should strengthen its regulations). 
598Warco, O. K. (2010). Fracking Truck Runs off Road; Contents Spill, Washington Observer-Rep, [Online], 
http://www.observer-reporter.com/or/localnews/10-21-2010-fracking-truck-rolls (Accessed 2104/2018). 
599Sawyer, H. (2009). Final Impact Assessment Report: Impact Assessment of Natural Gas in the New York City 
water supply watershed 49 Available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/12_23_2009_5nal_assessment_report.pdf. (Accessed on 
29/06/2017). 
600Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(D) (1979). 
601Ibid at § 520 Cmt. I. 
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tank…is not yet a usual activity for many people, and therefore the operation of such a 
vehicle may be abnormally dangerous”.602 
Presently, the production of oil and gas deposits through fracking only takes place in very few 
countries. The US is taking the lead in this area. However, although a few states have engaged 
in fracking activities, others have placed moratoriums towards the extraction of gas from 
unconventional reserves through fracking pending proper investigations as to the health and 
environmental implications. Observe the words ‘great mass of mankind’ being used while 
defining what common usage is in factor ‘e’ under the Restatement Act. With the phrase ‘great 
mass of mankind’, it suffice to say that where slick water technique is used to produce gas 
qualifies for the ‘common usage criteria’ as earlier discussed in Chapter V.  
The practice of this technique is still in its early stage, it probably has not yet “come into… 
general use,” at least to the extent that automobiles have.603 The world is a global community, 
and for slick water fracking technique to be seen as a process that has a common usage effect, 
the global community must be aware and have applied it towards the extraction of oil and gas 
resources for those countries that are endowed with hydrocarbons. As long as the USA is the 
only country that the slick water hydraulic fracking is making wave whilst other countries like 
China, Poland and the UK are yet to surmount the inherent environmental risks towards a 
sustainable shale gas extraction, it then means that the ‘common usage’ test is not yet fulfilled. 
Having considered that, the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried 
out is the next factor for determination.604 Take the following example: the impact of a missile 
does not ordinarily present an abnormal danger if it is located in the midst of a desert area 
compared to when it is fired into in a densely populated area.605 Thus, it goes without saying 
that a court may not consider fracking as an abnormally dangerous activity if it were taking 
place in an area far from human settlement, with no opportunity to contaminate drinking water 
supplies.  
In addition, appropriateness goes beyond where the activity is being carried out. Whether an 
activity is appropriate also depends on the type of technique that was adopted while other 
environmentally friendly options exist. There are other techniques with better and less health 
and environmental implications.606 These techniques were not adopted by the industry due to 
the cost implications involved in operating them (as discussed section 2.6). Rather, the slick 
water fluid based hydraulic fracking technique was used because of the reduced operating cost 
associated with the technique. It follows from this that it is inappropriate too where 
alternatives that are better exist, yet an option whose deficiencies outweigh its merits was 
opted for by the industry on the premise that it was cost effective. 
6.5.2.4 Assertion 4: It is False that Fracking Benefits Outweighs the Environmental and 
Public Health Risks 
What is required of the court is to evaluate the degree to which the activity’s value to the 
community surpasses the dangerous attributes.607 This issue has called for great deal of 
deliberation among judges and scholars who argued against this assertion in the hope that 
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regulations and liabilities for fracking be relaxed. This argument is anchored on the potential 
benefits fracking has brought to the US economy.608 
However, looking at the nature of the oil and gas industry, it is true that these projects take 
place for only a short period of time.609 The time frame for a well is dependent upon the 
commercial discovery for that well or wells. Thus, the said job opportunities and securities 
are tied to the life-span of the well. Issues like government regulation could lead to a slash in 
the workforce or a failure in the contractual work plan could lead to penalties from the host 
government. And to pay these penalties, there could be a reduction in the workforce or a 
commensurate forestalling of some sustainable development projects going on within the 
community.  
Also, the value an activity might present to the immediate community is sometimes based on 
the health disposition of the individual at the time the companies are operating. Not all might 
benefit. In contrast, the environmental and health dangers an activity presents can be felt 
evenly by all within that community. Both young and old share somehow in the negative 
implications that activity causes. Everyone is forced to partake involuntarily. The effects of 
an activity’s environmental dangerous impacts are communal in nature, whereas the benefits 
of the activity are not communal because they are based on certain reason such as choice and 
discipline and career line of people living around shale gas sites. For a detail arguments on 
these see section 5.8.5. The question is: Has the community been surviving without the oil 
and gas extraction activity’s benefits? Yes! 
6.6 Summary 
Considering all the Restatement factors, it is not out of place to conclude that fracking in itself 
as a technique is not an abnormally dangerous activity. Consequently, it is pertinent to note 
that the Restatement comments do not necessarily require that each of the six factors in section 
520 be fulfilled,610 especially if others weigh heavily, and the weight of the factors is to be 
considered by the court.611 However, just one of the factors is not considered to be sufficient, 
but a consideration of several of them will be determined before a strict liability doctrine can 
apply. 
However, because of the kind of harm fracking presents, especially water contamination, it is 
the argument of this thesis that when it comes to water contamination as a course of action, 
strict liability should be applied as a viable cause of action in determining whether an 
activity’s effect level is high. This argument makes sense because the value of the water to 
the community cannot be quantified with the benefits of jobs and investments presented by 
oil and gas extraction activities. Thus, in a way, fracking is not abnormally dangerous where 
there are no frequent water contamination claims. As long as the facts have been discovered 
that it is the defendant’s activity that caused such contamination, proof of negligence is not 
necessary at all. Strict liability automatically applies only to water contamination but for other 
harm caused by fracking whose occurrence level is not high, these can be subject to a 
negligence cause of action. 
                                                          
608See supra Crawford V. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 453 (Kan. 2002) foot note 549, (Discussing the “economically 
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Also, as discussed earlier, doubt remains regarding whether shale gas drilling and fracking 
can be carried out safely or that in locations where this activity take place, harm can be 
avoided even when oil and gas companies observe the utmost reasonable care. Far from 
reality, fracking may not become common and beneficial to a point where it can be exempted 
from strict liability as more fracking would lead to stricter environmental rules for mitigating 
the risks involved. 
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Chapter 7 
7. Hydraulic Fracking: Policy Alternatives to Environmental Regulation for Mitigating 
Risks 
It is no longer news that the limits to regulation governance is real and deeply entrenched in 
the ways that regulatory institutions handle environmental problems. Existing traditional 
environmental regulation appear to be built upon very conflicting relationships between 
governments, government agencies and enterprises. The era where environmental agencies’ 
mode of operations is designed around enforcement through site visits to deter firms from 
inappropriate behaviours has got to end in a rapid changing industry like the energy extractive 
industry.612  
Despite the important results realized so far from direct form of environmental regulation, this 
approach creates more difficult conflicts than strategies designed to survive on its own without 
a strict policing enforcement approach to achieve effectiveness in terms of compliance and 
risks mitigation. Self-sustaining strategies in environmental regulation governance builds 
cooperation, whereas the traditional style generates deadlock in decision making process and 
leads to parties with holding vital information. 
This has made mitigating risk complicated because the major part of a regulator’s efforts is 
now driven to penalise to either enrich the institution for further policing.  Therefore, there is 
no distinction between firm’s performances. This chapter seeks to explore multiple 
alternatives to foster improvements on compliance to achieve effectiveness in environmental 
regulation governance and to encourage already compliant companies to do what.613 
Consequently, this chapter will suggest innovative proactive policy strategies to set new 
relationships between regulators and regulated firms based on trust building and focusing on 
responsibilities and commitment. Besides improving relationships, Chapter VII also aims to 
bring to attention other environmental governance limits that must be considered. This 
includes: promoting efforts which ends when compliance is met thereby favouring optimal 
solutions; and regulatory models which ‘treats’ instead of ‘prevents’ risks at the point of 
technology development. Therefore, possible ways to ensure and guarantee the pursuit of a 
full legal standard of legal liability will be explored here in order to push the overall objective 
of environmental governance efficacy to be preventive and later precautionary. Sadly, the 
reverse is the case in the present environmental governance structure. 
7.1 Introduction 
It is important to mention that the ability of a regulatory institution to address a public policy 
issue depends on how well it is tailored or adaptable to the nature of the underlying regulatory 
problems such as the interests involved and whether the risk is an acceptable one. This sparks 
off the very vital element which gives credence to this policy interventionist approach as well 
as nonconventional regulatory approaches which this thesis seeks to address in this chapter as 
it relates to managing and mitigating risks associated with shale gas development.  
The attributes of legal institutions responsible for regulating shale gas development are 
significantly limited in their usefulness in prospectively regulating the risks of shale gas 
especially water contamination risks. Such attributes of regulatory agencies include the 
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limited budgetary constraints when it comes to its remedial powers in the event of 
environmental or health harm, and political constraints is another attribute of the regulatory 
bodies saddled with the obligation of regulating dangerous facilities.  
Decisions and decision makers in such regulatory bodies are significantly subject to political 
pressure since they were appointed by politicians, or the politicians stifle their budgetary 
demands. Some legal environments and legal frameworks exempt most dangerous facilities 
from legal liability through existing legal legislation. This is exemplified by the famous 
‘Halliburton loophole’ in the USA.  As a result, regulation is limited by these exceptive 
provisions contained in environmental regulatory laws.  
A key question at this juncture to ask is whether a liability approach has advantages over 
conventional regulation. Taking a cue from the classic work of Shavell (1984), he stated that 
liability approaches are advantageous to the extent that the four conditions already discussed 
in Chapter V are met. However, in the case of shale gas risks, widespread harms such as air 
and water pollution are difficult to address entirely through a liability system. Nevertheless, 
regarding other harms ranging from damage to private property or private water wells to truck 
accidents, liability systems can fill the vacuum left by traditional regulation.   
It is upon this premise that this thesis shall proffer innovative policy interventionist as well as 
relevant nonconventional approaches for filling the gaps to addressing the risks associated 
with shale gas development. Thus, liability rules and policy approaches shall be deployed to 
address the gaps left by traditional regulation so that liability and regulation can operate 
effectively in a symbiotic parallel in addressing different risks and harms from shale gas 
development. Interestingly, this system comprises good principles for deciding whether 
liability or regulation is the best option of controlling risks. Though to decide that might be 
difficult, especially in individual cases, in a wider perspective, the present balance between 
liability and regulation tends to agree with those principles and policy options. 
Hence, instead of stoking the already-controversial debates regarding whether additional 
regulation is required, it will make more sense to examine practical avenues for which the 
present system designed for managing and mitigating risks associated with shale gas 
development can be made more effective.  
Therefore, policy interventions which will act as a complement and improvement in 
regulating shale gas development shall be broadly discussed analysed alongside innovative 
ingredients for improving the liability system given the significance of liability in managing 
and mitigating development risks and encouraging exercise of care by operators. Accordingly, 
this chapter will explore the gaps and the added incentives to improve upon the liability 
systems by way of complementing traditional regulation in addressing risks associated with 
shale gas fracking. 
7.2 Information Asymmetry 
Why does the shale gas industry enjoy some legislative exemption in some legal frameworks, 
for example in the US? Why the slick water HVHF preferred over other available fluid based 
hydraulic fracking techniques? Why are the chemical compositions of the chemicals being 
used for hydraulic fracking not voluntarily disclosed by operators? All the above questions 
are examples of industry existing arrangements that could be set in place to level information 
asymmetries. 
Without mincing words, it is evidently true that individuals and organizations are privy to 
different information. Such information that they possess accordingly determines the conduct 
and actions they will respectively take in many circumstances. Considering the presence of 
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potential risks in shale gas development, for example, the operator adjusts the price of the 
resource extracted based on the level of risks they have been exposed to or their knowledge 
of the costs involved in producing the oil and gas as a commodity among other conditions. 
The buyer, in the same vein, can possess similar information of the risks the operator is 
exposed to during production from other operators of shale gas sites. However, what the buyer 
probably does not have, in contrast to the operator, is the level of information about the cost 
of extracting the oil and gas resources from the unconventional reserve. What this represents 
is a complete information asymmetry between the two parties, that is, the operator and 
regulator in risk management matters. 
Asymmetric information as a concept was first introduced in George A. Akerlof’s 1970 paper 
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.614 In the paper, 
Akerlof used examples of the automobile market to develop the concept of asymmetric 
information. He argued that in many markets the buyer uses some market statistics to evaluate 
the value of a class of goods. As a result, the buyer saw the average of the whole market while 
the seller of the goods had more intimate knowledge of a specific item. Therefore, Akerlof 
argued that it is because of the information asymmetry that the seller has an incentive to sell 
goods of less than average market quality.  
Information asymmetry is otherwise known as imperfect information. It happens when there 
is a difference in access to relevant knowledge. Therefore, the whole essence of this concept 
is the key to managing shale gas development because a good understanding of the concept 
is key to successfully manage and mitigate the relevant risks. As operators of dangerous 
facilities and the potential victims invariably hold imperfect information about one another, it 
creates difficulty in understanding the risks involved too. 
Linking this issue to shale gas extraction where a lot of information asymmetry exists from 
the stages of exploration to the actual extraction of these resources from deep underground by 
operators, the issue of risk management becomes a difficult objective to achieve when private 
actors have better access to information than regulators. Thus, liability is more effectual, all 
else being equal.615 Thus, allowing wrongdoers to escape liability because of information 
asymmetry between the operators and victims can create problems whereby victims are 
neither aware they have been injured, cannot ascertain who is behind their injury, nor cannot 
acquire sufficient proof to substantiate their claim.  
There is also the aspect of cost involved even in situations where such information can be 
obtained. Obtaining such information is difficult especially for widespread harms, like air and 
surface water pollution as already discussed in section 1.6. The challenge to locate and obtain 
this type of information’s is also evident where harms are relatively localised, as in some cases 
of groundwater or soil contamination. Having said that, it is imperative to examine some of 
the innovative policy intervention option designs for the effective operations of regulatory 
and liability approaches to manage problems of information asymmetry associated with shale 
gas development activity and improve the function of liability systems as a complement to 
traditional regulation.  
7.2.1 Disclosure Intervention Option 
If the idea of compulsory disclosure of information would be encouraged through policy 
making, it will go a long way in addressing the issue of information asymmetry in shale gas 
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development where levels of expertise between operators and potential victims differ 
immensely. Once this is achieved through policy intervention, the resultant effect is that there 
are beneficial changes in firm’s behaviour616 such that they become more careful because 
members of the public become aware of the ‘do’s and don’ts’ of the business of shale fracking 
through slick water hydraulic fracking. This also impacts on the choice of technology to use 
for such activities. This is true because, as already analysed in section 2.6, that among the 
alternative fluid based hydraulic fracking techniques, the industry opted for the slick water 
hydraulic fracking technique, the reason being that it is cost effective compared to other 
techniques at the expense of the health and environmental implications it presents to society 
in general. Thus, a strong disclosure governance arrangement for the development of shale 
gas from unconventional reserves will further strengthen the liability system and make 
regulation more effective in reducing risks associated with shale gas fracking.  
In addition, disclosure rules and requirements equip prospective plaintiffs with information in 
legal action. For example, victims of groundwater contamination would be able to access 
information to strengthen their case due to an already existing requirement that firms report 
spills and such other accidents, waste water transportation tracking and record keeping or even 
disclose the make-up of the chemicals used for fracking regulations: all can assist victims to 
identify and sue operators or those indirectly involved for the environmental damage.  
With such disclosure requirements, it would further curb the practice of mother companies 
incorporating smaller subsidiary companies to do the work so that in the event of damage, the 
smaller company can claim to be judgement proof as their available assets cannot cover the 
damage in question. But disclosure requirements can even recover such differences from their 
mother company since the law recognises the notion of judgement creditors suing the estates 
of a wrongdoer to recover damages in full for any environmental damage caused. 
Thus, where there are no such rules for disclosure, it may be difficult or impossible for such 
litigation to thrive. Although civil discovery can prove helpful for plaintiffs to uncover 
information, the route to acquiring such information might be costly for both the operator and 
the victims.617 
However, the requirements and rules for compulsory disclosure has generated very 
controversial debates. One such argument that the opponents of this policy intervention have 
always advanced centres on proprietary rights protected by law. The question is how victims 
of accidents would take advantage of such disclosure requirements other than protecting 
themselves from the negative impacts of dangerous risky activity. Therefore, proprietary 
rights protection is only limited to parties within the same industry who provide the same 
goods and service. As in the business of shale gas fracking, it is limited to those in the business 
of extracting oil and gas from both conventional and non-conventional fields.  
Technically, the disclosure requirements and rules gain more credence in that once everybody 
within the shale gas industry is made to disclose, for instance, the chemical make and the 
types they use, there will be no more secrets between participants in that industry. So, it would 
be a case of access to better practice as industry participants would be able to truthfully state 
the dangers that those chemicals present and warn against them. Also, there will be eventually 
unanimous agreement on which chemicals are environmentally friendly contra some 
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participants hiding behind the guise of proprietary rights and using chemicals that have the 
capability to contaminate groundwater and surface water.  
7.2.2 Shifting the Burden of Proof Option 
Another option available in addressing the issue of information asymmetry existing in the 
shale gas sector that frustrates the ability of traditional regulation to mitigate associated risks 
is the proposal for a shift in the burden of proof to the defendant operator in litigation. The 
requirement should replace or run concurrently with the rule for pre-testing of water wells 
near drilling operations to identify groundwater contamination as it is for most states in the 
US.618  
Such reports could be influenced and compromised by very big oil firms due to their 
affiliations with regulatory officials responsible for conducting such pre-testing exercises. The 
report would reveal a high concentration of the compounds similar to that deployed in fracking 
operations. But where the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant operator in order to 
exonerate them from liability it would serve to force operators to use chemicals or even force 
them to adhere to the best available practices during their operations.  
Pennsylvania, for example, does not require pre-testing of groundwater near drilling sites but 
shifts the burden of proof to the operator if such testing is not done.619 This shifting of burden 
of proof is sound in the sense that the operator is privy to information regarding the quality 
and other geological and hydrological conditions that the victim does not have access to on 
the one hand. On the other hand, even where a pre-drilling water test is carried out, it might 
not be a fair and accurate report of the event of things, because if not for the fact that shale 
gas extraction activity commenced near the plaintiff’s property, the question of contamination 
would not have arisen definitely in the long run.  
Thus, it can be inferred circumstantially that shale gas was responsible for the change of 
affairs. Once this option of shifting burden of proof is imposed, the liability system would 
function more effectively as beneficial changes to the behaviour of the operator would be 
guaranteed to a large degree. More so, there is the likely chance of reducing the litigation 
costs, decreasing the room for a wrongdoer to escape liability for the mere reason that the 
plaintiff could not link causative events, and cases would be decided expeditiously and timely.  
This option of shifting the burden of proof is also advantageous to the operator because they 
get the opportunity to improve the confidence of victims when they succeed in proving that 
their activities did not cause the alleged complaint of groundwater contamination, thereby 
getting the social license to operate within the immediate society. Again, litigation becomes 
a cheaper alternative to traditional regulation as resources meant to police these firms would 
be used for other developmental projects and operators are meant to do the spending to prove 
a disconnect between the alleged accident and their activity. 
7.2.3 The Imposition of Strict Liability Policy Intervention 
The classic English case of Ryland’s V. Fletcher620 can be said to be the very root in which 
strict liability can be traced. In Ryland’s case, a reservoir containing water was constructed 
on land owned by the defendant.621 These underground mines cut across the newly constructed 
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reservoir.622 Immediately upon the reservoir being filled with water, it flowed through the 
abandoned mines into the defendants functioning mines thereby causing their destruction.623 
From the facts of the case, the court realised although that the defendants were not negligent 
in constructing a reservoir on their land, according to the strict liability rule they were still 
liable.624 The decision of the court in the above case was that where a land owner brought 
something onto the land which ought not to be there, that thing becomes a danger irrespective 
of whether the defendant acted with all due diligence.625 The land owner was automatically 
liable in damages for any resultant harm, whether or not the behaviour was deliberate or 
negligent.626 The rationale behind the decision goes to show that while certain activities are 
ideal under certain jurisdictions, they are not fit to be carried out everywhere.627 
Nonetheless, the Ryland case set a landmark precedent in England; however, this was contrary 
to the situation in the US.628 The US courts resisted the rule of strict liability reason being that 
it has the potential of inhibiting expansion of developmental projects as it provided damages 
to harmed plaintiffs.629 What the US courts did was to have a kind of a restrictive strict liability 
rule such that defendants were liable only on grounds that the plaintiffs sustained injuries as 
a result of the defendant’s actions.630  
One other reason why many courts ignored the analysis in the Ryland case was due to the 
interpretation the courts had that defendants are “absolutely liable in all ramifications 
whenever anything subject to his control, escapes and results to harm”.631 This was a narrow 
interpretation and has been overtaken by events environmental regulatory reforms in the status 
of the legal framework of any nation. For example, harm caused by the actions of a third party 
where the defendants had satisfied all reasonable care requirements within the normal 
business activity, such harm cannot be transferred to the defendant in liability. Nevertheless, 
the way some writers understood the Ryland case is different. According to Prosser, liability 
should be borne by the defendant when his actions cause damage to another because the thing 
or activity in question is inappropriate to the location where it is maintained, in line with the 
character of the location and its surroundings.632 
Today, the doctrine of strict liability regarding abnormally dangerous activities formulated in 
the Restatement of Torts are followed by most courts.633 When the doctrine of strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities was still confined to the Ryland rule,634 Professor Francis 
Bohlen reported the Restatement of Torts in 1938.635 A comparative broad rule of strict 
liability was proposed by Professor Bohlen in the Restatement despite this fact.636 This rule 
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called for strict liability for “ultra-hazardous activities”.637 Two necessary elements constitute 
ultra-hazardous activities.638 First, under these elements, the said activity must involve a 
phenomenon that even the exercise of utmost care cannot eliminate the risk of serious harm 
to persons, chattels of others, and lands.639 Second, for it to qualify as an ultra-hazardous 
activity, it must not be a matter of common usage.640 Imperatively, activity is classified as 
ultra-hazardous if the risk of harm does not justify or outweighs the utility.641 
However, the Ryland rule is shorter in scope than Bohlen’s ultra-hazardous standard in two 
pertinent respects.642 The test in the Ryland rule regarding the non-natural use element gave 
room for the “matter of common usage” ingredient of ultra-hazardous activities.643 The 
common usage provision created an outcome where the principle of strict liability was 
extended to activities not usually undertaken by the great mass of mankind.644 Second, the 
limited definition of land in Ryland’s case was further expanded as a result of the ultra-
hazardous principle.645 In the Ryland case, the defendant’s liability was only limited to 
adjacent landowners.646 In contrast, the defendant’s liability extends to any person affected 
by his use of dangerous instrumentalities or activities.647 Consequently, the sharp difference 
between the Restatement Act was that, for an activity to qualify as “unavoidably” dangerous, 
such activity must be that it involves a risk that cannot be eradicated by the exercise of the 
utmost care.648 
Essentially the current position of strict liability can be traced to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts that incorporates the historical foundations. The Second Restatement postulates that 
liability for harm lies with one who undertakes an abnormally dangerous activity regardless 
of whether utmost care has been used to avoid such harm.649 Therefore, to conclude whether 
strict liability should apply to an activity is dependent primarily on a conclusion that that 
activity is abnormally dangerous. Accordingly, the Second Restatement has identified six 
factors which this thesis had earlier deliberated in section 5.8.1 to 5.8.5.650 
Those six factors were used by the drafters of the Restatement based on the premise that they 
did not agree that it was possible to arrive at an all-encompassing definition of what an 
abnormally dangerous activity is sufficient to cover every potential case.651 In addition, two 
pertinent points were clarified following the comments that accompanied the Restatement: (1) 
whether the activity is carried on in pursuit of profit or pleasure does not make a difference;652 
and (2) the rule of strict liability is not restricted to the defendant’s land; the activity could 
also take place on public land.653 
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In as much as these six factors are necessary and need to be taken into cognisance, the strict 
liability rule need not require that each factor ought to be present before arriving at a final 
decision.654 From the decisions of courts, factors (a), (b), and (c) have been treated by many 
courts as a priority to the analysis. However, the other factors ((d), (e) and (f)) have been 
applied inconsistently depending on the complexity of each case.655 What this implies is that 
the threshold for distinguishing negligence from strict liability lies on the first three factors, 
as they address the question of whether reasonable care eliminates the risk of the activity in 
view.656 More weight is put on the first three factors because the last three factors allow for a 
substantial amount of judicial discretion as they are based on facts presented.657 The big 
question is whether the danger(s) created by the activity and the location of where the activity 
took place are so glaring and great that, despite any contributions the activity brings to the 
community, the defendant “should be expected as a matter of law to pay for any harm it 
creates” without negligence being proved by the plaintiff.658 
At this juncture, it is important to state that strict liability is the most common approach in 
addressing information asymmetry in litigation, that is, liability without determining whether 
a defendant has exercised due care in the course of carrying out said operations. Traditionally, 
the principle is applied to ultra-hazardous activities, on the rationale that such activities 
involve a very high standard of duty of care.659 For example, in a few states in US, the 
principle is applied to oil drilling as this activity is classed as ultra-hazardous,660 but in others, 
the negligence standard661 is the rule for which the courts handle drilling related matters. 
Surprisingly, many instinctively believe that imposing strict liability should result in a 
beneficial attitudinal change whereby operators will take additional care.662 However, one 
vital advantage that strict liability exudes is in its ability to simplify litigation. This is true in 
that plaintiffs, in suing defendant operators, always find themselves unable to prove that the 
defendant exercised due care for the reason being that they are not well equipped with 
adequate information. What the strict liability rule then does is to empower the plaintiff to 
only prove they suffered injuries and that the defendant caused the so-called injuries. 
Again, the concept of imposing strict liability affects the level of activity as, on the one hand, 
some will simply not engage again since they are subjected to greater liability. On the other 
hand, it can compel those who intend to engage in risky activity to choose the best technique 
from the available repertoire.  
In relation to shale gas development techniques, as already examined, it will make operators 
go back to the drawing board to see how they can improve on the best fluid based hydraulic 
fracking technique. This may turn out to be good considering the information asymmetry 
syndrome on the part of the plaintiffs or the issue of the existence of judgment-proof 
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defendants. When operators simply choose not to engage again or revert to the best available 
technique, it simply reveals that the activity levels of harm are greater than socially optimal.  
7.2.4 Appointment of an Independent Well Assessor  
As the name implies, an assessor is one who critically assesses the progress and effectiveness 
of a given assignment or task to see that it is going on as planned. An assessor is mostly 
required for professionals or regarding a specific project. The duty in most cases is for the 
assessor to supervise the candidate and monitor them to ensure that everything is taking place 
in line with the laid down rules and regulation stipulated by the admitting institution. The 
assessor makes sure that they delivers workshops and training programmes, observe 
professionals at the sites or the project at the site, record the progress of the work, attend 
meetings and examine portfolios. 
To deal with information asymmetry in shale gas development, there is a need to appoint an 
independent assessor. The assessor in this concept must be independent to guarantee a fair 
and constructive assessment of the operations of shale gas activities within an area to see 
whether operators are adhering to the required safety standards while carrying out their 
activities.  
This assessor is to be appointed by the regulatory institution/agency but financed by the oil 
firms in terms of remuneration. Their removal should never be subject to the whims and 
caprices of the firms even though they pay them. Rather it should be determined by the 
institution that appointed them. This is important because if it was the other way around, their 
reviews and assessments would be tainted. 
Also, the findings and observations of the expert assessor should not be subjected to a 
confidentiality rule especially when victims of shale gas extractive accidents require it to 
prove whether a defendant operator has acted without due care. What this mean is that either 
party to a suit can take advantage of the findings of these expert evidences report and prove 
their case where necessary.  
If these palliatives are put in place through policy recommendations, the resultant effect is 
that firms would become weary in acting or engaging in activities that are beyond the socially 
optimal level of risk and further boost the motivation for victims of shale gas accidents who 
suffer harm to sue because the possibility of securing environmental justice is not far-fetched. 
7.3 Inability to Pay/Judgment Proof Defendant Problem 
This challenge often is applicable to a liability system’s approach of environmental protection. 
It is also true that policy makers are fully aware of the resultant problems whereby reliance 
on the liability system to take care of the possible damages falls through. This arises where 
the defendant’s available assets cannot compensate the victims of their wilful negligent acts 
or actions. This situation is so prevalent in the oil and gas sector in the sense that damages 
from failed fracking wells or water contaminations can be to the extent that many independent 
firms operating within the industry cannot compensate the victims of such catastrophic 
event(s) with their limited resources. 
In most cases, financial responsibility has been the traditional tool used to address these 
challenges inherent in liability systems. Some such financial arrangements includes insurance 
policy and bonding. The policy options to address the problem include the Insurance Policy 
and Bonding Financial Requirement Option and the Polluter Does Not Pay Model Policy 
Intervention. Both will now be discussed in the subsequent sections. 
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7.3.1 Insurance Policy and Bonding Financial Requirement Option 
When an operator applies for a permit to drill and exploit natural resources within a potential 
well, the operator is required to furnish evidence of adequate financial capabilities or 
insurance agreements to prove its ability to pay for related claims that may arise in the event 
of mishaps resulting in harm.663 
Further, bonds may be required to be posted by operators alongside the permits. Pennsylvania, 
for example, requires operators to file a bond of US$4,000 for each well permit.664 
Alternatively, operators in Colorado can file a ‘blanket bond’ of US$25,000 covering all wells 
in the state for that oil company.665 Similarly, Texas requires a US$25,000 blanket bond for 
up to ten wells.666 
When funded appropriately, bonding produces the required incentive of reducing the ability 
of operators with limited resources to escape liability and thus increasing the ultimate 
incentive to take due care to avoid harms. An amount of US$400 in bond is certainly 
inadequate to take care of the expected damages from serious accidents arising from oil and 
gas wells. Where the case is that the available firm’s assets is far less than the damage, it 
provides the likely impetus on the part of the operator not to take additional care.  
In the same vein, a US$25,000 blanket bond will also appear insufficient considering that 
large operators may have thousands of wells in their overall portfolio. Therefore, a stronger 
and extended financial responsibility requirements can improve the ability of the liability 
system to generate enough incentive for operators to take due care and avoid practices such 
as floating smaller independent companies for the sole purpose of appearing judgement proof 
when they are pronounced liable in damages by the court of a competent jurisdiction.  
Because of the above, this thesis shall develop a model in addition to the insurance and 
bonding requirements and to further boost the effectiveness of the liability system in 
conjunction with traditional regulation. This model was carefully studied from Indian 
environmental law about the specific problems associated with environmental litigation and 
liability issues. The judiciary in India has evolved a new method of approaching 
environmental tort through public interest litigation which includes the state authorities in the 
process of regeneration, compensation and relief. The proactive nature of this method makes 
it unique and has also been lauded in India and attributed to the Indian judiciary. This thesis 
therefore, propose a Model like that of the Indian judiciary which has already been 
implemented in several cases. This Model is known as the Polluter Does Not Pay Model 
Policy Intervention and will be discussed in more detail below: 
7.3.2 The Polluter Does Not Pay Model Policy Intervention 
Before considering the legal and moral rationale behind the development of this Model, it is 
pertinent to briefly discuss the factors that led to the incorporation of this Model in the legal 
framework in India. The Indian judiciary deemed it necessary in the face of over-legislation 
and under-enforcement which resulted in the unprecedented degradation of cities and rivers 
in India and it became a special interest for the Indian judiciary in terms of social justice as 
thousands of poor Indians were dying of respiratory diseases as a result of drinking 
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contaminated water. This continued for a long time because the victims of such environmental 
degradation had no individual financial capabilities to sue the polluters.667 
The usual remedy which is typical also in the USA is class action tort. The claims for various 
individuals who are affected by accident impacts is consolidated in order to reduce the cost of 
litigation for each individual in the group. Although Indian law allows for a class suit or a 
representative suit, whereby one or more members in a class group having the same interest 
may sue or defend on behalf of themselves and for others,668 it has been used in very few 
cases and with little success. 
In response to the bias against the poor and the chronic delays evident in the legal system in 
India, the judiciary resolved to come up with a different route that will enable victims to seek 
legal remedy from polluters. This legal remedy was exemplified as the Supreme Court 
recognised the right to a clean environment as part of the fundamental right to life under 
Article 21.669 This further opened up the floodgates for such environmental cases by allowing 
the cases to be filed as writ petitions. 
The Indian State High court can be approached under Article 226 of the Constitution if the 
complaint is of a legal wrong. However, where any of a person’s ‘fundamental rights’ are 
violated, they can approach the High Court, or the Supreme Court as contained in the 
fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution under Article 32.670 Hence, the Supreme Court 
is viewed as the enforcer of fundamental rights coupled with its plenary powers to address 
cases which in its opinion passes as a Public Interest Litigation.671 
Due to the above, the locus standi requirement for petitioning the Courts was diluted by the 
Supreme Court. What this means from a legal stand point is that it is not limited only to the 
victim to petition himself, but it extends to any public spirited individual to sue for legal 
remedy on behalf of disadvantaged classes or a member of a disadvantaged group (who in 
every sense is unable to approach the court himself due to his financial incapability).672 
The Supreme Court in the case of MC. Mehta v. Union of India held that environmental 
pollution and industrial hazards were not only potential civils torts, but included violations of 
fundamental rights, entertained through the Supreme Court by a public interest petition under 
Article 32. This case eventually necessitated the need for the Supreme Court to assume 
jurisdiction with respect to a wide range of environmental cases using the writ of mandamus 
and intervened in cases such as pollution from tanneries,673 pollution caused by chemicals in 
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Delhi,674 Ganga River water pollution case,675 Taj Mahal Pollution case,676Yamuna Rivers 
water Pollution case,677 ban on import of toxic waste case,678 pollution due to H Acid case,679 
Gomti River water pollution case,680 noise pollution by fire cracker case,681 pollution by 
chemical industries  in the Gajraula area case,682 mercury pollution in Singrauli case,683 diesel 
generator set case,684 modernisation of slaughter houses in Delhi matter,685 of regulation 
traffic in Delhi,686 regulation of Garbage disposal in Delhi matter,687 coupled with other issues 
regarding the environment. 
The Model is illustrated in various cases where the Supreme Court has resolved to entertain 
writ petitions against the government for violating the fundamental right to a clean 
environment due to government’s inability and failure administratively. The Court gave direct 
and precise instructions to the government authority by the writ of mandamus to take steps in 
order to mitigate the pollution and redeem the environment. A corresponding order and notice 
is issued by the government authority to the various polluters for the purposes of claiming 
damages and restoration costs for the same.688  
Thus, the Model works in India because the basic conditions are fulfilled by the Constitution 
empowering both the Federal and State Government to preserve the environment including 
the relevant authority reposed on them to do same by various environmental legislation like 
the Water Act of 1972, Air Act of 1963 and the Environmental Protection Act of 1986. The 
first such basic condition is that the government should have the authority and resources to 
pay interim relief and damages and shoulder the costs of environmental restoration. Second, 
the government must have the legal power to recover the money from the injurer. Having seen 
the factors that necessitated this Model as well as the conditions that must be present in order 
for the Model to succeed, it is now imperative to look at the rationale behind the formulation 
of the Model by the Indian judiciary.  
The idea of making the State responsible for the damages is representative of a communal 
liability system and a more sophisticated group liability structure. This of course is not a new 
interventionist phenomenon and in fact precedes the “state itself. From historical antecedents, 
remedies of such communal compensation and retaliation for wrongs were prevalent in 
primitive societies. Just as Posner posited in his paper on the theory of primitive societies that 
the pertinent thing is that the harm and the responsibility are borne collectively,689 what this 
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illustrates is that in the social order and norm, if one person kills another, the victim’s kinsmen 
have a duty to him which they can discharge by killing either the killer or one of his kinsmen 
in the retaliation stage. The killer’s kinsmen are obligated to provide compensation for the 
killer if the killer is unable or is not willing to do so.  
If neither the killer nor the kinsmen provide the required compensation, the victim’s kinsmen 
then have the duty to retaliate against the killer or his kinsmen by punishing them for their 
refusal to compensate. This kind of practice may seem abhorrent to modern sensibilities but 
may be efficient in the conditions of primitive societies. The killing of any of the killer’s 
kinsmen is fair game to the victim’s kinsmen avenging his death, or in the later stage of 
development, that the killer’s kinsmen are communally liable to the victim’s kinsmen should 
the killer refuse to provide compensation that is due from him, gives the killer’s or potential 
killers kinsmen an incentive to control his conduct.  
Thus, they can also decide to kill him themselves to avoid any danger to themselves. 
Technically, they have the highest inkling to weed out potential killers in their midst for the 
sole purpose of averting the costs in retaliation or compensation should they be keeping a 
killer. Moreover, the killer is not often the initial target of retaliation from the victim’s 
kinsmen and the knowledge that the sanction might not ultimately rest on the killer increases 
the incentives on the part of the killer’s kinsmen to turn him in for punishment.690 
These so-called primitive communal liability and compensatory methods are strong 
motivators for extracting information;691 they create motivation for the society to monitor the 
injurer and prevent injury. The Ybarra Case, for instance, illustrates a situation where a patient 
was able to recover compensation from a few doctors and nurses for injury caused during an 
operation despite that point that the actual injurer was not identified. In this case, the fellow 
medical practitioners in the room were unlikely to testify against one another for the negligent 
act of one of them. The fact showed that one unidentified defendant was responsible for the 
injury and the court saw that it would be entirely impossible for the patient to recover damages 
unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to reveal the identity of the 
negligent practitioner.692 
Indeed, the effects of this kind of judge-made law is that it is an efficient tool for extracting 
information as well as an avenue for members of the community to reduce injuries and to 
identify the injurer sometimes prior to the injury. This can be ultimately advantageous for 
activities that produce dispersed harms over a group of people and where the causation is 
often difficult to determine, particularly in the case of shale gas developmental environmental 
tort cases. 
The same idea of a communal liability and compensatory system can also be invoked in the 
case of environmental degradation associated with shale gas development due to the unknown 
and dispersed nature of harms, the difficulty of identifying the source and the operator 
responsible for certain accidents. Thus, it is the belief of this thesis that the liability system 
playing a complementary role in mitigating risks associated with industrial activities with 
such high frequency level for harm will have its intended effects if the government, being the 
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modern representative of the state, shoulders the cost of damages and the cost of restoration 
with taxpayer money then recovers same from the defendant operator subsequently by all 
means necessary. 
For this proposition to work the following assumptions and conditions must be present. The 
first and most important is that no oil and gas firm whose assets in total cannot conveniently 
internalise the cost of potential pollution or environmental degradation should be allowed to 
carry out any extraction activities without an affiliate company whose assets can internalise 
the costs of potential environmental degradation. If this is made a requirement at the point of 
applying for a permit, and a clause is included empowering government to pursue the 
affiliated company to recover damages where the smaller independent company cannot 
internalise the cost involved, it completely addresses the notion of firms being judgment proof 
because government can still proceed against the affiliate company. Second, anyone 
financially capable should have the locus standi to sue the defendant operator for the damage 
caused to avoid the issue of rationale disinterest associated with environmental litigation. 
7.4 Threat to Suit 
Shale gas development is known for evidencing diverse risks just like some human industrial 
activity. Some harms from shale gas might be traceable to one operator. For example, an 
explosion from a shale gas site or a truck accident can be attributed to one shale gas operator. 
These kinds of incidents can make suits by plaintiffs easy to identify to start commencement 
of legal action.  
However, there are some harms that are disparate in nature in terms of which operators 
amongst a number of different operators are responsible for the harm. Such disparate harm 
range from air pollution and surface water pollution to accumulated surface water 
contamination or pollution. This kind of disparate nature of harm often turns out to be a 
disincentive for the plaintiff in terms of legal action but turns out to be an incentive to the 
defendant operator in that they expect to escape suit for harms they may have caused. As a 
result, the incentives to reduce risk on the part of the operator by observing all necessary 
available approaches in carrying out this activity are not an urgent requirement. The operator 
does not have to self-regulate because they believe they might not be solely responsible for 
the air or water pollution around their shale gas site.   
This often accounts for the source of the appeal for most oil and gas regulations. Regrettably, 
no sophisticated policy can change this disparate nature of risks associated with such oil and 
gas operations. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of a liability system to tackle the disparate 
nature of such risks which often lead to a reduced threat of suit can be improved upon through 
some changes in policy planning. 
As this work is about proffering policy intervention options to mitigate risks of shale gas 
operations, it is important to identify and discuss some policy changes that can be 
implemented to address the problem of threat to suit associated with the ineffectiveness of 
liability and regulatory systems. 
7.4.1 Segregated Licensing Scheme Option 
The dispersed nature of risks in relation to shale gas development operations exemplifies the 
gap in regulation in practical terms. This dispersed nature of risks often is responsible for the 
threat of suit issue that potential plaintiffs go through as they find it very difficult to identify 
the actual operator(s) responsible for certain harms which is a requirement in law to establish 
the link between causation to impute liability on a party. 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
145
This kind of gap that traditional regulation and liability systems have not been able to address 
can, however, be addressed through a change in policy option. This is where this thesis makes 
a bold recommendation for a segregated licensing scheme for potential operators within a 
probable or proven shale gas reserve. As the name implies, it is a designation of licensing 
regime that gives each operator or group of operators a certain demarcated explored area to 
commence actual exploitation. Where the shale plays are vast and seem beyond one operator’s 
financial capabilities, group of operators should be assigned to explore and extract from that 
area. Those assigned operators would become jointly and severally liable for the damage that 
result from their licensed area. 
This scheme is beneficial for managing, reducing or completely avoiding the occurrence of 
shale gas accidents in that the regulator or the licensing authority is very much abreast of the 
no go areas for shale gas exploitation activities to be carried out. This ban may be due to 
reports revealed during the impact assessment that any shale gas activity will affect the 
presence of endangered species or because the area is densely populated in the event that there 
is a shale gas accident. For example, where there is water contamination or a frack-site-
explosion, the result will eventually be over and above the socially optimal acceptable level 
of harm. 
Also, the segregated licensing scheme can also be useful in addressing the threat of suit 
problem applicable to traditional regulatory and liability systems. The segregated scheme can 
solve the difficulty faced by plaintiffs of oil and gas accidents if policy can issue a permit to 
an individual operator that covers a large area such that every other subsequent licensee can 
get their permit tied to the main licensee. This is unique in that in the event of any accident 
that eventually results to harm of the plaintiff that is near that licensed shale gas area as 
described in the permit or work plan of the operator(s), the main applicant is held liable. Once 
this is implemented through policy intervention, the legal question of determining who caused 
the harm and the source of the harm is addressed based on circumstantial evidence as 
envisaged in the license or work programme as the case may. Thus, the defendant operator 
would be very much aware of the difficulty in escaping liability on grounds that the plaintiff 
is not aware of who and what the source of the cause for action is. In addition to the segregated 
licensing scheme, the joint and several liability rule can be incorporated as tools to address 
the threat of suit problem to achieve the required safety standards by the operator.  
7.4.2 Joint and Several Liability Regime Option 
This is a designation of liability regime in law by which members of a group are either 
individually or mutually responsible to a party in whose favour a judgment has been given. 
This is used in civil cases whereby two or more parties are found liable for damages. The 
plaintiff whom judgment was given in favour is at liberty to collect the entire judgment sum 
from any one of the parties in the group, or from all the parties in various amounts until the 
judgment is paid in full.  
In this form of liability, defendants in the suit can be held jointly and severally responsible 
even where their concurrent acts did not bring about the harm in question to the plaintiff. The 
harm caused by the defendants does not necessarily have to be simultaneous, rather what the 
law requires is that that it was a contributory link between the same events that led to the harm 
to the plaintiff. Thus, the segregated licensing scheme will provide a legal exception to the 
requirement whereby all parties’ actions must have a contributory connection to justify a 
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.  
For example, let us assume at this point that a plumber negligently installs a pipe meant to 
convey toxic chemicals to a nearby factory underground through a neighbour’s farm land. 
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That same pipe installed for conveying the toxic chemicals was inspected by and approved by 
another expert plumber. When the plaintiff suffered from loss of his entire farm crops as a 
result of a pipe rupture, the plaintiff, according to the joint and several liability principles, 
may sue both the plumber that laid the pipe and the one that inspected and approved of the 
work and hold them jointly and severally liable for the damage caused for their failure as 
experts.  
From the above example, both defendants in this scenario acted negligently but we cannot 
conclusively say that it is the action of one that may have caused the rupture for certain but a 
combination of the recklessness of both. True, the first plumber may have installed a sub-
standard pipe or did not do something right during installing the pipe underground. However, 
if the second plumber had carried out the inspection of the work properly in the first place, 
the defect that led to the rupture may have been detected prior to the rupture that led to the 
loss of crops in the plaintiff’s farm land. Thus, it is a case of making a legal inference to 
determine liability in this context.  
In relation to shale gas extraction activity and the disparate nature of air and water 
contamination harm, could it be said that the elements that account for the invocation of the 
jointly and several liability rules is present? The answer is in the affirmative. However, for 
this rule to work and to be applicable to solve the problem of threat of suit in relation to the 
shortcoming in the liability and regulatory approaches for reducing shale gas risks, certain 
requirements must have been established.  
The first is that the number of shale gas sites and their operators depending on their proximity 
and distance should be categorised into one group within an area. This is important as it will 
be easier for regulators to identify the group based on the present location of the plaintiff 
whose surface or groundwater sources has been impacted from suspected shale gas operations.  
Secondly, each member of the group should have been engaged in such an activity that could 
be the probable cause of air or water pollution during the same length of time and period or 
regulation should have fixed the number of years for each operator to be affected by the joint 
and several liability rule to cover such a disparate nature of liability.  
When one critically reviews the dynamic of the joint and several liability rule, it resonates an 
advantage in that it reduces the plaintiff’s risk that one or more defendants are judgment-proof 
by shifting that risk onto the other defendants. The downside of this rule is that it creates 
inequities amongst defendants where a relatively blameless defendant is forced to bear the 
financial burden of a guilty co-defendant’s insolvency. 
7.4.3 Information Disclosure Option 
The information disclosure policy rule option (extensive discussed previously in chapter VI 
of this thesis) can contribute in increasing the effectiveness of the liability systems as well as 
regulation combined. This is quite straight forward in that it will equip potential and actual 
victims with the information they need to find out about harms and identify the relevant parties 
which enables them to establish causation in litigation for determining liability. For more 
discussion on information disclosure, please refer to section 6.1.1. 
7.5 Costs  
Specifically, costs have been the major bane for plaintiffs to not even commence action 
against defendant operator(s) in most industrial activities that result in harms. Cost involved 
include: gathering intelligence or evidence; cost for instituting legal action in court ranging 
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from court process filing and legal representation fee; costs for filing a frivolous suit against 
the defendant;  or for wasting the time of the court.  
These costs increase with time and are not one-off payments. Therefore, the issue of cost can 
also be addressed. It is the recommendation of this thesis that almost all the policy intervention 
options discussed previously above that relates to resolving information asymmetries, 
addressing the judgment proof defendant problem, and issue of defendant’s ability to escape 
liability play roles in reducing the costs involved in litigation. Information disclosure rules 
assist the plaintiff in acquiring information with less hassles rather than relying on expensive 
discovery options.  
However, other measures which this thesis thinks should be explored to addressing the cost 
problem are discussed below 
7.5.1 Shifting the Burden of Proof Rule Option 
This legal and philosophical concept requires making a claim that also needs justification 
which then expects that the opponent justifies the opposite of the claim. Although this concept 
is quite different in each legal domain, one common trend applicable to all domains is that the 
burden of proof typically lies with the party making the claim. This can also lie with the other 
party denying a well-established fact or theory. 
The question we need to address is whether the burden of proof should at any point in time 
shift to operators of shale gas sites. To answer this question, it is important to first identify the 
criteria that ought to be evident before a court can order a shift in the burden of proof in 
litigation.  One of such criteria taking a cue from an employment case of, Ayodele v. Citilink 
Ltd & Anor,693 where Lord Singh held that the Equality Act of 2010694 does not exonerate the 
claimant from the burden of proof merely because words contained in the Equality Act of 
2010 suggests otherwise. Instead, he said it is not fair that a respondent should have to 
discharge that burden of proof unless and until the claimant has shown that there is a prima 
facie case of discrimination that needs to be answered. 
What then should constitute a prima facie case of discrimination which should provoke a shift 
in the burden of proof in shale gas development activity? One such controversy that 
constitutes a prima facie case that should provoke a shift in the burden of proof on a claimant 
to the defendant lies in the issue of non-disclosure regarding the chemical components that 
the oil and gas industry operators argue for.  These operators claim it infringes on their 
property rights. The mere refusal to disclose the chemical composition being used for fracking 
invariably represents a discriminatory advantage against the plaintiff to be able to prove his 
case on the balance of probability because the defendant is well equipped in terms of 
information. Therefore, the burden should shift to the defendant where they refuse to 
voluntarily disclose certain information while carrying out their operations. This is equally in 
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line with the wisdom behind the burden shifting rule because the burden of evidence gathering 
is on the party able to meet it at least cost. 
Another condition which needs to be fulfilled before the burden can shift to the defendant 
operator is that the proceedings filed before the court must be adversarial and not inquisitorial 
in nature; that is, the courts or the competent body does not need to investigate the facts to the 
case itself.695 
7.5.2 Expediting Litigation Option 
Obviously for locations where there are high volumes of oil and gas activities, there are bound 
to be frequent accidents associated with shale oil and gas exploitation. In order to deal with 
the numerous litigations, there is a requisite need to appoint enough judges to manage present 
and future proceedings. Apart from the regular adversarial court systems, government should 
endeavour to establish quasi-judicial bodies to look at minor incidents whose duty it is 
primarily to investigate matters of claims and the duty of care on the part of a defendant 
operator. This is unique because the normal adversarial adjudicative processes take a long 
time to conclude. This will improve the ability of courts to efficiently dispense with cases and 
encourage more plaintiffs in pursuing claims in court. In addition, this will make operators of 
such industrial sites to be more careful since they know that the processes for litigation has 
been simplified drastically for any potential plaintiff. However, these quasi-judicial bodies, 
the cases that should be transferred to them should be limited to cases not involving the 
interpretation of legal texts to determine the fact in issue for holding a party liable. 
7.6 Summary 
The identified problems of environmental regulation for mitigating risks from activities 
especially in the energy industry and energy law principles are suggests that the 
implementation of operators compliance to set regulatory set rules and programmes does not 
equal an increase in compliance or in optimal regulatory outcome.696 This results in companies 
indulging in expensive environmental and liability compliance systems in response to 
unnecessarily complex laws. Indeed, the proffered policy alternatives to environmental 
regulation for mitigating risks discussed in this Chapter resonates thematic issues of emerging 
research to analyse the extent to which environmental risk regulatory tools and innovation in 
the energy industry is compatible with regulatory effectiveness in improving compliance and 
achieve policy outcomes. Porter and van der Linder have suggested that environmental 
regulation and liability can be a veritable tool in stimulating companies to be innovative is 
devising self-regulatory frameworks for mitigating risks.697    
On the whole the innovative alternative policy interventions creates an opportunity but forces 
regulated firms to take responsibility itself in its own ways in response to regulation. 
Therefore, it turns out not to be a question of whether there was compliance, but a question 
of whether the policy and regulatory objective is achieved in safety and  risk mitigation that 
contributes to a healthy environment. Regulated entities are not being weighed down more 
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and more by prescriptive rules offers little which hampers the company’s ability to 
innovate.698  
Theoretically, flexible regulatory regimes that its design is outcome driven rather than rules 
oriented, then compliance with risk mitigation programmes can fit well into the company’s 
normal operating procedures, training programmes and business goals. It will be cost-efficient 
and competitive such that regulatory monitoring will almost be unnecessary to ensure a safer 
environment. However, most regulators approach and business strategies is still far from 
attaining ideal conditions of regulatory effectiveness posited by the theory. 
Strict liability are also being seen as one of the palliatives to the problems identified in this 
thesis as well as by critical energy law scholars of how to ensure that liability regimes 
permeate the internal orderings of regulated entities, ensure that operators will be held 
responsible for dispersed harm which are quite difficult to attribute to a particular operator. 
The risk based strict liability rule for addressing water contamination issues helps to avoid the 
possibility operators to be shielded from liability where they have complied with prescriptive 
regulatory set standards. Conversely some scholars have suggested that the best way forward 
is to require large energy companies to regulate themselves (i.e. to implement internal 
outcomes-oriented compliance systems in a way that is responsive to regulatory concerns.699  
The objective is here is to focus regulatory efforts in the direction of those able to shoulder 
the costs of environmental remediation and force major industry players to act as surrogate 
regulators. As a result, these surrogate regulators provide the economies of scale for smaller 
players to comply with the standards towards risk mitigation. Thus, there is an increased level 
of efficiency in environmental regulation and liability regimes.700 Consequently, regulatory 
efforts anchored on risk based strict liability does not limit itself to the potential degree of 
harm from an activity in defining what an abnormal risk is. Rather it takes into consideration 
the probability (increased frequency level of risk occurring) of particular risk associated with 
an activity. (See thesis body on factors (a) & (b) Great harm and higher degree of risk, section 
5.8.1). 
Also, the era whereby energy corporations as subjects of regulation are pictured as institutions 
who have to be forced to ‘do the right thing’ through deterrence threats must be backed up by 
the facts that corporations can ‘do the right thing’ through persuasive regulatory approach. 
Some influential regulated firms will be highly responsive and motivated to act in rational 
ways for its own sake, that the presence of deterrence threats will not necessarily make firms 
to make it a feature of a daily decision to be receptive to safety rules that mitigates risks from 
energy related activities. Many regulated firms will also act in ways that appears to preserve 
their corporate legitimacy and reputation in the eyes of their peers, clients or government 
irrespective of what it will cost them. In circumstances where formal punitive measures are 
asserted, it is the use of informal approach such as shame and negative publicity that turns out 
to be more effective motivators for compliance with risk and safety regulatory requirements. 
                                                          
698Boyd, J. (1998). Searching for the Profit in Pollution Prevention: Case Studies in the Corporate Evaluation of 
Environmental Opportunities, Discussion Paper 98-30. Resources for the future, Washington DC. 
699Selznick, P. (1992). The Moral Commonwealth, University of California Press, Berkeley; Mclnerney, F. & 
White, S. (1995). The Total Quality Corporation: How 10 Major Companies Added to Profits and Cleaned up the 
Environment in the 1990s, Truman Telley Books/plume, New York. 
700Caltkins, S. (1997). “Corporate compliance and anti-trust agencies’ bi-modal penalties” Law & Contemporary 
Problems Volume 60(3), pp. 127-167. 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
150
No doubt regulated firms will frequently be responsive to weak sanctions including publicity 
and shame because there are usually variety of actors associated with any wrongdoings.701 
However, this thesis argue that when there is an increased frequency level of risk from an 
activity, it therefore portends that weak sanctions can no longer achieve its corrective aim. In 
such cases, a strong deterrence threat such as a risk based strict liability regulatory approach 
becomes relevant. To hard targets, maximum penalties will not deter them. To those 
vulnerable regulatory targets, maximum penalties will be relevant in deterring them. Whereas, 
weak sanctions (shame or publicity) will deter soft targets of regulation, by the mere exposure 
of their inability to meet their legal obligation even if does not provoke criminal 
responsibility.702 Interestingly, the energy industry is such that is comprised of  a mix of both 
hard target and vulnerable target firms that requires a blend of maximum and minimum 
punitive measures to achieve an effective regulation in mitigating risks where necessary and 
depending on the nature of firm. 
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Chapter 8 
8 Final Conclusions and Future Outlook 
8.1 Introduction 
The question of whether a stricter liability and an alternative regulatory regime are required 
to complement the existing regulatory regime that govern shale gas extraction activity is the 
main trigger for this research. Both arguments for and against this question has been examined 
in this work. The limitations of a one size fit all model of regulation from the perspective of 
this thesis is been criticized. First on the premise that liability based on negligence can create 
an incentive for operators who engage in activity that produce increased frequency level of 
risk to be shielded from liability. Why this happens is because the claimant in most cases is 
unable to prove the negligence of the defendant operator as the evidence might have been 
destroyed in the accident or incident. The oil and gas extractive industry is where such 
difficulties might be present and creates for the threat to suit syndrome in environmental 
litigation cases. Second, C&C regulation presents a legal gap in that operators might be 
shielded from liability having satisfied all prescriptive standard of regulation for carrying out 
the activity or operation that results in the harm to the victims of environmental pollution or 
accident. These issues will be summarized here and the position of the thesis shall be 
presented as it attempts to answer the questions raised in this work. 
This thesis, to set the basis for the conclusion and its future research outlook, demonstrated 
through legal based principles and concepts as to why shale gas extraction activity should be 
subject to stricter environmental liability regime by stating that because the issue of water 
contamination risk has an increased frequency level of incidents on one hand. Again, this 
research argued that when these contaminations occur the water resources are irredeemable.703 
Thus, the thesis views such risk as abnormally dangerous based on a legal concept formulated 
by this work known as the ‘transgenerational impact factor.’ It relied on the factors contained 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Act to argue its position to subject shale gas fracking 
water contamination risk to a strict liability and regulatory regime based on the 
transgenerational impact factor. Also, it proposed self-regulatory approach as a complement 
to command and control environmental regulation. 
Now to answer the main research question whether shale gas activity should be subject to a 
strict liability and regulatory regime. This work agrees strongly that water contamination risk 
should be subject to a strict liability cause of action when claims for water contamination 
arise. But strongly disagrees that shale gas activity in its entirety should be subject to a strict 
liability and regulatory regime as long as there are no increased frequency of any of the risks 
associated. In order for this proposal to fit to the existing environmental laws, legal principles 
and regulation, this thesis formulated a new concept of liability known as the ‘risk based strict 
liability rule.’ This thesis illustrated that this rule can be triggered based on two conditions:  
whether the frequency level of that risk occurring is highly probable or when it does occur 
whether the resultant harm can have a transgenerational effect on the victim.  
However, the down side of the risk based strict liability rule is that it can only be triggered 
and applied when the activity that might present such risks has actually commenced. Before 
this thesis concludes, it is important to draw a nexus between the principles of sustainable use 
of natural resource and the obligation to imposed by national and international statute for the 
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need to protect the environment and why the this thesis contributions fits with energy law 
scholarship.  
Environmental consequences are bound to follow every energy exploration and extraction 
through processing and transportation and then to distribution, consumption, and disposal of 
the natural resources that are deployed to produce energy. From the above, it leaves an 
unassailable conclusion that energy and the environment share a much more physical 
connection in the fuel cycle. As a result, it resonates the impossibility of the idea whereby 
energy law and policy and environmental law and policy can be treated as different areas of 
regulation. Remarkably, the phenomenon of irreversible damage associated with energy 
activities exacerbates the environmental problems attendant with energy system. For instance, 
the energy industry being the main contributor of CO2 emissions which is an irreversible 
phenomenon that leads to climate change that imposes risks and fatalities on humans. 
Undoubtedly, there are trade-offs that ought to be addressed or more importantly overcome 
between energy and the environment.704 These trade-offs are necessary because historically 
traditional energy narrative focused on economic growth where all sophisticated economy 
focus more on cheap, readily available and reliable energy sources. Inevitably, the need for 
energy and national security as well as environmental protection to be included in the drive 
for accessible energy sources has become the core input for contemporary energy policy.705 
The environment, human health, energy security and the economy are all impacted by all 
forms of energy extraction activity. The key always is to examine each energy source for its 
full life cycle impacts with a view to proffer the strategies which will engender effective 
compliance to mitigate the attendant risks. Nevertheless, one thing stands out in comparison 
to other human activities, the extractive sector present clearer, more numerous, more severe, 
and irreversible risks. 
Therefore, to strengthen the principles of sustainable use of natural resource and the need to 
protect the environment which overall constitute the bases for energy justice within energy 
law and policy objectives, there must be a framework strategy that promotes the parameters 
of self-regulatory and stricter liability policy interventions which in turn ensures an effective 
compliance with set rules for risk mitigation. The link is this, self-regulatory and stricter 
liability systems erodes the notion whereby regulators relying on their ability to implement ex 
post regulations that address and fix a problem, such as oil spill or water contamination or 
even a nuclear malfunction that has occurred in the past. Instead, forward thinking industry 
formulated ex ante measures are necessary in an effort to forestall continuing and increased 
frequency levels of risks from energy extractive activities.  
8.2 Research Contributions 
One important issue faced by modern societies is how to avoid severe, presumably 
cataclysmic, harm to the natural environment. The reasons behind such harm are not only 
complex but controversial, and they arise from a wide spectrum of economic and social 
pressures. The results are evidenced in the apparent pollution, land degradation, deforestation, 
ozone depletion, climate change, and the loss of biological diversity which creates severe and, 
in some cases, transgenerational impacts to the planet that is required to sustain us. 
Consequently, it has been argued that the window of opportunity in which to avert these 
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ecological disasters is rapidly closing in, and that in some cases, it may already be too late to 
prevent ongoing health implications and environmental degradation.706  
One solution to manage these severe risks associated with resource extraction which accounts 
for related impacts on the natural environment and humanity has been the use of regulation 
and liability regimes.707 However, in today’s world, all indices points to the fact that recent 
technological advancements have presented a situation where direct (C&C) regulation can no 
longer adapt to the changing dynamic of technology in several fields of discipline. One area 
where this miscarriage is so evident is in the extractive industry. Regulation is said to have 
been operating from a distance rather than taking the centre stage in mitigating the attendant 
risks. More pathetic is the fact that companies, and not regulators, decide on the details on 
safety governance, production technology, and quality of product.  
The issue of information asymmetry has been the fundamental reason behind this twist in the 
safety governance issues and quality of production technology in the energy industry. This 
invariably leads to the limited effectiveness seen presently in today’s regulatory environment 
surrounding shale gas extractive activity. Given the room to re-regulate, how can we attempt 
to further strengthen the effectiveness of regulation without forfeiting the benefits resource 
extraction activity offers? Put another way, how can we re-regulate to balance the conflicting 
needs between what is beneficial to society and what is beyond the socially optimal level of 
harm to the same society? These underscores the significance of this research.  
To deal with these questions, it is the assumption of this thesis that regulation can be more 
effective and improved upon if it does not neglect the strategic regulatory approaches which 
will force the industry to self-regulate. This is important because indirect control otherwise 
known as self-regulation is compatible with controlling dispersed harms associated with 
highly risky activities like shale gas extraction. It is also ideal in that it reduces the uncertainty 
in immature technologies as well as addressing the asymmetric information syndrome 
prevalent in resource extractive technologies. These problems provoke a strong incentive for 
regulatory subversion or capture by the operator.708 Thus, breeding a fertile ground for non-
compliant participants to the set regulatory rules targeted toward mitigating risks in the energy 
sector. 
Therefore, the implication of this thesis is explicitly to devise a legal complementary 
framework where environmental liability and regulatory strategies would be able to engender 
higher levels of compliance as well as achieve policy and regulatory objectives from the 
context of energy law principles that govern operations of resource extraction. The thesis seek 
to not only improve compliance with regulatory standards or requirements. It went further to 
argue that achieving compliance alone cannot be the true determinant of an effective 
regulatory strategy. To this end, this thesis have also taken a step further to contribute to the 
available literaures by proposing specific strategies that will foster rational behaviour amongst 
regulated entities in the energy sector. Thus, this thesis contributed to the available literature 
by not only agreeing that a combination of multiple regulatory instruments should be used to 
improve regulatory quality. Rather it clearly argue for a self-regulatory approach to be 
combined with traditional regulation to achieve effectiveness in regulatory strategy. 
The interrelationship between self-regulation, C&C regulation and risk is analysed explicitly 
in section 1.8 and 2.3.1 respectively. Also, for a better understanding of how self-regulatory 
strategies yielded the desired level of compliance, section 4.5.3 and 4.6 identified examples 
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of how self-regulatory strategies have been a success in ensuring compliance and mitigating 
risk safety compliance problems. From the examples, examined in the above sections, it is the 
assertion of this thesis that self-regulation, not prescriptive (context based) regulatory 
standards should be the core trigger for human rationality. The human brain developed as a 
sophisticated social brain to be to deal and adapt to self-regulatory responses in most contexts 
and overrule, if need be direct external context based regulatory responses.  
Consequently, when human rationality is viewed as having evolved together with the 
problems of risks mitigation for adaptive behaviour in a changing environment like the energy 
sector, it invariably results in a social kind of rationality that is connected to self-regulatory 
and internal management strategies adaptable to the complex social interdependencies of 
collective efforts. 
Aside the examples cited above in section 4.5.3 and 4.6 it is imperative just to consider yet 
another success that proves further the effectiveness of self-regulatory strategies in improving 
compliance. Here the EPA was facing problems in the way it communicated with local 
communities in the regulation of companies’ proposals for development and other issues. 
Significant conflicts between local communities and facilities on environmental issues were 
amongst other problems being faced by the EPA, with many local communities not pleased 
with the level of environmental improvement achieved by the EPA, working with local 
facilities. In Altona an area in the U.S, where two catastrophic accidents had occurred over a 
ten year period. As a result, the residents were generally opposed to every application brought 
by local facilities for developments or changes. Due to these oppositions from local residents, 
it affected the EPA’s attempts to work with these facilities to achieve its objectives of 
pollution prevention and control.709 
To deal with this deadlock, the EPA set in motion a compliance plan where a community 
liaison officer was appointed to facilitate consultation between management and local 
communities to address these challenges as well as set objectives for environmental 
improvement in local facilities. The consultative group set up for each of the plant is 
comprised of local community representatives, those who had complained to the EPA about 
the plant and top management of the plant. The consultative groups met monthly to 
understand, identify and understand the environmental issues confronting the plants, from the 
plants’ and communities’ perspective and to agree on an improvement plan to address those 
issues. The EPA acted as a neutral party to provide advice in and to facilitate such consultative 
meetings. When the groups have devised a working expected initial plan, they now meet 
quarterly to hear reports of the implementation of the plan and to tackle new issues. This 
process is repeated every two years.710 
The Accredited Licensee concept is set up by the EPA as a reward for companies with good 
environmental performance. An “Expected Initial Plan” (EIP) is one of the key indicators of 
this performance level. Sequel to an amendment made in Victoria, a state in Australia to the 
Environment Protection Act 1970, gave companies some leverage to be freed from the 
standard prescriptive approach to works approval and licensing if they can demonstrate a 
higher level of environmental performance as well as an ongoing ability to maintain and 
improve performance. However, to be an accredited licensee, a company must have: an 
                                                          
709Environmental Protection Authority (1993). “A question of trust: Accredited Licensee Concept.” Discussion 
Paper, Environment Protection Authority, Melbourne, Victoria 
710Law Reform Committee. (1997). “Regulatory efficiency legislation: Discussion Paper”, Parliament of Victoria, 
Melbourne, Paragraphs2.23-2.28; Author’s research at the EPA 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
155
environmental management system, an environmental audit programme and an environmental 
improvement plan.711 
This accredited license concept yielded a gradual success such that as of 1998, there were 32 
EIPs agreed by the local consultative groups already in effect and further 18 in the process of 
consultation and agreement. Again, a total of 11 accredited licences had been issued out of a 
total of 1229 licenses issued in three years. The EIPs have resulted in huge improvements in 
environmental outcomes for particular sites such as a halving in emissions of volatile organic 
compounds at Alton between 1989 and 1998.712 
From the above example, it is evident that another way regulation can become effective in 
engendering an increased level of voluntary compliance for mitigating risks associated with 
dangerous activities, is to provide companies or individuals with a reduction of penalty if they 
are found to have breached the set regulatory standards. The U.S Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for organizations is the most significant development of this kind of legal leverage. 
This guidelines that gives reduction in penalty were promulgated by the U.S Sentencing 
Commission, a judicial agency which went into effect without congressional action. How this 
operates is that companies who have initiated good compliance programme’s design by 
certain elements in the Guidelines will enjoy decreased fines when they commit an offence. 
On the other hand, companies who lack such defined compliance programmes are placed on 
probation pending when they are willing to initiate one. Many regulators have copied this 
scheme where companies’ programmes reflect that of the U.S Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines. In fact, this scheme from surveys has shown that the guidelines caused up to 20% 
of the companies under review to initiate for the first time an internal system for ensuring 
regulatory compliance and up to 45% to further improve their internal compliance system.713 
Accordingly, it is the conclusion of this thesis that strategies targeted at improving regulation 
cannot be effective in encouraging compliance toward mitigating risks from activities if 
regulated entities lack the expertise or capabilities on how to comply with set regulatory 
standards and requirements. The responsiveness of enterprises to deterrent threats of punitive 
sanctions or economic incentives such as workers compensation as the case may be, depends 
on the information or technological capacity to comply. No matter how decent and strong a 
regulatory rule may seem, firms will not seem to comply except that regulation addresses the 
problem of capacity building. Thus, if regulation ought to be effectiveness in risk mitigation 
in the energy industry, it is expedient for regulators to nurture and improve regulated firm’s 
capacity to comply with these set standards by providing a level playing field for all 
participants. This is essential because smaller firm’s lack the economies of scale to invest in 
systems that engenders a traction for compliance. This also account for the irrational 
behaviour of some operators within the energy industry. 
Given these advantages, how can environmental regulation overcome the shortcomings 
inherent in self-regulatory approach in mitigating risks associated with resource extractive 
technique like fracking? Unlike other scholars714 that have proposed or argued vaguely that 
regulators could better manage the risks to water contamination from fracking activities by 
strengthening regulatory safeguards, incentivising research, clarifying tort responsibility and 
using insurance mandates to ensure compensation and remediation.715 This thesis proposes 
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self-regulatory approaches through specific strategies to overcome the shortcomings of direct 
regulatory approaches suggested to mitigate the risks of dispersed harms.  
Again, considering the widespread ban on fracking technology within States in the U.S716 and 
within the EU due to its environmental impacts, this thesis aims to develop a framework that 
will give members of the public the assurance that there are enough safeguards that guarantees 
keeping risk mitigation to a socially optimal level. Also, it precludes the operator of a 
dangerous activity to be shielded from liability because he adhered to the prescribed best 
practices or regulatory requirements. On the reverse side, operators of energy related activities 
will be given the social license to operate as members of the public are quite confident that 
justice would be done if harm occurs. 
Prior efforts to mitigate certain risks associated with extractive activities through regulation 
and liability fell short in capturing the effectiveness required for achieving a socially optimal 
level of harm. For example, Shavell Steven in his work 717 clearly outlined the issues that 
confronted the tasks of mitigating risks. Such issues include: information asymmetry; inability 
of a judgment debtor to pay; the cost involved in suing an alleged defaulter; and threat to suit. 
He vehemently argued that the issues of energy are fundamentally entrenched in an 
indissoluble nexus with multiple dimensions that, in turn, exert asymmetric influence over 
divergent stakeholders and settings and occur at different spectrums and physical scales. 
Having done that, Shavell did not take a definite stance on the issue of the best tool between 
liability and regulation in mitigating risks associated with resource extraction. 
Rather he proposed a combination of both by highlighting the merits and demerits in both 
tools. Also, Caroline Cecot in her article ‘Fractured Systems: Multi Policy Proposal for 
Promoting Safe Shale Gas Delivery in the United State’718 clearly toed the line of argument 
coincidentally by proposing multi policy strategies. The work identified the use of liability, 
regulation and financial liability schemes such as the establishment of “Superfunds”, which 
obligates operators to contribute to the fund. Here she suggested operators with the greatest 
default should be made to contribute more. However, their work did not contain specific 
strategic policy options that might address the issues of dispersed harms that are associated 
with shale gas fracking. Further, they719 did not clearly recommend a system that would 
strengthen the effectiveness of regulation by ensuring compliance without the regulatory 
institution closely monitoring the operators of such risky activity. It is based on these 
overarching premises that this thesis builds upon to provide specific policy options that might 
help to address the asymmetric influence over diverse stakeholders as prevalent in the 
industry. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to add to the collection of solutions Shavell proposed 
for each of the problems that confronts regulation and liability systems. Thus, the thesis’ 
contribution to the available literature regarding safe shale gas extraction has the following 
ramifications discussed below. 
This research argues for a combination of policy proposals for strengthening the existing 
regulatory system. Specifically, the work proposed and agreed with some of the suggestions 
of scholars that for there to be safety in energy related extractive activities like shale gas 
fracking, regulators need to clarify tort responsibility. This is true. However, this thesis seems 
to be quite bold in arguing for a strict liability to be applied to fracking risks to the extent that 
it involves water contamination claims by adducing evidence that suggest that this is the most 
                                                          
716See supra Loftis, R. (2013) footnote 44 at p.23 
717See supra Bechara, A & Damasio, A.R. (2005) footnote 58. 
718See supra Wendy, W. (2015) footnote 77. 
719See supra Shavell, S. (1984) foot note 288. 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
157
prominent risk (See section 3.5). The legal rationale for this is anchored on the argument that 
water contamination risks are the most to occur in terms of frequency presently in the U.S. 
Also, on the premise that water is a special commodity which ought to be protected in line 
with the objective of the United Nation (UN) Millennium Development Goals.720 
More so, energy development is the most rapid growing consumer of water in the US and 
around the world.721 And any attempt to prioritise gas as an energy source over water means 
that the very essence of living would disintegrate as the status of water and energy are distinct 
and contribute immensely to the aspects of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Therefore, if strict liability is applied to water contamination claims, it would make operators 
to conduct impact assessments and rigorous testing of techniques instead being in a haste to 
introduce technologies with great impacts. 
Furthermore, this thesis makes a novel contribution on how to solve the issue of liability 
claims when it comes to dispersed harms from oil and gas extractive activities like shale gas. 
Dispersed harms from extractive activities makes a potential plaintiff unable to sue a 
defendant-operator(s). This indirectly gives the operator the incentive to continue the 
polluting act. Some of such dispersed risks could be air and groundwater contamination. This 
thesis contributes by specifically identifying the independent segregated licensing scheme to 
address this difficulty faced by potential plaintiffs. By this, the thesis sets out that when 
issuing licenses for exploration and extraction of energy sources, the relevant licensing 
authority should designate a large area to an individual licensee where by other license holders 
can trace their rights to the original license holder. In the event of a dispersed air or 
groundwater contamination where the source is unknown, it affords the plaintiff to sue for 
liability claims connecting that harm to the original license holder. This resonates the joint 
and several liability rule under tort law and thus clearing any ambiguity surrounding the 
perpetuator of the alleged harm and addressing the ‘threat to suit’ problem inherent in direct 
forms of regulation. 
This thesis made another contribution in addressing the information asymmetry syndrome and 
the inability to pay/judgment proof defendant problem which accounts for the regulatory 
subversion or capture and the shortcoming of liability systems in mitigating risks by 
suggesting self-regulatory policy interventions. To address the information asymmetry each 
well should have an ‘independent well assessor’ whose responsibility is to report directly to 
the regulatory institution. Whereas, a model known as the ‘Polluter Does Not Pay’ is proposed 
to tackle the inability to pay/judgement proof defendant. How this works is that the plaintiff 
who is unable to recover in damages against the defendant because the defendant’s available 
assets cannot cover the judgement sum, the plaintiff can recover same from the government 
who in the first place gave the judgement debtor the license to engage in the activity that 
caused the said harm. However, this model will only work for most legal systems where the 
ownership of mineral rights resides with the government. The government in turn may recover 
same from the mother-company or benefit from the insurance or bonding cover in place. It 
also allows for expediting payments for damages to do victims of environmental accidents. 
8.3 Final Conclusions and Future Outlook 
In the context of resource extraction activities, restructuring can be provoked when the 
existing legal framework shows limitations in meeting the interests of all parties’ that are 
going to be either affected or benefit from an activity. Such interests on the part of people 
living around that activity is the issue of their safety and where damage occur, adequate and 
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fair compensation. The interests on the part of the operator of such activity is to recover returns 
on   the investment. The satisfaction of these divergent and conflicting interests is solely on 
the regulatory institution and liability regime whose responsibility is to ensure a balanced 
arrangement between the various stakeholders in resource extraction activity in the energy 
industry.   
The development of shale gas resource through the combination of innovative techniques 
known as the directional drilling and high volume fluid based fracking technique could 
become beneficial globally if harnessed sustainably. This is because more energy resources 
will be available to meet the demands of energy needs of the world. However, these new 
technologies has equally presented new risks that show that the existing environmental 
regulatory laws in some legal jurisdictions have become obsolete and too weak to improve 
compliance level for set safety standards. One way in mitigating these risks associated with 
resource extraction activity like shale gas is through the use of environmental regulations and 
liability systems. However, there has been series of debate in the global energy forums 
regarding environmental regulatory reforms. Whether stricter or lighter forms of regulatory 
and liability regimes is ideal to achieve an effective means of mitigating risks. This has in 
fact, taken the centre stage of discussion in environmental forums. These conflicting 
perceptions provokes the main research question: whether shale gas extraction activity should 
be subject to a strict environmental liability and regulatory regime to achieve a sustainable 
shale gas development? 
To answer the question, this thesis reviewed and analysed the U.S regulatory and liability 
regimes applicable to shale gas extractive activity. This is to determine its ability in achieving 
the environmental health protection. This research reveals that there is a wide array of 
legislations at both state and federal level that govern the operations of shale gas development. 
However, these traditional regulations alone are limited in achieving a higher degree of 
compliance and policy outcomes. 
On the other hand, the thesis examined shale gas health and environmental impacts. Now 
based on the available literature that analysed the risks of shale gas, this thesis observed that 
water contamination seem to be the risk with an increased frequency rate of occurrence. To 
substantiate this assertion that water contamination risk is one of the fundamental issue, it is 
pertinent to mention that the GWPC in the U.S published a review of state oil and gas 
regulations designed to protect water resources for twenty seven major oil and gas producing 
states in 2009.722 On the backdrop of this review, GWPC concluded that, in general, state oil 
and gas regulations are adequately designed to protect water resources. Among the states 
reviewed, requirements to protect water resources covered permitting, well drilling and 
construction (Eg. casing, cementing, and pressure test requirements), well closure and 
abandonment, and waste fluid management.723 
While the review shows that there were regulations intended for protecting water resources, 
it mentioned that few states explicitly mentioned hydraulic fracturing in their regulations and 
found that most states had an extensive array of permitting and operating requirements for oil 
and gas wells. As a result, the review made a list of findings and recommendations to 
strengthen state programmes to protect water resources. In similar light, the recommendations 
made by the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board as instructed by President Obama on March 
31 2011 reveals the following recommendations to address the safety and environmental 
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performance of shale gas production.724 They include: Possible pollution of drinking water 
from methane and chemicals used in fracturing fluids; air pollution; community disruption 
during shale gas production; and cumulative adverse impacts that characterise shale gas 
production can have on communities and ecosystems. Among the concerns identified by the 
subcommittee, contamination of drinking water is first on the list signifying once again the 
major high risk level for water contamination.725 
Based on empirical data, this thesis have shown that water contamination risk is unique to 
fracking by first analysing four scenarios for which this single risk can occur as shown in 
Chapter III in section 3.5. Second, by perusing through articles conducted on shale gas 
incidents analysis. These articles revealed that among all the incidents and accidents from 
shale gas fracking, water contamination happen to be the most frequently occurring risk. At 
this point a quick statistical analysis of the number of violations that occurred from January 
2008- June 2010 in the U.S during shale gas development is necessary to show the frequency 
in which water contamination occur. The Pennsylvania Land Trust Association has reviewed 
environmental violations accrued by Marcellus Shale drillers working in Pennsylvania. At 
least, a total of 1,435 violations of state oil and gas laws due to gas drilling or other earth 
disturbance activities related to natural gas extraction from the Marcellus Shale in this two-
and-a-half-year period. The association identified 952 violations as having or likely to have 
an impact on the environment. 483 were identified as likely being an administrative or safety 
violations. The report breaks the violations down by type. For example, of the 952 violations: 
268 involved improper construction of waste water impoundments, 10 involved improper well 
casing, 154 involved discharge of industrial waste and 16 involved improper blowout 
prevention.726 From the report, it clearly shows that violations relating to water protection 
issues is more.  
This can only further embolden the justification for imposing a maximum or stricter 
environmental regulatory approach for mitigating increased level of risks from activities has 
gained credence in energy law principle in achieving compliance and policy objectives. This 
most authoritative theory of the optimal mix of regulatory strategies in mitigating such 
increased frequency level of risks from an activity is Ayres and Braithwaite. In their 1992 
book, ‘Responsive Regulation’ on the pyramid of enforcement strategies, they gave reasons 
why this pyramid of regulatory strategies is an effective and efficient approach in persuading 
compliance with policy objectives on the backdrop of empirical psychological and 
sociological evidence, as well as economic and political modelling and game theory.727 The 
pyramid suggest the idea that regulators should leverage on the goodwill of those they are 
regulating, by persuading them to voluntarily comply. When this approach fails, regulators 
should then resort to using their most drastic regulatory strategies and reverting to a trusting 
demeanour when these strategies achieve its goals.728 From their argument, it suffice to say 
that compliance is optimized by regulation that is contingently co-operative, tough and 
forgiving. Thus, regulatory design should prioritize restorative, compliance-oriented means 
                                                          
724Stephen, G. et al., (2011). Methane contamination of drinking water accompanying gas well drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, Institute of Ecosystem Studies, Volume 20, pp.8172-8176 [Online] 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1100682108 (Available 12/10/2018). 
725Ibid. 
726Indiana University of Pennsylvania, ‘Marcellus Shale Drillers in Pennsylvania Amass 1,435 violations’ at 
http://www.iup.edu/newsitem.aspx?id=97300&amp (Accessed on 06/08/2017). 
727Ayres, I. & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
728Ibid at p.51 
 
Mitigating Risks from Energy Resource Extraction 
 
 
 
160
without compromising the possibility of using stricter measures where necessary.729 And 
where necessary from the context of risk governance can be construed as when risks from an 
activity (water contamination from shale gas fracking) has this increased frequency level of 
occurrence. 
The ideologies and theoretical principles of Ayres and Braithwaite apply to regulatory 
schemes for the whole industries and not limited to individual regulatory encounters. 
Therefore, the concept postulates that allowing an industry the discretion and responsibility 
to implement sel-regulatory reform strategies first rather than moving straight to imposed 
C&C regulation, gives the government the leverage to be more successful in achieving their 
goals of regulatory reforms. On the aspect of using self-regulation to complement C&C 
regulation, this thesis demonstrated that C&C otherwise known as prescriptive environmental 
regulation have certain difficulties that accounts for its limitation in mitigating risks. First, 
prescriptive regulation offers no incentive to improve the quality of the environment beyond 
standards set by a particular law. Once the C&C regulation is satisfied, polluters have zero 
incentive to do better. Second, C&C regulation is inflexible. It usually requires the same 
standard for all polluters or those within the same line of activity. Often the same pollution 
abatement and risk mitigating technique is used across board. This means that C&C regulation 
draws no distinction between risks that are abnormal or between firms that would find it easy 
and inexpensive to meet the pollution standard-or to reduce pollution even further-and firms 
that might find it difficult and costly to meet standards. As a result, firms have no reason to 
rethink their production methods in fundamental ways that might reduce risk even more and 
at lower cost. 
Third, C&C regulations are written by legislators and the Environmental Agency. Therefore, 
they could be subject to compromises in the political process. Every firm argue-and lobby that 
stricter environmental laws are full of fine print, loopholes and exceptions. Based on the 
incessant lobbying by these oil and gas firms, these political elites can influence the 
environmental policies to favour the firms as compensation for financing their re-election 
whilst campaigning for political offices. Based on these difficulties inherent in C&C 
regulation that this work subscribes to a stricter environmental liability and regulatory 
approach for mitigating certain classes of risks.  
The risk/segment based strict liability rule is formulated in this research because of the nature 
of shale gas extraction, the fact that the technique of slickwater hydraulic fracking is relatively 
new and as such the industry is still guising some aspects. Also, there is the issue of 
information asymmetry between the defendant operator and the claimant where fracking 
claims come up. This phenomenon makes it difficult for the claimant to prove the negligence 
of the defendant in civil suits to recover in damages. Reason being that most often than not; 
the evidence is destroyed in the accidents or incidents that led to the claimant’s harm. Thus, 
from an equitable stand point the claimant in such position has a lot to grapple with in proving 
the guilt of the defendant. Based on this, it is imperative that the burden of prove ought to 
shift to the defendant-operator in such scenario where evidence might be destroyed in the 
accidents and incidents which created the cause of action in liability suits. 
To justify the need for a risk based strict liability rule, this thesis further identified and 
examined certain available environmental principles including ‘nuisance, trespass law, and 
the res ipsa loquitur’ by distilling their advantages and disadvantages from a legal stand point. 
It also argued vehemently in accordance to the factors enumerated in the Restatement 
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(Second) of Torts of 1979 against the backdrop of energy extractive activities and the risks 
they present in order to see if it is really abnormally dangerous to operate under the present 
circumstance. (See section 5.8-5.8.5 in Chapter V)  This thesis has argued that even if fracking 
is carried out with the utmost care possible, it does not eliminate the occurrence of water 
contamination.730 
Although, this thesis acknowledged that both conventional and unconventional oil and gas 
extraction techniques can lead to water contamination. However, it dissented on the ground 
that water contamination incidents associated with hydraulic fracking technique is abnormal 
because of its increased frequency level of occurrence. Corroborating this assertion based on 
the high degree of risk factor (b) as contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. More so, 
the depths at which fracking take place in some shale plays are remarkably shallower when 
compared to conventional extraction depths.731 Casings and cement works might fail in the 
process of extraction, which may be unknown by operators and residents living around shale 
sites. This failure in casing and poor cement works is just one channel through which water 
contamination can occur. Other sources include spillage from ponds at shale sites due to run 
of water and migration of fracking fluids underground.732 
Therefore, it is the conclusion of this thesis that fracking is not an abnormally dangerous 
activity in its entirety. However, the high risk of water contamination disqualifies the notion 
that fracking is safe and environmentally friendly. To this end, this thesis has provided a valid 
argument to prove that the risk of freshwater and ground water contaminations which fracking 
cause should be subject to a risk based strict liability standard.  
This recommendation for a risk based strict liability rule is key especially as the industry and 
regulatory institutions continue to suggest solutions to improve the energy policy options 
sustainable development and reduce risks levels from energy extractive activities. Strict 
liability becomes imperative to avoid increased clashes from increased fracking, thereby 
creating a strong incentive for fracking to continue by resolving the conflicts over whether 
the benefits of fracking outweigh the disadvantages. Consequently, future contamination will 
be limited. 
On the basis of the factors in the Restatement (Second) of Torts shows that contamination 
threats associated with fracking techniques provokes two necessary elements.733 First, 
whether an activity must necessarily involve a risk of serious harm to the person, land, or 
chattels of others that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care. Second, whether 
such an activity must not be a matter of common usage. Thus, this work has demonstrated 
that the frequency at which these water contaminations take place, makes it a serious risk 
because water is a unique commodity that cannot be short-changed for the temporary benefits 
fracking presents. Accordingly, the technique of fracking is not yet a matter of common usage 
as it is only being used in few countries like USA, Canada while others like the UK, Poland 
and the rest are still making plans.734  Common usage cannot be interpreted only in line with 
‘the nature of activity’ but it also includes the number of locations/countries that adopt such 
a technique to qualify it as being used by the ‘great mass of mankind.   
More so, the cost implication involved in redeeming freshwater contamination is so enormous 
that it would be better that the contamination had not happened in the first place. In fact, it 
                                                          
730Restatement of Torts § 520(B). 
731See supra Gray, W.B & Shimshack, P. (2011) foot note 118. 
732See supra Vengosh, A. et al., (2014) foot note 476. 
733See Restatement of Torts § 520. 
734See supra Kolb, R.W (2014) foot note 290. 
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has been analysed735 that the cost of remediation is equivalent to the cost of adopting other 
best alternatives with huge cost to operate within the industry. From that, this thesis has also 
demonstrated that the phrase ‘cost effective measures’ often used whilst the acquisition of the 
benefits of natural resources is involved, is the root cause of the industry coming up with 
abnormally dangerous techniques amidst better alternatives. Where this is the case, health and 
environmental needs are thereby compromised in the long run. 
Hence, fracking accidents that cause water contamination should be held as unavoidable risk 
as a matter of law. Although, fracking has been a common occurrence in the extraction of oil 
and gas deposits even in conventional wells, slick water hydraulic fracking does not qualify 
under the common usage test under the Restatement Second of Torts736 in that, this technique 
is yet to be understood by the great mass of mankind. Again, examining the cases, an activity 
that cause water contamination harm very frequently is an abnormally dangerous one. This 
suggests therefore that due care cannot eliminate such an activity’s potential for causing harm. 
It would be equitable if an enterprise is held strictly liable on the basis of the risk based strict 
liability model proposed by this research. 
This thesis shows its relevance and contribution to the field of knowledge by formulating 
three additional factors to the already existing six factors enumerated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to ascertain whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. These additional 
factors include: whether an activity’s harm causes a transgenerational impact, the frequency 
of occurrence of accidents that leads to harm and whether there are better alternative 
techniques before operators chose the one in question. Weighing these additional factors to 
fracking’s water contamination risks, it is evident that it clearly falls through on the abnormal 
dangerous activity’s test. The fresh water contamination risk has a transgenerational impact 
because once water is contaminated, it is difficult to reclaim and it is therefore typically 
abandoned.737 Even where it is redeemed, the negative perception of the contamination still 
lingers to the next generation. 
Based on the above analyses, the first sub question of this research which seek to understand 
when is the appropriate time for applying a liability or regulatory tools for mitigating risks 
has been answered too. At this juncture it is pertinent to answer the second sub-question of 
this thesis. This question relates to the need to explore other features that should be included 
in both the risks based strict liability and self-regulatory systems as environmental tools for 
improving effectiveness of environmental regulation. These features are important because 
the public deserves assurance that the full economic, environmental and energy security of 
shale gas extraction will be realised without sacrificing public health, environmental 
protection and safety. Nevertheless, accidents as well as incidents have happened with shale 
gas extraction, and uncertainties about impacts needs to be quantified and clarified. Therefore, 
this research has highlighted innovative policy features as extensively discussed in Chapter 7 
building on Shavell’s proposals for improving the difficulties and limitations in regulation 
and liability systems that govern shale gas development. If these options are implemented, it 
will give the public reason to believe that shale gas resources are being developed in a manner 
that is most beneficial to the nation. 
                                                          
735Amba, O. (2017).  A chemical engineer under the department of petroleum Regulation in the Nigerian 
Regulatory Institution with 12 year experience in oil and gas extraction technique.  
736Restatement (Second) of Torts Act 1979 factor (e). 
737Industry Experts say fracking in the UK reveals that almost all shale gas reserves are located below major water 
aquifers and concludes that due to this it is almost practically impossible to drill for these resources without 
contaminating water. (Illustrating the comments of Dr. John Bloomerfield of the British Geological Survey, 2014). 
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In addition to the problems that confronts both liability and regulation as environmental 
protectionist tools in any given activity, this thesis demonstrated one more reason why C&C 
prescriptive environmental regulation is limited. As part of the way forward, this research 
argued for self-regulatory approach for mitigating risks associated with shale gas development 
as it fosters higher levels of compliance. Self-regulation as an alternative to the prescriptive 
environmental regulation is unique in the sense that it does not shield the operator from 
liability even where they have satisfied all set standards as regulated enterprises are seen as 
the ones taking the shot. Rather, it makes the operator to internalise the cost of his polluting 
activity that have a high degree of occurrence level. From a legal stand point, where 
defendants satisfies all safety standards set for the operation of either an aspect of an activity 
he can be exempted and shielded from liability from an equitable stand point.738  
However, if policy intervention is implemented to promote a self-regulatory model in setting 
best practice requirements for enforcing behavioural change, it will definitely impute liability 
to all defendants in similar industry mix for the consequences of their action. Industry cannot 
no longer argue that they satisfied all standards they themselves have set to govern their 
operations. There is the implied assumption that they are expected to review their conducts 
and standards as they progress in carrying out their activity. By so doing, it is the argument 
of this thesis that it will definitely spur defendant-operators to always set standards that will 
definitely forestall the occurrence of harm or preclude the industry from introducing 
technologies that are not eco-friendly whilst better options exists. 
The information asymmetry as popularized by George Akerlof the renowned economist in his 
paper ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’739 has led 
to this limited effectiveness the field of environmental regulation has witnessed.  
Information asymmetry is otherwise known as imperfect information. It happens when there 
is a difference in access to relevant knowledge. Therefore, the whole essence of this concept 
is the key to managing shale gas development because a good understanding of the concept 
is key to successfully manage and mitigate the relevant risks associated with energy source 
extraction. As operators of dangerous facilities and the potential victims invariably hold 
imperfect information about one another, it creates difficulty in understanding the risks 
involved too. 
Linking this issue to shale gas extraction where a lot of information asymmetry that has made 
regulation quite challenging in that the regulators do not know all that go on underground. 
This, makes role of risk governance, a difficult objective to achieve when private actors have 
better access to information than regulators. Thus, liability is more effectual, all else being 
equal.740 Hence, allowing wrongdoers to escape liability because of information asymmetry 
between the operators and victims can create problems whereby victims are neither aware 
they have been injured, cannot ascertain who is behind their injury, nor cannot acquire 
sufficient proof to substantiate their claim.  
There is also the aspect of cost involved even in situations where such information can be 
obtained. Obtaining such information is difficult especially for widespread harms, like air and 
surface water pollution as already discussed in section 1.6. The challenge to locate and obtain 
                                                          
738Equity sees that as done which ought to be done (illustrating one of the equitable maxims under common law) 
This maxim exists to create exception to the norm 
739See supra Ohio Administrative Code 1501:9-1-02(F) (2014) foot note 618. 
740See Shavell, S. (1984) supra footnote 288 pp.274–76.  
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this type of information is also evident where harms are relatively localised, as in some cases 
of groundwater or soil contamination.  
It is upon these costs, information asymmetry, judgement proof defendant and threat to suit 
problem embedded in regulatory and liability regimes that the work concludes that some of 
the innovative policy intervention option designs for the effective operations of regulatory 
and liability approaches to manage problems of information asymmetry associated with 
energy related development activity and improve the function of liability systems as a 
complement to traditional regulation. These options include the following: information 
disclosure, joint and several liability, polluter does not pay model, insurance and financial 
requirement, shifting the burden of proof rule, appointment of independent well assessor 
policy intervention options. 
It suffice to conclude that the totality of this thesis is to devise a complementary framework 
to C&C regulation for achieving compliance and policy objectives through the properties of 
liability and self-regulatory approach to ensure and promote the effective development of 
shale gas. This is based on the argument that the existing legal regulatory framework 
governing shale gas fracking is still lacking in addressing some of the legal issues highlighted 
in this research. Thus, a one size-fit all style of regulation is far from yielding the degree of 
compliance required from the industry and mitigate the associated risks by transferring the 
liability to the defendant in shale gas civil claims involving water contamination. Water 
contamination risks should be treated as a distinct and separate from other shale gas risks 
because reasonable care cannot easily forestall their frequent level of occurrence considering 
the present wave of technology in place for extracting these resources. Thus, making shale 
gas an abnormally dangerous activity that justifies a risk based strict liability regime for water 
contamination claims.  
Evidently, researchers are currently devising a number of policy interventions that would 
recognize enterprises who developed excellent compliance systems by incentivizing them is 
the best way possible. One of such incentives for compliance could be a reduced burden of 
routine inspections, penalty discounts for minor incidents of non-compliance that do happen, 
simplifying licensing and permits processes, permission to use a label or mark certifying a 
high level of compliance, and indemnities for voluntary disclosure and correction of non-
fraudulent non-compliance. However, one crucial area that will prompt further research is the 
possibility of researchers to develop regulatory strategies that will offer distinct but 
standardized regulatory paths to enterprises with different credentials, characteristics and 
histories of compliance. The combination of instrument mixes that will be offered to 
compliant enterprises would be more flexible and attractive than that levied on the averagely 
compliant enetrprises, while another set of regulatory strategies with greater monitoring and 
reprint requirements might be required for supposed “laggards” or enterprises on “probation” 
after a serious non-compliance episode.741 Another likely future area of research outlook will 
be the role of third parties and civil society in regulation and compliance. Third parties might 
be either persuaded to join the formal regulatory system via government regulation, or be 
responsible for regulatory ordering distinct from or subordinate to government regulation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
741Gunningham, N. & Grabosky, P. (1998). Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
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